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Abstract
We investigate two previously little studied aspects of favor-trading. First, we study whether and how
individuals who stand to gain from favor-trading can best form cooperative relationships in an environment
with private information about each agent’s ability and willingness to do favors. For agents with a low discount
factor (low types) cooperation is not incentive compatible, for agents with a high discount factor (high types)
it is. Both types receive privately observed opportunities to do favors with positive probability each period.
We show high types are always able to separate from low types. Separation is implementable as soon as a high
type receives a favor opportunity if the opportunities are independent across agents. If they are mutually
exclusive, high types continue to separate with probability one if one of the agents is designated to do the first
favor and that agent is a high type. Equilibria that designate an agent to act first implement separation
approximately twice as slowly as symmetric equilibria that task the first high type with opportunity to separate
first. Therefore the latter type of symmetric equilibria may dominate the former type of non-symmetric
equilibria. Second, we study two-player games of favor-trading in a complete information environment
standard to the literature, but in contrast to prominent models of favor-trading to date, we assume agents have
concave utility functions of the form u(x)=x^a; 0
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN FAVOR-TRADING
Simo J. Kalla
Andrew Postlewaite
We investigate two previously little studied aspects of favor-trading. First, we study
whether and how individuals who stand to gain from favor-trading can best form co-
operative relationships in an environment with private information about each agent’s
ability and willingness to do favors. For agents with a low discount factor (low types)
cooperation is not incentive compatible, for agents with a high discount factor (high
types) it is. Both types receive privately observed opportunities to do favors with posi-
tive probability each period. We show high types are always able to separate from low
types. Separation is implementable as soon as a high type receives a favor opportunity
if the opportunities are independent across agents. If they are mutually exclusive, high
types continue to separate with probability one if one of the agents is designated to do
the first favor and that agent is a high type. Equilibria that designate an agent to act first
implement separation approximately twice as slowly as symmetric equilibria that task
the first high type with opportunity to separate first. Therefore the latter type of sym-
metric equilibria may dominate the former type of non-symmetric equilibria. Second,
we study two-player games of favor-trading in a complete information environment
standard to the literature, but in contrast to prominent models of favor-trading to date,
we assume agents have concave utility functions of the form u(x)=xα, 0<α<1, in-
stead of linear utility functions. We characterize equilibria in the concave case and
describe qualitative differences to the linear case. We also construct parametric mod-
els to numerically solve and analyze multi-state equilibria.
v
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Chapter 1
1 IntroductionIntroduction
This dissertation consists of the topical introduction (Chapter 1 ) followed by two essays
on favor-trading: “Favor-trading with Incomplete Information” (Chapter 2), and “Favor-
trading with Concave Utility Functions” (Chapter 3).
People frequently exchange informal services or favors in expectation of future recip-
rocation when these favors are efficient, in that the benefit generated is greater than the cost
of doing favors. When people are able to monitor opportunities by others to reciprocate,
building a long-term relationship based on such exchanges is easily enforced with tit-for-tat
tactics or a threat of a complete end to cooperation. The favor-trading literature on the other
hand focuses on how efficient long-term cooperative relationships can be supported when
the ability of agents to do favors is not perfectly monitored. This literature has furthermore
relied on models with risk-neutral agents and intrinsically efficient favors, in that the costs
involved are smaller than the benefits generated in absolute terms. In chapter 2 we investi-
gate the impact of the possibility of impatient (noncooperative) agents on whether and how
favor-trading relationships can best be maintained. In chapter 3 we drop the assumption
1
of intrinsically efficient favors and linear preferences. Instead, we assign agents concave
utility functions and investigate trade in favors that derive their value from a risk-sharing
function.
Previous research has investigated strategies for favor-trading relationships when each
agent is sufficiently patient to wait for reciprocation. However, suppose the agents do
not know how patient the other is (her discount factor). How should they proceed? A
patient (cooperative) agent may not be willing to do a big favor initially when it is possible
that the other agent is impatient and therefore may not return the favor. Even if she were
known to be patient, it might still be better to wait for her to make the first move unless
the expected payoff was sufficiently large relative to the cost of the initial favor. On the
other hand, proposing a small first favor in return for the promise of bigger future favors
could motivate a generally noncooperative agent to cooperate temporarily only to shirk later
after some big return favors were realized. The question is whether or not some range of
initial favors exists such that they are small enough relative to future promises to convince
a patient agent to act first, but large enough that an impatient agent would be deterred from
mimicking the patient agent? Alternatively, could the two agents flip a coin to decide who
acts first? This would eliminate the temptation to wait for the other agent to make the first
move, but it would roughly double the expected time to the first agreed favor. Finally, how
does the distribution of the favor making opportunities affect the potential for cooperative
relationships?
We take as our benchmark a streamlined version of the favor-trading model by Abdulka-
dirog˘lu and Bagwell [1] (AB hereafter). In this model favors are efficient so agents can
form mutually beneficial favor-trading relationships provided they are sufficiently patient.
Opportunities to do favors, or favor opportunities for short, arrive with some probability
each period, but their arrival is only observed by the agent who receives the opportunity
to do a costly favor. She then decides whether or not to do the favor. Since reciprocation
2
cannot be conditioned on the arrival of favor opportunities, it must be conditioned on past
behavior or some form of a balance of previously exchanged favors. For example, consider
the following form of favor-trading known as equality matching. One agent is exogenously
designated as an advantaged agent, the other as a disadvantaged agent. The disadvantaged
agent owes the advantaged agent a favor. Once this favor is done, the roles are reversed and
the new advantaged agent simply waits until she receives a return favor, and so forth. This
is the simplest form of favor-trading and the easiest to enforce.
However, the exogenous designation of the advantaged and disadvantaged agent in AB
[1] would exclude equilibria of interest to us. To see why first note that in equality matching
the disadvantaged agent’s incentive to do a favor is to receive future favors. If she does not
do the favor, she will never receive favors herself. Now suppose the designation was not
exogenous. Suppose instead the agents started as equals, and the first one to do a favor
would become the first advantaged agent. Suppose further that an agent believes the other
will do the first favor, opportunity allowing. If the agent under this belief receives the
first favor opportunity herself, she would have two choices. Choice one would be to do
a favor, incur a cost, become advantaged and receive a favor in return the next time the
other agent receives a favor opportunity followed by the usual equality matching endgame.
Choice two would be to do no favor, incur no cost and receive a favor anyway the next
time the other agent receives a favor opportunity followed by the usual equality matching
endgame. Clearly choice two is always better, regardless how patient the agents are, since
the benefit is the same but with no cost. Since we consider equilibria in which agents are not
exogenously designated as advantaged and disadvantaged, we have to consider additional
incentives for an agent to act first even with complete information, that is both agents are
known to be patient. To this end we need to consider strategies such that first agent to act
only does a small favor in return for larger future favors.
Another reason to start with small favors specific to our model is uncertainty about
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whether the opposing agent is patient or impatient. Regardless of the endgame, the first
agent to do a sufficiently large favor to identify herself as patient also takes the risk that her
partner is impatient and will not reciprocate. If the endgame consists of equality matching,
only a patient agent will reciprocate because patient agents are defined as those who benefit
from equality matching, impatient agents are defined as those who do not. Hence equality
matching is an effective way to deter impatient agents frommasquerading as patient agents.
The problem is finding a smaller first favor to trigger an equality matching endgame. If it
is too small relative to the expected reciprocation, an impatient agent with opportunity will
have incentive to mimic a patient agent by doing the small first favor herself and thereby
rendering the described strategy for separation ineffective.
Equilibria of greater value than equality matching do exist in most favor-trading games.
For example, Mo¨bius [12] (2001) studies equilibria in which agents may do multiple con-
secutive favors without reciprocation before suspending cooperation. In equality matching
cooperation is suspended after just one favor. Since favors are efficient, equilibria that
implement multiple consecutive favors generally dominate equality matching. Hauser and
Hopenhayn [8] (2005) and AB [1] (first draft in 2004) also construct equilibria that domi-
nate equality matching by use of multiple consecutive favors, but they use favors of varying
sizes. These equilibria are also more attractive to an impatient player than equality match-
ing. If she can mimic a patient agent with a small initial favor, she could receive multiple
favors in return rather than just the one in equality matching. Hence her incentive to mimic
patient agents would be higher and separation would be more difficult. That is why we
focus on equality matching to implement separation. However, we also show that the more
efficient equilibria are implementable either immediately or after some time is first spent
equality matching to deter impatient agents.
The distribution of favor opportunities, is important in the incomplete information ver-
sion of favor-trading even though the complete information models are generally robust
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to the arrival process of favor opportunities. For example, in Hauser and Hopenhayn [8]
favor opportunities are independent across agents while in AB [1] they are mutually ex-
clusive, yet both models find qualitatively similar equilibria. Case in point, both exhibit
debt forgiveness, that is favors owed depreciate over time, which gives agents an incentive
to continue doing small favors even when reciprocation has not been received for previous
favors. With incomplete information the distribution of favor opportunities is important be-
cause it affects agents’ beliefs. The more pessimistic an agent grows the smaller the initial
favor she is willing to do to identify herself as the patient type. If favor opportunities are
independent, both agents grow pessimistic at the same rate over time as no one does a favor.
If the opportunities are mutually exclusive, agents may grow pessimistic at different rates
if one or both of them ignore opportunities to do favors. We analyze favor-trading under
both an independent and a mutually exclusive favor opportunity distribution to understand
how the choice of favor distribution impacts the ability of patient agents to set themselves
apart from the impatient agents.
Our main result is that patient agents are always able to distinguish themselves from
impatient agents at the first available opportunity if favor opportunities are independent.
This can be accomplished by symmetric strategies such that a patient agent does a small
favor at first available opportunity, the recipient of such a favor reciprocates with a larger
or full favor if she is patient, and they subsequently form an equality matching relationship.
However, both agents grow more pessimistic about the other’s type as time goes by with no
favor done, so the first favor they are willing to do to prove that they are cooperative must be
decreasing over time. This introduces an inefficiency into the relationship because smaller
favors are less efficient than larger ones, and may lead to equality matching relationships
of lesser value. A way for patient agents to separate without this inefficiency is for them
to flip a coin or otherwise choose one of them at the beginning of the game to do the first
favor. This strategy leads to separation approximately twice as slowly as the symmetric
5
strategies, but since the agent chosen to do the first favor does not grow pessimistic over
time about the other agent’s type, the first favor also does not have to be decreasing over
time nor does the value of the equality matching endgame that follows if both agents are
cooperative.
If favor opportunities are mutually exclusive achieving separation is more difficult.
Designating one of the agents to act first continues to work in the same manner as in the
independent case, but symmetric strategies are more problematic. In particular, for any
proposed size first favor, no matter how small, it is only a matter of time before a patient
agent would grow too pessimistic to do it. On the other hand, an impatient agent would
not grow significantly more pessimistic if she received a large enough share of the favor
opportunities. In such a case she would be willing to do the initial favor, if small enough,
to mimic a patient agent in and receive a large return favor. Hence the possibility of im-
patient agents mimicking patient agents can only be deterred for a fixed time in the above
described symmetric equilibria if favor opportunities are mutually exclusive. Despite this
difficulty with symmetric equilibria, we show that they are more efficient at times than
equilibria that designate one of the agents to do the first favor. An important consequence
of this result is that more information (mutually exclusive favor opportunities) may lead to
a worse outcome.
Our model also has the broad characteristic that agents first start small while they are
uncertain about the other agent’s type, but build up to more profitable relationships once
each of them has demonstrated she is sufficiently patient. Watson [19] (1999) found a qual-
itatively similar result in a prisoner’s dilemma model with both ’good’ and bad’ types of
agents. However, his model differs from ours in that he assumes deviations from coopera-
tive behavior are publicly observable, whereas we do not.
Chapter 3 is presented in part as a discussion paper and in part as an empirical (nu-
merical simulations) component for solving favor-trading equilibria. Our motivating ob-
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servation is that to date prominent models of favor-trading have assumed agents have linear
preferences (linear favor-trading models). In chapter 3, informal favor-trading is considered
to be a form of insurance. We study agents with concave utility functions (concave favor-
trading models), and favors that derive their value from risk sharing. With concave utility
functions that offer sufficiently high marginal returns at the start and low marginal returns
at the end, agents can beneficially exchange favors at some level for any discount factors.
This is in contrast to the linear favor-trading models, in which the incentive compatibility
of favors traded in certain equilibria is independent of the size of the favors because agents
are essentially risk-neutral with respect to favors.
Furthermore, we show qualitative differences in some types of equilibria. For example,
if utility functions are linear and agents’ discount factors are just large enough to satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraint for the simplest form of favor-trading called equality
matching (an agent does one favor, waits until reciprocation, then another, and so forth),
the best the agents can do is to equality match full favors. If the same agents have concave
utility functions, we show that the equivalent equality matching equilibria are dominated
by equilibria involving a smaller than full first favor, which will be followed by a small sec-
ond favor even if reciprocation has not yet been received (multi-state equality matching).
Consequently, the assumption of linear preferences drives some of the results in prominent
favor-trading models. The rest of chapter generalizes multi-state equality matching equi-
libria. We also define infinite state equality matching, but argue against their efficiency.
A key component of chapter 3 is the construction of two parametric models to numer-
ically analyze multi-state equilibria specifically, but these techniques may be of interest
for investigating other favor-trading problems or applied game theory problems in general.
The first model simulates a large sample of games for a given set of parameters, derives
payoff functions from the simulation results, then optimizes these functions to solve for
the optimal strategy. The second model solves directly the system of simultaneous pay-
7
off equations associated with an equality matching game, and uses the results to find the
optimal strategy. We use these models to compute a large set of solutions spanning the pa-
rameter space and interpolate the general equilibrium characteristics from these data points.
We also construct a model with favor-depreciation and compare our preliminary results to
multi-state equality matching. Most of the results in chapter 3 are presented as conjectures
because they are based on numerical results rather than closed-form proofs. We support
them with a number of plots and tables that illustrate our findings for data points that span
the parameter space. However, we could not carry out asymptotic analysis as numerical
models tend to fail at the boundaries.
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Chapter 2
2 Favor-trading with Incomplete InformationFavor-trading it Incomplete Information
2.1 Introduction
This chapter studies whether and how individuals who stand to gain from trading favors
can best form cooperative relationships in an environment with private information about
each player’s ability and willingness to do favors. Previous models in the favor-trading
literature focused on optimizing favor-trading relationships under complete information.
This chapter introduces incomplete information about player types. The central question
addressed is whether cooperation can be maintained in favor-trading relationships after
the introduction of non-cooperative players into the pool of potential trading partners, and
if so how can the cooperative players separate themselves most efficiently from the non-
cooperative types.
For the purposes of this dissertation favor-trading is considered to be non-monetary
trade in goods, services or opportunities and favors are assumed to be efficient. The model
contains a positive measure of players with a low discount factor (low types) who do not
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find cooperation beneficial, and a positive measure of players with a high discount factor
(high types) who do. Players receive opportunities to do favors for each other (favor op-
portunities) according to either a mutually exclusive or independent distribution, but these
opportunities are private information.
As an example, consider a firm with several parallel divisions that function indepen-
dently under separate managers. Suppose two new managers have been recruited to head
the marketing and finance divisions, respectively. Each manager’s job is to maximize pro-
ductivity within her own division, but every once in a while one of the managers receives a
new idea or opportunity that would be beneficial for her division but even more beneficial
for the neighboring division. Monetary side payments are not allowed, but reciprocation in
similar favors can provide a basis for mutual gains if both managers are sufficiently patient.
However, the managers do not know each other’s discount factor, which in this example
could be interpreted as the likelihood of staying with the firm long-term. So how should
the managers proceed?
The main result in this chapter is that the high type players are almost always able to
separate themselves from the low type players at the first available opportunity by using an
“equality matching” (EM) mechanism if opportunities to do favors arrive independently.
EM simply means that each agent waits for reciprocation of a previous favor before do-
ing the next one. In the case of mutually exclusive favor opportunities, separation is still
guaranteed for high types with probability one if one of the players is designated to do
the first favor, and separation will occur as soon as the designated player receives a favor
opportunity, assuming she is a high type.
However, such strategies induce separation only half as quickly (roughly speaking) as
strategies that call for the first player to receive a favor opportunity to do the first favor,
and hence separate if she is a high type. In equilibria based on such symmetric strategies,
separation is only guaranteed with probability one under independent favor opportunities,
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but not under mutually exclusive favor opportunities. The paper establishes a bound on the
number of periods in the mutually exclusive favor opportunity case during which the low
types will not mimic the high types with positive probability. An important consequence
of this result is that more information (mutually exclusive favor opportunities) leads to a
worse outcome.
The paper also compares the equilibria involving a designated first favor maker (DFFM
equilibria) to equilibria characterized by symmetric strategies (SS equilibria) and finds that
either may dominate depending on the parameter values. Numerical results suggest that SS
equilibria dominate DFFM equilibria in cases involving relatively impatient agents likely
to receive favor opportunities early on, whereas DFFM equilibria dominate when agents
are very patient, but the probability of receiving favor opportunities is low. To see why,
consider the case of mutually exclusive favor opportunities and suppose the probability of
receiving an opportunity to do a favor is approximately one half. Then it is almost certain
that one of the two agents will receive a favor opportunity during the first period, and
therefore under a symmetric strategy for signaling type, separation will almost certainly
occur during the first period, which is all the more important for relatively impatient high
type players eager to gain from the benefits of an EM endgame. Designating one of the
two players to do the first favor would halve the chance of separation in the first period,
which is all the more costly when the high type players are impatient to begin a cooperative
relationship.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the model and our
equilibrium concepts including how key concepts from AB [1] translate to our streamlined
version of their model and how other favor-trading literature relates to this paper. In section
2.3 we analyze the case of a patient agent facing an unknown type, and investigate how the
two can best form a favor-trading relationship. In section 2.4 we analyze the case of two
unknown type agents when opportunities to do favors are mutually exclusive. In this section
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our focus is on the existence of separating equilibria, and how best to separate into the case
analyzed in one-sided incomplete information case analyzed in the previous section. In
section 2.5 we extend the analysis to the independent favor opportunity case, and compare
the results to the case of mutually exclusive opportunities. Section 2.6 concludes chapter
2. An appendix follows and the bibliography is at the end of the dissertation.
2.2 The Model
Consider the earlier motivating example: A firm has several parallel divisions that function
independently under separate managers. Suppose two new managers have been recruited to
head the marketing and finance divisions, respectively. Each manager’s job is to maximize
productivity within her own division, but every once in a while one of the managers receives
an opportunity to help the other division at a cost to her own. The ability or opportunity to
help is private information, but when possible the cost is known to be less than the benefit.
Monetary side payments are not allowed, but reciprocation in similar favors can provide
a basis for mutual gains if both managers are sufficiently patient. But the managers do
not know how patient the other is, or how likely she is to stay with the firm long-term. To
address whether and how they can form a cooperative relationship we analyze the following
formal model.
Two agents, a and b, are randomly picked from a population with μo ∈ (0, 1) of high
types with discount factor δH and 1 − μo of low types with discount factor δL. Each
agent has utility function u(x) = x. They play an infinitely repeated stage game with the
following structure. At the beginning of each period nature allocates an opportunity to
do a favor (favor opportunity) according to either a mutually exclusive or an independent
distribution. Under a mutually exclusive distribution either agent a or b receives a favor
opportunity with equal probability, p ∈ (0, 1/2), or neither does with probability 1 − 2p.
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Under the independent distribution each agent receives a favor opportunity with probability
p ∈ (0, 1). Favor opportunities are private information. An agent who receives a favor
opportunity may either keep it private and incur no cost, or do a full or partial favor of size
x, y ∈ (0, 1], for agents a and b, respectively, at a cost equal to the size. The benefit to the
recipient is ky or kx, for agents a and b, respectively, where k > 1. For example, if agent
a does a favor of size x, flow payoffs to (a, b) are (1− x, kx). Favors, including their size,
are public information. The stage game is repeated in each subsequent period.
To see how favor-trading works consider the following game called equality matching
(EM). In EM of level z ∈ (0, 1], one agent is called advantaged, the other disadvantaged.
The disadvantaged agent is said to owe the advantaged agent a favor of size z. If the disad-
vantaged agent does a favor of size z, she becomes advantaged and the other disadvantaged.
If she does no favor, she remains disadvantaged. Favors of size other than z are not part of
equilibrium play and can be deterred by Nash reversion. When z = 1, the game is called
full equality matching.
For the moment, consider a game of full equality matching between two high types
in a complete information environment. Suppose agent a is disadvantaged, b advantaged.
Let (uem, uˉem) denote the average discounted payoffs expected by agents (a, b), or more
generally by disadvantaged and advantaged agents, respectively. Let σem (uem, uˉem) =
(σaem (uem, uˉem) , σ
b
em (uem, uˉem)) denote the EM strategy profile that implements the pay-
off pair (uem, uˉem). Under σem the payoffs are
uem = pδ
H uˉem + (1− p)δHuem, (1)
uˉem = p
(
1− δH + δH uˉem
)
+ p
(
(1− δH)k + δHuem
)
+ (1− 2p)δH uˉem. (2)
The first equation consists of two events: (i) with probability p agent a receives a favor
opportunity, does a full favor (x = 1), and becomes the advantaged agent; that is, agent
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a is promised continuation payoff uˉem, (ii) with probability (1 − p) agent a receives no
favor opportunity so her flow payoff is zero and her continuation promise remains uem
along with her disadvantaged status. The equation for payoff uˉem consists of three events
that occur with probabilities p, p and (1 − 2p), respectively: (i) agent b receives a favor
opportunity, does no favor and receives a flow payoff of 1 instead, and her continuation
promise remains uˉem as she is still advantaged, (ii) agent a receives a favor opportunity,
does a full favor (x = 1) so agent b receives a flow payoff of k, but her continuation payoff
drops to uem because she now owes agent a the next favor, and (iii) neither agent receives a
favor opportunity, so agent b’s flow payoff is zero and her continuation payoff remains uˉem.
The two previous equations contain two unknowns, uem and uˉem, solving for these yields
uem =
δHp2 (1 + k)
1− δH(1− 2p) , (3)
uˉem =
p
(
1− δH(1− p)) (1 + k)
1− δH(1− 2p) . (4)
For the simple EM strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) in each stage game,
neither agent can have a profitable deviation available to them. It is trivial that the advan-
taged agent has no profitable deviations as she just waits for reciprocation, but does no
favors. Public (observable) off-equilibrium path deviations, such as the advantaged agent
doing a favor or one of the agents doing the wrong size favor, can easily be deterred by
threat of autarky (no more favors). Therefore, we only need to check that it is not profitable
for the disadvantaged agent to do no favor despite receiving a favor opportunity. As usual,
it is enough to consider a one-shot deviation. Agent a’s discount factor has to be high
enough that the incentive compatibility constraint below is satisfied.
ICCaem : δ
H uˉem ≥ 1− δH + δHuem
⇐⇒ uˉem − uem ≥
(
1− δH) /δH .
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Using equations (3) and (4), ICCaem may be written as
p(1−δH(1−p))(1+k)
1−δH(1−2p) − δ
Hp2(1+k)
1−δH(1−2p) − 1−δ
H
δH
≥ 0
⇐⇒ 1−δH
δH(1−δH(1−2p))
(
δHp (k − 1)− (1− δH)) ≥ 0.
It follows δH ∈ (0, 1)must satisfy δHp (k − 1)−(1− δH) ≥ 0 for ICCaem to hold. Solving
δHp (k − 1) − (1− δH) ≥ 0 for δH yields δH ≥ 1
1+p(k−1) = δ
∗
. We use this boundary
discount factor to define high and low type agents.
Condition (5): δH ≥ δ∗ := 1
1 + p (k − 1) > δ
L. (5)
Any observable deviation from the equilibrium path can be deterred by the threat of
reversion to autarky. It is also easy to verify that uem = p for δH = δ∗ so the individual
rationality constraints of uˉem, uem ≥ p are satisfied. Therefore, this EM strategy profile
is a Nash equilibrium. In fact, we could use the stronger equilibrium concept of public
perfect equilibrium (PPE) following Fudenberg, Levine andMaskin.[5] A strategy for agent
i ∈ {a, b} is public if it depends only on her current period private information, in this case
whether or not the agent received a favor opportunity, and the public history, which for this
game consists of public favors done up to and including the last period. A PPE is a profile
of public strategies that form a Nash equilibrium for each period and the corresponding
public history.
Since the payoff pair (uem, uˉem) is enforceable (implementable), it follows by symme-
try that (uˉem, uem) is also enforceable, and therefore any utility pair on the line connecting
(uem, uˉem) and (uˉem, uem) is enforceable with the use of a public randomization device.
AB [1] aptly call these PPE with current and continuation payoffs restricted onto a sym-
metric line, symmetric self-generating line (SSGL) equilibria. The details of SSGL and the
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corresponding equilibria will be explained in more detail in the next two subsections. For
now it suffices to say that AB [1] solve for the highest such line; the highest symmetric
self-generating line (HSSGL) and they show that condition (5) is exactly the right bound
necessary to implement HSSGL equilibria. In fact, the simple EM mechanism is a HSSGL
equilibrium for δH = δ∗. In the case where δH > δ∗, we may use the extra wiggle room to
obtain a higher total payoff (and thus a higher SSGL) by requiring the advantaged agent to
make further small favors while she waits for reciprocation from the disadvantaged agent.1
Observe that for the first-best outcome both agents would have to exhibit full trust in
terms of x and y. AB [1] (p. 12) call x + y the level of trust. Agent a (b) is said to
exhibit more trust if x > y (y > x). However, if both agents exhibit full trust every period
regardless of history, neither agent has any incentive to do costly favors. Thus the first-best
outcome cannot be achieved. However, on the HSSGL line, the level of trust is maximized
subject to the restriction that continuation payoffs are picked from the same HSSGL.
It is perhaps natural to wonder if it is incentive compatible for low types to trade smaller
favors, that is, to cooperate on a lower SSGL. It is not. Decreasing the size of favors and re-
peating the analysis for the EMmechanism shows that discount factors above or equal to δ∗
are still necessary to sustain cooperation. Furthermore, cooperation on a lower line would
be less efficient. The discount factor required to support EM equilibria is independent of
favor size because agents have linear utility functions. They are effectively risk neutral with
respect to the size of favors. In terms of the mathematics, the lower cost of smaller favors
is directly proportional by factor one to the resulting lower continuation payoffs. A formal
proof will follow after we first introduce additional notation. For future reference, let σem(z)
denote the EM strategy profile when the size of exchanged favors is z ∈ (0, 1]. Let uˉem(z)
1AB also constructed other types of equilibria that may lead to higher or lower total payoffs than HSSGL
equilibria depending on the parameter values. However, we concentrate on HSSGL equilibria because they
always exist if condition (5) is satisfied, and loosely speaking outperform other types of equilibria when p is
not very high.
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and uem(z) denote respective continuation payoffs for advantaged and disadvantaged agent.
Unless otherwise noted, we use EM to refer to matching of full favors, or simply full EM.
2.2.1 Summary of notation and structure
The notation that follows is necessary to formally define the equilibrium profiles we will
use in the sections that follow, but we present it in a format well-suited for reference.
Payoffs are in average discounted values.
Model parameters:
i ∈ {a, b} : Agents.
ωi ∈ {L,H} : Agent i’s type; L = low, H = high.
p ∈ (0, 1) : Probability agent i ∈ {a, b} receives a favor opportunity.
Opportunities are either mutually exclusive or independent.
k > 1 : Benefit per unit of favor.
δi ∈ (0, 1) : Discount factor of agent i ∈ {a, b}.
μo ∈ (0, 1) : Fraction of high type agents in population.
Actions:
x, y ∈ [0, 1] : Size of favor by agents a, b, respectively.
Payoffs:
(u, v) : Current payoffs to agents (a, b).
(uo, vo) : Continuation payoffs to (a, b) when no one does a favor.
(ui, vi) : Continuation payoffs to (a, b) when i ∈ {a, b} does a favor.
Table 1: Summary of notation
2.2.1.1 Information structure: Let t = 1, 2, . . . denote the time index. Let wit = 1 if
agent i receives a favor opportunity in period t and 0 otherwise. Agent i privately observes
W it = {wiz}tz=1. Let τt = (x, y) denote favors (x, y) ∈ (0, 1]2 agents a and b, respectively,
do in period t. If neither agent does a favor, then let τt = 0. Both agents observe Tt =
{τz}tz=1. Private history of agent i and public history up to and including period t are
denoted by hit = W it ∈ Hit and Ht = Tt ∈ Ht, respectively. A strategy for agent i,
denoted by σi, consists of a favor making decision, I it , for each period based on i’s type,
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her private history up to period t, and public history up to period t − 1. More formally,
I it : {H,L} ×Hit ×Ht−1 → [0, 1] s.t. I it = 0 when wit = 0.
2.2.2 Strategies and equilibrium concepts
For our solution concept we will use Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). PBE consist of
a strategy profile
(
σ =
(
σa, σb
))
and a belief system
(
μ =
(
μa, μb
))
such that σ is sequen-
tially rational with respect to μ and μ is consistent with σ. That is, the strategies are optimal
at every stage of the game given the beliefs, and the beliefs are updated according to Bayes’
rule from equilibrium strategies and observed actions. We should, strictly speaking, also
specify beliefs for off-equilibrium path actions, however, we deter these actions with the
threat of autarky play, which is always an equilibrium response, so it is understood that be-
liefs consistent with autarky exist and would be straightforward if burdensome to specify.
Therefore we generally leave out off-equilibrium path beliefs from our belief functions.
But this brings us to the following two definitions.
Definition 2.1 Let σiaut be such that I it = 0, ∀t.
Definition 2.2 Let H∗t be the set of all public on-equilibrium path histories up to and in-
cluding period t.
For example, if two agents are playing a full equality matching game and agent a is
the initial disadvantaged agent, any history such that agent b did the first favor, one of the
agents did two consecutive favors, or a partial favor, would not be inH∗t . However, histories
that include only private deviations, that is, a disadvantaged agent does not do a favor when
she has the opportunity, would still be inH∗t . Next, let us define EM formally.
Definition 2.3 An equality matching strategy at level z ∈ (0, 1] for agent i, denoted by
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σiem(z) or simply σiem when z = 1, is such that
I it =
 z if agent i is disadvantaged, w
i
t = 1 and ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1,
0 otherwise.
Lemma 2.4 (Necessary and sufficient condition for EM) δH ≥ δ∗ = 1
1+p(k−1) is neces-
sary and sufficient to implement σem(z), ∀z ∈ (0, 1] in a complete information environment.
Proof. In appendix.
While EM is generally not the most efficient way to trade favors, the first best outcome
is not enforceable, and in the AB [1] model, the second best outcome may be intractable.
Presumably that is why AB [1] focused on PPE restricted to symmetric lines rather than to
the whole space of feasible and individually rational payoffs. While our primary interest
is to implement separation efficiently, rather than to optimize subsequent endgames, we do
argue that after separation into an EM game, high types can achieve equilibria of higher
value. To this end, we explain AB’s highest symmetric self-generating line (HSSGL) equi-
librium concept [1] as it applies to our version of their model. While we do not repeat their
proofs, we do provide a basic explanation of how these results were obtained because our
model is sufficiently different that a direct transition of results from AB [1] would not be
immediate or even possible. Later we show formally that a pair of high types can move to
a HSSGL equilibrium after equality matching for long enough.
Definition 2.5 A self-generating line (SGL) is a line in the payoff space such that any
payoffs (u, v) on the line may be implemented using some actions (x, y) and continuation
payoffs (ui, vi, uo, vo) subject to ui + vi = T and uo + vo = T for i ∈ {a, b}. A symmetric
self-generating line is a SGL such that (u, uˉ) → (uˉ, u), and the highest symmetric self-
generating line (HSSGL) is a symmetric SGL such that T is maximized [1] (p. 12).
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The HSSGL equilibria are PPE restricted to symmetric lines. As is normal in the lit-
erature, AB [1] use the recursive approach introduced by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [2]
(APS). Let operator B produce the largest self-generating set of PPE values, Ψ∗.2 Then for
any set Ψ ⊂ R2, let B(Ψ) = {(u, v) ∈ Ψ : ∃ (ui, vi) ∈ Ψ, i ∈ {a, b} ; (uo, vo) ∈ Ψ; x, y ∈
[0, 1], s.t. (6)-(10) below are satisfied}. [1] (p. 10-11). In autarky each agent’s payoff is p,
so the individual rationality constraints are the following:
IR : u, v, ui, vi, uo, vo ≥ p. (6)
The relevant incentive compatibility constraints for agents a and b state that when the agent
has an opportunity to do a favor, the flow payoff, which reflects the cost of the favor, and
the continuation promise for doing the favor exceed the flow payoff without cost and the
continuation payoff when neither agent does a favor:
ICCax :
(
1− δH) (1− x) + δHua ≥ (1− δH)+ δHuo, (7)
ICCby :
(
1− δH) (1− y) + δHvb ≥ (1− δH)+ δHvo. (8)
The current period payoffs u and v must be consistent with the flow payoffs and the con-
tinuation promises consisting of three possible outcomes: either agent i receives a favor
opportunity and does a favor for j, agent j receives a favor opportunity and does a favor for
i, or neither agent receives a favor opportunity:
u = p
((
1− δH) (1− x) + δHua)+ p ((1− δH) ky + δHub)+ (1− 2p)δHuo, (9)
v = p
((
1− δH) (1− y) + δHvb)+ p ((1− δH) kx + δHva)+ (1− 2p)δHvo. (10)
2To this end, assume that observable off-equilibrium path deviations, such as a favor of different size from
the on-equilibrium path favor, will be punished with reversion to autarky. Thus, the only relevant deviations
for the following analysis will be on-equilibrium path deviations, namely deviations that are not observable
to one of the agents.
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By restricting their analysis onto symmetric lines, AB [1] essentially reduce the prob-
lem to starting with the full EM profile, σem, and solving for the highest enforceable favor
by the advantaged agent, that is a favor that makes her incentive compatibility problem
bind, and all continuation payoffs must be chosen from the same symmetric line. That way
the value of the game remains the same regardless of who, if anyone, does a favor. In par-
ticular, AB [1] (p. 24-25) provide the equivalent of the following characterization of their
HSSGL equilibrium, which implies that the corner payoff pair, (u, uˉ), can be implemented
with (x, y, ua, ub, uo, va, vb, vo), such that
x = 1, y = δ
H−δ∗
δH+δ∗ , (11)
ua = u + (1 + y)
1−δH
δH
= uˉ, ub = u, uo = u + y
1−δH
δH
, (12)
va = u, vb = uˉ, vo = uˉ− y 1−δHδH , (13)
u = p + y (p (k − 1) + 1) = p + δH−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1
δ∗ , (14)
uˉ = pk − y = u + 2(1−δ
H)
δH+δ∗ . (15)
and by the threat of autarky if one of the agents publicly deviates off-equilibrium path.
The other corner payoff pair, (uˉ, u), can be implemented symmetrically. It then follows
that any payoff pair (u, v) between (u, uˉ) and (uˉ, u) may be implemented with a public
randomization device at the start of the game. Call this strategy profile σhssgl(u, v).
In a 2005 version of their paper, AB [1] further calculate a deterministic algorithm to
enforce σhssgl(u, v). From the corner solution we know the total trust, x + y = 2δ
H
δH+δ∗ , and
the total payoff, T = u + v = 2p + 2δ
Hp(k−1)
δH+δ∗ , ∀x, y, u, v on the HSSGL. We also have the
corner point values, (u, uˉ) and (uˉ, u), defined by (14) and (15), that are necessary for use
as maximal rewards to implement any HSSGL equilibria. In fact, we know that ua = u +
(x + y)1−δ
H
δH
= uˉ, ub = u, va = u and vb = uˉ. The incentive compatibility constraints must
also bind, so we can use identities mentioned previously, along with (binding) equations
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(7)-(10) to calculate x, y, uo and vo required to implement any payoff pair (u, v) on the
HSSGL defined by (u, uˉ) and (uˉ, u). Our equivalents of AB’s equations [1] are stated
below without proof:3
x = δ
Hδ∗
1−δH
[
v−(1−δH)p
δH
− u
]
, y = δ
Hδ∗
1−δH
[
u−(1−δH)p
δH
− u
]
, (16)
uo = δ
∗
[
u−(1−δH)p
δH
+ u(1−δ
∗)
δ∗
]
, vo = δ
∗
[
v−(1−δH)p
δH
+ u(1−δ
∗)
δ∗
]
. (17)
2.2.3 Previous favor-trading literature
Mo¨bius [12] first investigated the type of 2-player favor-trading games we study (2001),
albeit with complete information and continuous time. He focused on an intuitive “chips
mechanism.” That is, each player begins with K chips, and each time an agent does a favor,
she earns a chip. If one agent accumulates all 2K chips, she suspends favors until recipro-
cation. EM is effectively a chips game with only one chip held by the advantaged agent.
Hauser and Hopenhayn [8] continue Mo¨bius’ [12] favor-trading research by allowing par-
tial favors (2005). Consequently, they let the cost of favors vary based on public history of
favor exchanges, notably including time passed since the last exchange. They characterize
a set of Pareto optimal PPE, and show numerically that partial favors lead to significant
efficiency gains over Mo¨bius’ chips mechanism. [12] Their findings display similar char-
acteristics to HSSGL equilibria formulated by AB [1] in discrete time (first draft in 2004).
Both Hauser and Hopenhayn [8] and AB [1] use PPE as their solution concept and allow
partial favors. Both find equilibria that call for larger favors to be followed by unlimited
smaller favors until reciprocation. This is in contrast to Mo¨bius who assumed favors were
3A strategy profile σ(u, v) that begins at time t ∈ N, denotes a strategy profile σ that implements expected
payoffs (u, v) at that time. However, σ will not implement (u, v) every period after t. The payoffs to be
implemented each period depend on the history and σ. For example, σhssgl(u, uˉ) at t = 1, denotes a HSSGL
strategy profile that at the beginning of period 1 is expected to generate payoffs (u, uˉ). If neither agent does
a favor in the first period, σhssgl is expected to yield payoffs (uo (u, uˉ) , vo (u, uˉ)) at the beginning of period
2, where uo and vo are given by the last equation above for u = u and v = uˉ.
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all the same size, and an agent would suspend favors whenever she was owed 2K favors.
Both Hauser and Hopenhayn [8] and AB [1] discover what the former call “debt forgive-
ness.” That is, the value of favors owed declines; debt is forgiven, unless “interest” in the
form of small favors is “paid” by the advantaged agent.
Therefore it seems that favor-trading in a complete information environment is robust to
the model’s timing structure (continuous versus discrete) and the arrival process of favors
(independent versus mutually exclusive). We show that with incomplete information, the
more efficient equilibria characterized by multiple consecutive favors are initially precluded
by the possibility of low types, but can always be achieved over time between high types.
We also show that the distribution of the arrival process of favors plays an important role
in strategies for separation. Furthermore, independent favor opportunities in discrete time
raise the possibility of both agents having the opportunity to do a favor for at the same time.
This possibility has not been studied in previous favor-trading models.
A notable difference between Hauser and Hopenhayn [8] and AB [1] is that AB in-
clude opportunities for immediate reciprocity with private information. However, AB [1]
show that immediate reciprocity is unnecessary for HSSGL equilibria, which is why our
streamlined version of their model does not include it. Further, AB [1] describe favor op-
portunities as income shocks, and favors as investments. We dropped this terminology
because favor-trading precludes side payments, and we felt that using monetary language
to discuss the topic confused the issue. We also normalized payoffs to average discounted
values for convenience.
Outside of the favor-trading literature, Watson [19] did study the sustainability of coop-
eration using a two-player infinitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma model with incomplete
information about agents’ types. However, in his model deviations from cooperative be-
havior are publicly observable, whereas in favor-trading games only cooperative actions
are observable, and deviations are private Still, both models have the broad characteristic
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that agents start cooperation with small stakes, but form more profitable relationships over
time if each agent proves her willingness to cooperate.
2.3 One-sided incomplete information
For the rest of this section, we consider the case of mutually exclusive favor opportunities,
with one known agent; a is a high type, and one unknown agent; b is a high type with
probability μo, and a low type with probability 1− μo.
2.3.1 Separation with equality matching (EM) equilibria
A low type agent b facing a high type agent a would prefer to be seen as a high type in
order to receive favors from a even though she would not reciprocate. The high type wants
to separate herself from the low type as soon as possible and exchange favors with a. The
question is whether a separating equilibrium exists, and if so, how quickly and efficiently
can a high type separate?
The answer to the first part should be clear if we consider the EM strategy profile,
σem(z)
(
uˉem(z), uem(z)
)
, discussed in section 2. Recall that the necessary and sufficient con-
dition for agent b to benefit from EM is δb ≥ δ∗. It follows immediately that a high type
may separate as soon as she receives a favor opportunity by doing a favor of size z. Call
this immediate separation, that is, separation at first possible opportunity. To formalize this
answer, we first have to define beliefs.
Definition 2.6 μ ≡ μt ≡
(
μat , μ
b
t
)
where μi0 ≡ μo and μit : Hit ×Ht−1 → [0, 1] represents
agent i’s belief. That is, μit is the probability assigned by i to the event that the other agent
is a high type based on i’s private history up to period t and public history up to t− 1.
Sometimes we drop the time index for convenience (μ ≡ μt) . The domain of the belief
function consists of agent i’s private history up to the current period and the public history
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up to the last period because it refers to agent i’s belief at a point in period t when i has
observed her private signal (her favor opportunity is 0 or 1) but not the public signal (period
t favors, if any, are still pending). That is, μit captures agent i’s updated belief in period t at
the point in time when she has either received a favor opportunity and is deciding whether
or not to do a favor, or she has received no opportunity and is waiting to see if the other
agent does a favor.
Lemma 2.7 (Separation with one-sided incomplete information) A strategy profile
(σ, μ) defined by equations (18)-(21) is a PBE for z ∈ (0, 1] .
σa :=σaem(z)
(
uˉem(z), uem(z)
)
, (18)
σb :=
 σ
b
em(z)
(
uˉem(z), uem(z)
)
if ωb = H ,
σbaut if ωb = L,
(19)
μbt :=1, (20)
μat :=

0 if Ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1 (off-equilibrium path move),
1 else if ∃n < t s.t. τn = (0, z) ,
μat−1 else if wat = 1,
μat−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μat−1)p
otherwise.
(21)
Proof. The proof follows immediately from lemma 2.4 as long as σ is consistent with
μ. In this case μ was constructed from σ by Bayesian updating, so consistency follows.
Recall that part of the EM strategy is to stop doing favors (switch to autarky) if anyone
deviates publicly from the equilibrium path. Thereby such moves are deterred. Conse-
quently off-equilibrium path beliefs are moot (first row of μat ). On the equilibrium path,
three possibilities exist: (i) agent b does a favor of size z, in which case a believes b is a
high type (second row of μat ). This belief is consistent with σ because only a high type
would do a favor per σ. (ii) If agent a receives the favor opportunity, b does not because
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favor opportunities are mutually exclusive, so a’s belief about b does not change (third row
of μat ). This is trivially consistent with σ. (iii) Agent a receives neither a favor opportunity,
nor a favor from b. Either agent b did not receive a favor opportunity (neither agent did),
or she received the opportunity but did not do the favor per σ because she is a low type. In
this case, agent a’s updated belief per Bayes’ rule is
μat = P
(
ωb = H : {τt = 0 ∩ wat = 0}
)
=
P(ωb=H∩τt=0∩wat =0)
P (τt=0∩wat =0)
=
μat−1(1−2p)
μat−1(1−2p)+(1−μat−1)(p+1−2p)
=
μat−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μat−1)p
.
Figure 1 depicts paths to events that agent a may observe and her subjective equilibrium
beliefs along these paths. For brevity we use w.t to denote the recipient of a favor opportu-
nity in period t.
Agent a’s belief about b’s type
Prior: μat−1 1−μat−1
Type: ωb = H ωb = L
Probability:
Opportunity (w.t):(private info)
p
b
p
a
1-2p
∅
p
a
p
b
1-2p
∅
Observed
event:
Favor
received
Opportunity
received
No opportunity
and no favor
Posterior
belief: μ
a
t = 1 μ
a
t = μ
a
t−1 μat =
μat−1(1−2p)
1−p+μat−1p
Figure 1: Baysian updating of beliefs
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2.3.2 Separation and highest symmetric self-generating line (HSSGL) equilibria
Next we investigate whether or not high types can separate immediately into a HSSGL
equilibrium profile. If δH = δ∗, full EM and HSSGL equilibria coincide. This was shown
in section 2. Therefore, suppose δH > δ∗ for the rest of this subsection. As before we
assume agent a is a high type and agent b is an unknown type.
For the moment, suppose agent a’s strategy is to wait for a favor of size z ∈ (0, 1], and
if b does such a favor, a will respond with HSSGL play with b as the advantaged player.
The point of the exercise is to find out if a HSSGL equilibrium can be directly implemented
after separation. To this end, we may set z = 1 without compromising the generality of
the result. This choice of z minimizes the incentive for low types to mimic high types,
yet is incentive compatible for high types per subsection 2.2.2, in which AB’s HSSGL
equilibrium [1] results were adapted to our model with complete information. In particular,
equations (12)-(15) detail the incentive compatible HSSGL strategy profile to support a
corner solution. That is, the continuation payoffs necessary to support a full favor by a
disadvantaged high type agent, and a partial favor by the advantaged agent. Recall that
each high type agent’s incentive compatibility constraint binds in a HSSGL equilibrium, or
else we could use the available slack to move to a higher line. Therefore, we cannot lower
the continuation promise to agent b to deter low types further unless we deter the high types
as well.
In summary, it is enough to calculate if a low type agent b would be willing to do a
full favor in return for σahssgl (u, uˉ). Equations (16) and (17) specify all actions by agent a,
and b follows the autarky strategy after the initial full favor. Therefore we may calculate
the expected payoff to agent b and verify that for some parameter values she would have
incentive to pool with high types. The lemmas below formalize these claims.
Lemma 2.8 (HSSGL payoff to advantaged low types) The expected payoff to a low type
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agent b under strategy profile σ = (σahssgl (u, uˉ) , σbaut) is
vL0 = p + pk
δH(δH+δ∗−2δLδ∗)
(δH+δ∗)(δH−δLδ∗(1−p)) . (22)
Proof. In appendix.
The next proposition defines a strategy for agent a of doing no favors unless b does a
full favor first. If the favor is received, a will play according to HSSGL strategy profile that
implements the corner payoff pair (u, uˉ) favoring agent b. Given such a strategy, the propo-
sition will prove that condition (5) alone does not guarantee that high types can separate
immediately into a HSSGL endgame, and a stronger condition is required.
Proposition 2.9 (Immediate HSSGL separation) Consider HSSGL payoffs (u, uˉ)
defined by (14)-(15) and let t∗ denote the first time agent b does a full favor. Then for
strategy
σa :=
 σ
a
aut for t ≤ t∗ (no favors until b does a full favor)
σahssgl (u, uˉ) starting at t = t
∗ + 1 (HSSGL play if b does a favor)
where t∗ := inf {t ∈ N : τt = (0, 1)} and inf {∅} ≡ ∞,
immediate separation is enforceable only if δL is low enough or δH is high enough. The
technical condition they must is
δHk p(1+(k−1)p)(1−2δL+δH(1+(k−1)p))
(1+δH(1+(k−1)p))(δH(1+(k−1)p)−δL(1−p)) ≥ 1−δ
L
δL
. (23)
Proof. Given σa, a low type agent b will only do a full favor if the following incentive
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compatibility constraint is satisfied:
ICCLhssgl : δ
LvL0 ≥ 1− δL + δLp. (24)
Substituting in for vL0 from lemma 2.8 and simplifying yields condition (23).
Lemma 2.10 (Simple lower bound for δˉL) Let δˉL be defined by (25),
δL ≤ δˉL := 2
Bˆ+
√
Bˆ2−
4α(Bˆ+p(k−1))
1+α
< δ∗
where Bˆ=1+α(1−p)+pk and α≡δ∗/δH .
(25)
then δˉL ≥ δL := 1/ (1 + pk) .
Proof. The expressions for δˉL is derived in the appendix. The continuation promise for a
low type that mimics a high type is in HSSGL is vL0 = p (k + 1) because with probability
p she receives a favor of value k from the other agent and with probability p she receives
the favor opportunity of value 1. Substituting vL0 = p (k + 1) into ICCLhssgl (inequality
24), assuming it binds, and solving for δL produces solution δL = 1/ (1 + pk) . Therefore
it suffices to show that vL0 ≤ p (k + 1) . Rewriting vL0 from lemma 2.8:
vL0 = p + pk
δH
(
δH + δ∗
)− 2δHδLδ∗
δH (δH + δ∗)− (1− p) (δH + δ∗) δLδ∗
< p + pk
δH
(
δH + δ∗
)− (1− p) (δH + δ∗) δLδ∗
δH (δH + δ∗)− (1− p) (δH + δ∗) δLδ∗
∵2δHδLδ∗>(1−p)(δH+δ∗)δLδ∗ ⇐= 2>(1−p)(1+δ∗/δH)
=⇒ vL0 < p (k + 1) . (26)
=⇒ δˉL ∈
(
1
1+pk
, 1
1+p(k−1)
)
≡ (δL, δ∗) .
The point of presenting lemma 2.10 was to demonstrate that for k large, δL → δ∗ and
therefore δˉL → δ∗. Suppose that δL ∼ U (0, δ∗), then the subpopulation of low types with
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incentive to mimic high types in a game involving separation into HSSGL is bounded from
above by δ∗ − δL per lemma 2.10. As a fraction of all low types
δ∗−δL
δ∗ =
1
1+p(k−1)−
1
1+pk
1
1+p(k−1)
=
p
(1+pk)(1+p(k−1))
1
1+p(k−1)
= p
(1+pk)
→ 0 as k →∞.
The discount factor bounds, δ∗ and δˉL, are directly proportional to the expected contin-
uation payoff from
(
σaem (uem, uˉem) , σ
b
aut
)
and
(
σaem (u, uˉ) , σ
b
aut
)
, respectively. Since the
difference between δ∗ and δˉL is generally speaking small, it follows that the low type would
generally not stand to benefit greatly from HSSGL play over EM play. The reason is that
in EM the advantaged low type is guaranteed a favor worth k as soon as agent a receives a
favor opportunity, whereas in HSSGL play, low type agent b will only receive a full favor
if agent a receives a favor opportunity the very next period after b gains the advantaged sta-
tus. After that the size of the favor b is owned keeps decreasing unless b keeps doing small
favors to remain fully advantaged, and even then her continuation payoff would depreciate
each period when neither agent received a favor opportunity.
As for condition (23), we can write δ˜H = k
(1+p(k−1))2 − 11+p(k−1) . It is then easy to
see that δ˜H → 0 as k → ∞. The exception to this rule is if p → 0 at a faster rate
than 1/
√
k. That is, condition (23) is generally violated only if p is significantly smaller
than k in relative terms. The reason why δH is even a factor in the low types incentive
compatibility constraints is because of the way HSSGL equilibria are calculated; namely,
the size of partial favors are chosen so that ICC of high types binds. The higher the high
type’s discount factor, the greater the favors. We have now established conditions under
which low types would not mimic high types. Next we use these results to formally define
an equilibrium profile that implements immediate separation if agent b is a high type and
δL ≤ δˉL.
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Lemma 2.11 (From EM to HSSGL) Suppose δL ≤ δˉL as defined by equations (25). Let
t∗ := inf {t ∈ N : τt = (0, 1)} where inf {∅} ≡ ∞, and consider strategy profile (σ, μ)
defined by equations (27)-(30).
σa :=
 σ
a
aut for t ≤ t∗,
σahssgl (u, uˉ) for t = t∗ + 1,
(27)
σb :=
 σ
b
hssgl (uˉ, u) starting from t = inf
{
s ∈ N : wbs = 1
}
if ωb = H ,
σbaut otherwise,
(28)
μbt :=1, (29)
μat :=

0 if Ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1 (off-equilibrium path move),
1 if Ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and ∃n < t s.t. τn = (0, z) ,
μat−1 if wat = 1,
μat−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μat−1)p
otherwise.
(30)
Then (σ, μ) is a PBE profile.
Proof. Since σhssgl (u, uˉ) is a PPE profile (restricted to a symmetric line) with complete
information, it is also a PBE profile post separation since beliefs become trivial at that point,
and σhssgl (u, uˉ) implements a Nash equilibrium at each stage of the game that follows. For
t ≥ t∗, μa = μb = 1 on the equilibrium path, so the beliefs are consistent with σhssgl (u, uˉ).
And given σa, it is incentive compatible for a high type agent b to do a full favor (y = 1)
when she first receives a favor opportunity per subsection 2.2.2, and equations (11)-(15) in
particular. The belief system μ is clearly consistent with σ, and given δˉL, low types would
not try to mimic the high types per proposition 2.9.
The next step is to consider what happens if low types have discount factors between δˉL
and δ∗. We know immediate separation can always be implemented with an EM endgame
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per lemma 2.7, but not with a HSSGL endgame per proposition 2.9. However, since δ∗ is
the threshold discount factor required for equality matching to be incentive compatible, and
δL < δ∗ by definition, it follows that EM is strictly not incentive compatible for low types.
Suppose we promise an agent a payoff T periods from now preceded by full EM. This
strategy profile would be incentive compatible for high types for any T in the absence of
low types, so we can make T sufficiently large that low types are deterred by the prospect
of T periods of EM play prior to the promised higher value payoff.
Corollary 2.12 Suppose δL ∈ (δˉL, δ∗). Let t∗ := inf {t ∈ N : τt = (0, 1)}, where inf {∅} ≡
∞, and consider (σ, μ) defined by (31)-(34).
σa =

σaem (uˉem, uem) for t < t∗ + T ,
σahssgl (uˉ, u) starting at t = t
∗ + T if a advantaged,
σahssgl (u, uˉ) starting at t = t
∗ + T if b advantaged,
(31)
σb =

σbem (uˉem, uem)
if ωb = H starting at t = inf
{
s ∈ N : wbs = 1
}
for T periods,
σbhssgl (uˉ, u) starting at t = t∗ + T if a advantaged and ωb = H,
σbhssgl (u, uˉ) starting at t = t∗ + T if b advantaged and ωb = H,
σbaut if ωb = L,
(32)
μat =

0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1 if t ≥ t∗ and ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1,
μat−1 if wat = 1,
μat−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μat−1)p
otherwise,
(33)
μbt = 1. (34)
Then (σ, μ) is a PBE for T ∈ N large enough.
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Proof. In appendix.
There are several other methods to deter low types before a move to a HSSGL endgame
Some of these methods are probably more efficient in some circumstances. For example,
if δH > δ∗, there exists some slack in the high type agent b’s EM incentive compatibility
constraints, that could be used to implement a lower first return favor by agent a. Given
a large enough difference between δL and δH , this tactic might deter the low types after
just one round of favor trades, albeit at b’s expense. Another method would be to play
according to a HSSGL equilibrium profile for some δˆ ∈ (δ∗, δH). In particular, if the
optimal time required to deter a low type were measured in continuous time, then it would
land on a T ∈ N with probability 0. That is, a small inefficiency is generated by the
discrete time structure of our model, which necessitates rounding off to the nearest integer.
Such inefficiencies could be removed, at least partly, by playing according to a HSSGL
equilibrium profile, in the last period of T , for an appropriately chosen δˆ ∈ (δ∗, δH).
However, while we recognize that such small efficiency gains are possible, we chose to
focus on the EM separation because it is more general.
2.4 Two-sided incomplete information
When incomplete information is two-sided, a high type agent may attempt to separate her-
self from the low type by doing the first favor. Denote such a favor by zt at period t. If
the initial favor necessary to trigger cooperation between high types is sufficiently large, it
will deter low types from mimicking high types, providing a way for high types to separate
themselves. After an initial separation, we are back to the one-sided incomplete informa-
tion case described by the results in the previous section. The question is, can we find a
sequence of sufficiently large initial favors to deter the low types from pooling with high
types, but still low enough that high types would have incentive to do the favor and risk not
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receiving reciprocation if the other is a low type, instead of just waiting for the other agent
to go first. Recall that in AB’s EM and HSSGL equilibria [1], advantaged and disadvan-
taged designations are determined exogenously, so there is no first mover problem.
In the first subsection, we will follow the same approach. We investigate equilibria
in which one agent is designated to do the first favor. Such a strategy takes care of the
first mover problem. The designated agent, or the designee from now on, will not grow
increasingly pessimistic when the other agent does no favors (since the strategy profile
doesn’t call for it), and she has no option to wait for the other to go first, so her incentives
to separate are increased. However, the trade-off is that separation between high types takes
roughly twice as long as it would if both agents were attempting to separate. This is why
we investigate symmetric strategies for separation in the second subsection.
2.4.1 Designated first favor maker (DFFM) equilibria
Consider a strategy of designating an agent at the beginning of the game to do the first favor
of pre-agreed size z, while the other waits. In separating equilibria z has to be high enough
to deter low types from pooling with high types. If the designee does a favor of size z, she
earns the advantaged status in an full EM game that follows, provided of course the other
agent is a high type. A formal description of this strategy, and a proof are below. For now,
suppose without loss of generality that agent a is the designee. For now we abstract from
how the agents determine the designation, but for some later results we will assume agents
can randomize, at least with even odds (coin flip), to see who is to do the first favor.
Proposition 2.13 (Existence of DFFM equilibria) Let t∗ := inf {t ∈ N : τt = (z, 0)},
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t∗∗ := inf{s ∈ N : was = 1} and consider strategy profile (σ, μ) be such that
σa :=

σaem(z)
(
uem(z), uˉem(z)
)
if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1, ωa = H, t ≤ t∗∗,
σaem (uˉem, uem) starting at t = t
∗ if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1, ωa = H,
σaaut otherwise,
(35)
σb :=
 σ
b
em (uˉem, uem) starting at t = t
∗ if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1, ωb = H,
σbaut otherwise,
(36)
μat :=

0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1 if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and ∃n < t s.t. τn = (0, 1) ,
μo if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and @n ≤ t s.t. τn = (z, 0) ,
μat−1 if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and wat = 1,
μat−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μat−1)p
otherwise,
(37)
μbt :=

0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1 if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and ∃n < t s.t. τn = (z, 0) ,
μbt−1 if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and wbt = 1,
μbt−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μbt−1)p
otherwise,
(38)
z ∈ [z, zˉ] ≡
[
μopδLk
1−δL(1−p) , min
{
1,
μopδH(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}]
. (39)
Then (σ, μ) is a PBE profile.
Proof. Off-equilibrium path beliefs do not need to be consistent in a PBE, so they are
moot. During publicly observable equilibrium path play, agent b believes a is a high type
with probability 1 if she receives the pre-agreed initial favor z. In the meantime she grows
more pessimistic according to Bayesian updating when she receives neither a favor from
a nor a favor opportunity during the same period. Her beliefs remain unchanged when
she receives the favor opportunity because opportunities are mutually exclusive so there
35
is no new information about the other agent. However, even though agent b grows more
pessimistic over time if she does not receive a favor, this does not affect the equilibrium
outcome because she is not called upon to do any favors until agent a separates first.
Agent a’s beliefs on the other hand remain unchanged until she does the first favor
unless there is a public off-equilibrium path action by one of the agents. After the first favor,
agent a believes b is a high type once the favor is returned according to (full) EM matching.
Until such time her beliefs are updated according to Bayesian updating when she receives
neither a favor opportunity, nor a favor from b. Agent a’s beliefs remain unchanged when
she is the one to receive the favor opportunity. These beliefs are clearly sequentially rational
on the equilibrium path so it is enough to solve for z such that the incentive compatibility
constraints hold for each agent.
The incentive compatibility constraints obviously hold for agent b since she simply
waits until the other does a favor and then plays the EM strategy starting as the disadvan-
taged agent if she is a high type, and the autarky strategy otherwise. A deviation (favor) on
her part would cost her today and result in autarky play.
For a low type agent a we need to solve for the largest size favor, call it z, she is willing
to do to mimic a high type. Similarly we need to solve for the largest size favor, call it
zˉ, a high type agent a is willing to do to signal her type and begin a full EM game as the
advantaged agent provided agent b is also a high type. If not, a receives the autarky payoff
instead. Bounds z and zˉ can be computed from the incentive compatibility constraints for
the low and high type of agent a, respectively. To end the proof, we show that [z, zˉ] 6= ∅.
We show that z is increasing in δL and zˉ in δH (as well as all other arguments), so using
δL = δH = δ∗ we obtain the maximum value for the lower bound and the minimum value
for the upper bound, each of which is μo. Hence [z, zˉ] 6= ∅, and in particular, μo ∈ [z, zˉ] for
any values of δL, δH , p and k. The calculations to prove this are essentially straightforward
but tedious and have therefore been relegated to the appendix.
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2.4.1.1 Characteristics of a designated first favormaker (DFFM) equilibrium: Sup-
pose for the moment that agent a is still, without loss of generality, the designated agent
in a DFFM game. If a is a low type, no favors will be exchanged on the equilibrium path,
and both agents simply receive their autarky payoff, p. However, if a is a high type facing
a low type, her expected payoff would be
uHLD = p
(
(1− δH)(1− z) + δHp)+ (1− p)δHuHLD
=
p((1−δH)(1−z)+δHp)
1−δH(1−p) = p− p 1−δ
H
1−δH(1−p)z, (40)
and the corresponding payoff for the low type agent b would be
vHLD = p
(
(1− δL)kz + δLp)+ p ((1− δL) + δLvHLD )+ (1− 2p)δLvHLD
=
p((1−δL)(1+kz)+δLp)
1−δL(1−p) = p + pk
1−δL
1−δL(1−p)z, (41)
and if agent a is facing another high type, then after the initial favor, her continuation payoff
will be uˉem instead of p, so her payoff would be
uHHD = p
(
(1− δH)(1− z) + δH uˉem
)
+ (1− p)δHuHHD
=
p((1−δH)(1−z)+δH uˉem)
1−δH(1−p) = p
1−δH+δH uˉem
1−δH(1−p) − p 1−δ
H
1−δH(1−p)z,
and the corresponding payoff for the high type agent b would be
vHHD = p
(
(1− δH)kz + δHuem
)
+ p
(
1− δH + δHvHHD
)
+ (1− 2p)δHvHHD
=
p
(
(1− δH)(1 + kz) + δHuem
)
1− δH(1− p) = p
1− δH + δHuem
1− δH(1− p) + p
(1− δH)k
1− δH(1− p)z.
The following table summarizes the results with payoffs (u, v) for each type combina-
tion.
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ωaωb uω
aωb vω
aωb
LL p p
LH p p
HL p− p 1−δH
1−δH(1−p)z p + p
(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p)z
HH p1−δ
H+δH uˉem
1−δH(1−p) − p 1−δ
H
1−δH(1−p)z p
1−δH+δHuem
1−δH(1−p) + p
(1−δH)k
1−δH(1−p)z
The total value of the game is
TD = (1− μo) 2p + μo (1− μo)
(
uHLD + v
HL
D
)
+ μ2o
(
uHHD + v
H
D
) (42)
= (1− μo) 2p + μo (1− μo)
(
2p− p 1−δL
1−δL(1−p)z + p
(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p)z
)
+ μ2o
(
p1−δ
H+δH uˉem
1−δH(1−p) + p
1−δH+δHuem
1−δH(1−p) + p
(1−δH)(k−1)
1−δH(1−p) z
)
.
Substituting in the values for uˉem and uem from (4) and (3) and taking the derivative
with respect to z, the initial (separating) favor, yields
∂TD
∂z
= μop
(
(1 μo)
(
(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p) − 1−δ
H
1−δH(1−p)
)
+ μo
(1−δH)(k−1)
1−δH(1−p)
)
> 0
⇐=
(
(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p) − 1−δ
H
1−δH(1−p)
)
> 0 and other terms clearly positive
⇐= 1−δL
1−δL(1−p) >
1−δH
1−δH(1−p) ∵ δ
L < δHand k > 1.
In words, the total expected payoff in a DFFM equilibrium is increasing in initial favor
size (z). This should not be surprising since doing favors is efficient. Of course, increasing
z increases the cost faced by the designee, agent a, to elicit a full EM response from agent
b, provided that b is a high type, while a’s continuation promise remains unchanged at
u = μouˉem + (1 − μo)p. Naturally, agent b would benefit. But suppose the agents do not
know ahead of time whether or not they will be designated to do the first favor, and instead
the designation will be determined by a fair coin flip at the beginning of the game. Would
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the high types want z to be high or low now?
We are interested in this question because each agent who plays this game is either
a high type or pretends (at least passively) to be a high type, so any strategies espoused
by these agents (pre-separation) should conform to the high types’ interests when those
interests are unambiguous. For example, if the agents (claiming to be high types) decide to
match pennies to decide who is to do the first favor, and if they choose the size of the initial
favor z ∈ [z, zˉ], they should both purport to favor the optimal z for high types, or else they
would reveal their type.
Lemma 2.14 (Optimal favor size in DFFM equilibria) Let (σ, μ) be a DFFM equilib-
rium profile consistent with proposition 2.13. Then an initial favor of size
zi =

μoδLpk
1−δL(1−p) if μok < 1,
any point in [z, zˉ] if μok = 1,
min
{
1,
μoδHp[(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)]
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}
if μok > 1,
(43)
maximizes expected payoff to a high type agent i provided that the designee is chosen
randomly with even odds.
Proof. The expected payoff a high type agent i, who will be designated to do the first favor
(that is, to assume the role of agent a of proposition 2.13) with probability 1/2, or to wait
for the other agent to do so (role b) otherwise, is
uHD =
(
(1− μo) uHLD + μouHHD
)
/2 +
(
(1− μo) p + μovHHD
)
/2
=
1
2
[
(1− μo)
(
p− p 1−δH
1−δH(1−p)z
)
+ μo
(
p1−δ
H+δH uˉem
1−δH(1−p) − p 1−δ
H
1−δH(1−p)z
)]
+
1
2
[
(1− μo) p + μo
(
p
1−δH+δHuem
1−δH(1−p) + p
(1−δH)k
1−δH(1−p)z
)]
=
1
2
p
[
1− μo + μo 1−δ
H+δHuem
1−δH(1−p) + 1− μo + μo 1−δ
H+δHuem
1−δH(1−p)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡κ
(44)
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+
1
2
p
[
μo
(1−δH)k
1−δH(1−p) − (1− μo) 1−δ
H
1−δH(1−p) − μo 1−δ
H
1−δH(1−p)
]
z
= κ +
p
(
1− δH)
2 (1− δH(1− p)) [− (1− μo)− μo + μok] z
= κ +
p(1− δH)(μok − 1)
2 (1− δH(1− p)) z
∴ ∂u
H
D
∂z
=
p(1− δH)(μok − 1)
2 (1− δH(1− p)) ≷ 0 ⇐⇒ μok ≷ 1.
Since total welfare of high types is either increasing or decreasing, the optimal choice of
the initial favor size is one of the endpoints of interval [z, zˉ], the set of favors consistent
with DFFM equilibria of proposition 2.13. The only exception is μok = 1 ⇒ ∂u
H
D
∂z
= 0, for
which case a favor of any size in [z, zˉ] will do.
Lemma 2.14 applies to DFFM equilibria consistent with proposition 2.13. That propo-
sition implemented a full EM endgame post-separation. However, we showed in section 2.3
that high types can always move from the full EM line to the Pareto optimal HSSGL line
either immediately, or after sufficiently many periods of EM play. For DFFM equilibria
beyond proposition 2.13, in particular for equilibria that implement a HSSGL endgame,
lemma 2.14 does not apply. However, it stands to reason that since low types would have
more incentive to pool with high types, the high types would have more incentive to choose
a higher initial favor to deter the low types, and in particular, to cut down the number of pe-
riods of EM play necessary to move to the HSSGL endgame in instances where immediate
separation to HSSGL is not possible.
2.4.2 Symmetric separating (SS) equilibria
By symmetric separating equilibria we mean perfect Bayesian equilibria profiles, (σ, μ),
such that, σa defines an equivalent strategy for agent a as σb does for agent b, and (σ, μ)
implements separation with positive probability. We do not require separation with prob-
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ability one even when both agents are high types. Indeed, we will later show that SS
strategies are inherently limited in this regard when favor opportunities are correlated. Cor-
related signals are informative about the other agent’s type, which can result in increasingly
divergent beliefs between agents over time. And once beliefs diverge sufficiently, low types
cannot be deterred from pooling with high types using symmetric strategies. However, we
prove that SS equilibria that implement separation with positive probability always exist.
First, two definitions.
Definition 2.15 Suppose that (σ, μ) is a PBE profile for a favor-trading game with two-
sided incomplete information such that σ implements separation of two high type agents
with probability (1− ε) ∈ (0, 1). Call (σ, μ) an ε-perfect separating PBE.
Definition 2.16 (Indicator function) 1{arg} = 1 if arg is true, 0 otherwise.
Consider the following example of a (1 − 2p)-perfect separating PBE. Given the op-
portunity, a high type agent does a (small) favor of size z1 in the first period. If one of the
agents does such a favor, she becomes advantaged in the game of full equality matching
that follows provided the other agent is also a high type. If neither agent does a favor in
the first period, both agents follow the autarky strategy from thereon. A low type agent fol-
lows the autarky strategy regardless. Separation occurs with probability 2p if both agents
are high types, hence the name (1− 2p)-perfect separating PBE. This profile is described
formally below.
Lemma 2.17 (First period separation) Consider strategy profile (σ, μ) defined by (2.17)-
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(46) for i ∈ {a, b} :
σi :=

I i1 = z11{wi1=1} if ω
i = H and t = 1,
σiem (uˉem, uem) starting at t = 2 if ωi = H and τ1 = (z1, 0) ,
σiem (uem, uˉem) starting at t = 2 if ωi = H and τ1 = (0, z1) ,
σiaut otherwise,
(45)
μit :=

0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1
if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and either i received z1
in first period or i did the first favor
and received full reciprocation,
μit−1
if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and either i received a favor
opportunity this period, or no favors were done
in the first period, but i did receive a favor
opportunity that period (so μit = μo, ∀t),
μo(1−2p)
1−(1+μo)p
if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1, no favors were done and no
opportunity received by i in first period,
μit−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μit−1)p otherwise.
(46)
Then (σ, μ) is a (1−2p)-perfect separating PBE profile for z1 ∈ [z1, zˉ1] 6= ∅, where z1 and
zˉ1 are defined by (47).
z1 =
μoδLpk
1−δL(1−p) and zˉ1 = min
{
1,
μoδH((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}
. (47)
Proof. In appendix.
The one period case gives a glimpse of how the two-sided incomplete information game
behaves. Namely a small favor is necessary to initiate some form of cooperation. The spe-
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cial characteristic of the above equilibrium is that the agents are able to go to full equality
matching if both are high types and one of the two initiates cooperation during the first
period. Note that as the fraction of high types decreases so does the amount, z1, needed
to initiate cooperation. This is because both agent types become more pessimistic as μo
decreases. The high type will be less likely to find a cooperative partner, and the low type
will be less likely to find a high type to reciprocate a small initial favor with a full favor.
Therefore, it seems likely that in an infinite horizon problem the initial favor necessary to
initiate cooperation would decrease as agents grow more pessimistic over time. The prob-
lem, however, is that both agents do not necessarily grow pessimistic at the same rate. For
example, suppose one agent, say agent a, is a low type and the other, agent b, is a high type.
Then it is possible agent a receives a string of favor opportunities at the beginning of the
game but does no favors. Agent b would grow more pessimistic by each period, whereas
agent a would not receive any information to update her beliefs. At some point the upper
bound for the initial favor z derived from a high type’s incentive compatibility constraint
would cross the lower bound derived from the low type’s incentive compatibility constraint
for certain histories such as described above with positive probability.
But would it be possible to lower the continuation promise along with zt to deter the
low types? For example, if the EM endgame is conducted at level zt, we know from lemma
2.4 that low types would never join in while the high types could benefit from it. How-
ever, lemma 2.4 applies in the complete information environment with two high types, one
advantaged, the other disadvantaged right from the start of the game. Without preset des-
ignations it turns out that even the high type agents would require a higher continuation
promise than just em (zt) to start a partnership. In particular, for a game of full equal-
ity matching, a high type agent would be at most willing to do an initial favor of 1/2 for
δH = δ∗ and never more than k
k+1
even as δH → 1. The proposition below presents the
exact bounds for the general case.
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Proposition 2.18 (Bounds with complete information) Consider a game of equality
matching at level z2 ∈ (0, 1] between two known high type agents that follows a fa-
vor of size z1 by either agent. The agent to do the initial favor becomes the advan-
taged agent in the subsequent em(z2) game. This game can be implemented with any
z1 ∈
(
0, pkδ
H
1+δH(p(k+1)−1)z2
]
for any δH ∈ [δ∗, 1) .
Proof. The advantaged and disadvantaged payoffs, uˉem(z) and uem(z), would be the same
as before since they are clearly not dependent on any first period payment. The expected
payoff for the undesignated agent would be
uˆem(z) = p((1− δH)(1− z1) + δH uˉem(z))
+ p((1− δH)kz1 + δHuem(z)) + (1− 2p)δH uˆem(z).
Solving for uˆem(z) and substituting in for uˉem(z) and uem(z) from (71) and (69) yields
uˆem(z) = p +
p(1−δH)(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z1 +
p2δH(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p)z2.
Per proof of lemma 2.4, we still need δH ≥ δ∗ for the incentive compatibility constraints
to hold during the second phase of the game that consists of equality matching at level
z2 ∈ (0, 1]. The question is, what level of z1 is required to guarantee that the incentive
compatibility constraint is satisfied for the first agent with a favor opportunity to do a favor?
As usual, it is enough to consider a one-shot deviation.
ICCHfirst : (1− δH)(1− z1) + δH uˉem(z) ≥ 1− δH + δH uˆem(z).
To analyze ICCHfirst, let f be a function of the left-hand side minus the right-hand side,
f ≡ (1− δH)(1− z1) + δH uˉem(z) −
(
1− δH)− δH uˆem(z)
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= −z1 + δHz1 + δH
(
uˉem(z) − uˆem(z)
)
= −z1 + δHz1 + δH
[
p + p (1−δ
H)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z2
−
(
p + p(1−δ
H)(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z1 +
p2δH(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p)z2
)]
= −z1 + δHz1 + δ
H(1−δH)
1−δH(1−2p)p (kz2 − (k − 1) z1) .
The plot below provides a graphical example of the problem f ≥ 0, for z2 = 1, p = 1/4,
k = 5 fixed, and z1 ∈ [0, 1] and δH ∈ (δ∗, 1) as variables, where δ∗ = 11+p(k−1) =
1
1+ 1
4
(5−1) = 1/2.
Figure 2: Constraints without designated first mover
The region above the plane and below the curved surface represents the feasible com-
binations of z1 and δH that are incentive compatible. The z1 = 1 edge of the graph also
shows f < 0 (incentive compatibility is not satisfied), for all δH , in this case at least. To
generalize the intuitions represented in the graph proceed by taking the first two derivatives
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of f with respect to δH ,
df
dδH
= z1 +
[
1−δH−δH(1−δH(1−2p))
(1−δH(1−2p))2
]
p (kz2 − (k − 1) z1) , and
d2f
d (δH)2
= − 4p
(1−δH(1−2p))3 p (kz2 − (k − 1) z1) = −
4p2(kz2−(k−1)z1)
(1−δH(1−2p))3 < 0.
That is, f is strictly concave in δH and therefore has a minimum at either δH = δ∗ or
δH = 1. Evaluating these two limit points of f is a straight-forward exercise that yields the
following results after the appropriate simplification,
lim
δH→1
f = 0, and
lim
δH→δ∗
f = −z1 + z11+p(k−1) +
1
1+p(k−1)
(
1− 1
1+p(k−1)
)
1− 1−2p
1+p(k−1)
p (kz2 − (k − 1) z1)
= pk(k−1)(z2−2z1)
k+1+p(k2−1) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ z2 ≥ 2z1.
Therefore a half sized initial favor may always be used by high type agents to commence
an equality matching game. To find an upper bound for z1, say zˉ1, we solve f = 0,
which yields z1 = pkδ
H
1+δH(p(k+1)−1)z2. Observe that zˉ1 is directly proportional to z2, and
that zˉ1 < lim
δH→1 zˉ1 =
k
k+1
z2 < z2. In summary, a game of equality matching at level
z2 ∈ (0, 1] between high types such that neither agent is designated to go first, but instead
the first agent with a favor opportunity is required to do a favor, is incentive compatible for
z1 ∈
(
0, pkδ
H
1+δH(p(k+1)−1)z2
]
, which proves proves proposition 2.18.
If a low type is included in the game among a continuum of high types (that is μo ≈ 1),
using z1 < z2 presents a clear problem since the original bound for δ∗ was derived using
z1 = z2. The ICC for a low type, say agent b, to follow the autarky strategy and not to pool
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with the high types when z1 < z2 is as follows:
ICCLz1<z2 : 1− δL + δLp ≥
(
1− δL) (1− z1) + δL (μbtvz2 + (1− μo) p)
=⇒ (1− δL) z1 ≥ δL (vz2 − p) ,
because μbt = 1 since agent b is by assumption the only low type in a continuum of high
types. The continuation payoff to b if she does the favor and if agent a is a high type is
vz2 = p
(
1− δL + δLvz2
)
+ p
((
1− δL) kz2 + δLp)+ (1− 2p)δLvz2
= p +
pk(1−δL)
1−δL(1−p)z2.
Substituting from above for vz2 into ICCLz1<z2 and simplifying yields
(
1− δL) z1 ≥ δL (p+ (1− δL) pk1−δL(1−p)z2 − p)
⇐⇒ z1 ≥ δL pk
1− δL(1− p)z2
⇐⇒ δL ≤ 1
1 + p (k (z2/z1)− 1) .
Observe that the bound on δL is lower than δ∗ = 1/ (1 + p (k − 1)) for z1<z2, which
identifies an obvious problem with symmetric separating equilibria. Namely, we need to
reduce the size of the first favor or limit the time available for separation in order to achieve
separation between high types, but this will increase the incentive for low types to mimic
the high types unless δL is sufficiently low.
Proposition 2.19 (Time constrained separation in SS equilibria) Suppose (σ, μ) is a
PBE profile in a game with two unknown types, and σ is such that for t ≤ T ∈ N ∪ {∞}
the first high type agent to receive a favor opportunity will do a favor of size zt ∈ [zt, zˉt] ⊂
(0, 1], where [zt, zˉt] is the interval of incentive compatible first favors at time t. If agent i
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does the first favor of size zt, (σ, μ) implements an EM strategy for high types, starting with
i advantaged, at level m (zt), where m : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is an increasing function. Then,
(i) ∃nˉ ∈ N such that (a) [zt, zˉt] 6= ∅ with probability 1 for all t ≤ nˉ, and (b) [zt, zˉt] = ∅
with positive probability for all t > nˉ. (Separation between high types is always possible
with positive probability, but never with probability 1 because it has to occur within a finite
time period).
(ii) In equilibrium, zˉt and m (zt) satisfy the following relationship,
m (zˉt)
zˉt
− 1 ≤ 1− δ
L(1− p)
μoδLpk
≡ M ∈
(
1
μo
,∞
)
, ∀t ≤ nˉ, (48)
and separation has to take place within a finite period of time, otherwise a low type may
pool with high types with positive probability.
Proof. The details are in the appendix. From lemma 2.17 we know that nˉ ≥ 1, but we have
to show that for t large enough there exist possible histories such that a low type would be
willing to do a favor that is equal to or grater than the biggest favor a high type is willing
to do. We use a basic proof by contradiction. Suppose a separating symmetric equilibrium
exists satisfying (σ, μ) of proposition 2.19 for nˉ = ∞. Since neither type can have a prof-
itable one-shot deviation for any history that occurs with positive probability, we proceed
by deriving a tight greatest lower bound for zt from the low type’s incentive compatibil-
ity constraint. To do this, we use the “worst case” scenario that given t a low type has
received favor opportunities each period so far. Consequently the low type’s beliefs have
remained unchanged at μo. This provides us with condition (48), and that is why μo is part
of the condition. Note that the condition is defined for the upper bounds of zt and m (zt)
instead of zt and m (zt) themselves. That is because we know their upper bounds must be
decreasing as agents grow more pessimistic over time, whereas the actual sequence of zt
could behave quite erratically if σ so specified, and the incentive compatibility constraints
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allowed. We then derive a (slack) upper bound for zt from the high type’s incentive com-
patibility constraint. This bound has to hold for all zt in the range of possible equilibrium
zt, so we pick the highest one and show that condition (48) is violated when the high type
grows sufficiently pessimistic, that is for t large enough.
Corollary 2.20 For any equilibrium profile (σ, μ) and sequence {zt}∞t=1 of potential first
favors consistent with proposition 2.19,
m (zt) = min
{
Mzt + z
LH
t , 1
} (49)
is optimal, where zLHt :=
(
1− δL (1−p))∑∞i=0 ((1− p)δL)i zt+1+i.
Proof. This result for m (zt) is immediate because favors are efficient and Mzt + zLHt is
the least upper bound on m (zt) conditional on sequence z ≡ {zt}∞t=0 as specified by (σ, μ).
The least upper bound condition is from (104) in the proof of proposition 2.19. And zLHt is
as specified by (102).
Equation (49) may at first seem convoluted because of the inclusion of zLHt , but that
is only the case if z were an infinite sequence of strictly positive terms, which is ruled out
by proposition 2.19. Since the strictly positive terms in zt are finite, say ending at some
T ∈ N, then zLHT = 0, and consequently m(zT ) = min {MzT , 1}. We may then calculate
the rest of the least upper bounds using backward induction (in theory), although for T
large this may be intractable in closed form.
Proposition 2.21 For any equilibrium profile (σ, μ) consistent with proposition 2.19 equi-
librium separation has to occur within
T ≡ sup
{
t ∈ N
∣∣∣∣ μo(1− 2p)t−1μo(1− 2p)t−1 + (1− μo)(1− p)t−1 ≥ 1− δ
H
δHBM
}
periods,
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where B and M are defined by (71) and (48), respectively.
Proof. From proposition 2.19 we know that separation has to occur in finite time, call this
T periods at most. Then zs = 0 for all s > T , which means that SLHT = SHLT = SHHT = 0
for the period T incentive compatibility constraints, which in turn means that we can write
condition (107) for T as
zT ≤ δ
H
1− δH μ
a
T B m(zT )
=⇒ 1− δ
H
δHB
≤ μaT
m(zT )
zT
≤ μaT M.
Suppose agent a is a high type playing according to σ. Then the history must be such that
she has not received a favor opportunity until now and the other agent has done no initial
favor. In notation, (haT , HT−1) = ({0, 0, ..., 0, 1} , {0, 0, ..., 0}) ≡
(
h˜aT , H˜T−1
)
. Then
μaT
(
h˜aT , H˜T−1
)
= μaT−1 since waT = 1, and μat−1 =
μo(1−2p)T−1
μo(1−2p)T−1+(1−μo)(1−p)T−1 by (109).
Substituting this into the above incentive compatibility constraint yields,
1− δH
δHBM
≤ μo(1− 2p)
T−1
μo(1− 2p)T−1 + (1− μo) (1− p)T−1 .
The left-hand side of the above inequality is just a constant, so we can compute T . Also
note that once T is known we can compute zT from lemma 2.17, except using μaT instead
of μo and then work backward to calculate the other zt. Furthermore, let g := 1−δ
H
δHBM
, then
it is straightforward to show that
∂g
∂δL
= μo(1−δ
H)k(1−δH(1−2p))
δH(1−δL(1−p))2(k(1−δH(1−p(1−1/k))) > 0,
∂g
∂δH
= −μoδ
Lk
(
(1−δH)2k+2(1−δH)δH(k−1)p+2(δH)2p(k−1)
)
(δH)2(1−δL(1−p))2(k(1−δH(1−p(1−1/k)))2 < 0,
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so g is maximized at δL = δH = δ∗. Plugging in δL = δH = 1
1+p(k−1) and simplifying
yields g|δL=δH=δ∗ = μo, so the incentive compatibility constraint is always satisfied for at
least T = 1, which we knew already from lemma 2.17.
2.4.2.1 Importance of mutually exclusive favor opportunities: The proofs of Propo-
sition 2.19 and Proposition 2.21 relied on the mutually exclusive favor opportunities so that
one agent could grow pessimistic while the other did not. It would therefore be fair to ask
whether symmetric separation has to occur within a fixed time period simply because of the
mutually exclusive nature of the favor opportunities and whether independent favor oppor-
tunities, which are less informative, could actually lead to a better outcome. The answer,
roughly speaking, is that they would. Changing the distribution of favor opportunities from
mutually exclusive to independent would change the model drastically since we would then
have to worry about favor-trading during periods when both agents received a favor oppor-
tunity, which would have a major impact on the incentive compatibility constraints and
on the general nature of the problem at hand. However, as a thought experiment, suppose
the underlying favor opportunity distribution is kept as is, but it is assumed, contrary to
fact, that μat = μbt = μt and that this is common knowledge. Then it can be shown that
symmetric separation does not have to occur within a fixed time period.
Proposition 2.22 (Mutual exclusivity and SS equilibria) Suppose (σ, μ) is a PBE profile
in a game with two unknown types. Suppose σ is such that the first agent to receive a favor
opportunity will do a favor of size zt ∈ (0, 1] to signal type if she is a high type while a low
type will follow the autarky strategy. And suppose σ calls for separation to be followed by
an equality matching game at some level m (zt) ∈ (0, 1]. Furthermore, suppose agents’
beliefs are μat = μbt = μt, ∀t. Then separation can be guaranteed.
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Proof. From ICCLz in the proof of proposition 2.19 we have that for the low type agents
not to mimic the high type agents zt must satisfy
zt ≥ μbt
δLpk
1− δL(1− p)m (zt) ,
and from ICCHz we have that for a high type agent to do the first favor, zt must satisfy
zt ≤ δ
H
1− δH (1− μ
a
t ) S1 +
δH
1− δH μ
a
t (Bm (zt)− S2) , where
S1 = p
(
1−δH) ∞∑
i=0
(
δH(1− p))i zt+1+i,
S2 = p (k − 1)
∞∑
i=0
(
δH (1− 2p))i ((1− δH) zt+1+i + pδHm (zt+1+i)) ,
and B = p(1− δ
H)k + δHp (k − 1)
1− δH(1− 2p) from (71)
Combining the two conditions above, rearranging and using μat = μbt = μt yields the
following condition that must be satisfied as t grow large for separation to be guaranteed:
μt
δLpk
1−δL(1−p)m (zt) ≤ δ
H
1−δH ((1− μt) S1 − μtS2) + δ
H
1−δH μtB m (zt) . (50)
First we need to show that (1− μt) S1 − μtS2 ≥ 0 for t large enough. To this end, observe
that
(1− μt) S1 − μtS2 = (1− μt) p
(
1− δH)∑∞i=0 (δH(1− p))i zt+1+i
− μtp (k − 1)
∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1− 2p))i ((1− δH) zt+1+i + pδHm (zt+1+i))
≥ (1− μt) p
(
1− δH)∑∞i=0 (δH(1− p))i zt+1+i
− μtp (k − 1)
(
1− δH (1− pM))∑∞i=0 (δH(1− p))i zt+1+i
since
(
δH(1− p))i ≥ (δH (1− 2p))i , ∀i ≥ 0,
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and m (zt+1+i) ≤ Mzt by (48)
=
(
(1− μt) p
(
1− δH)− μtp (k − 1) (1− δH (1− pM)))St+1,
where St+1 =
∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1− p))i zt+1+i
≥ 0 for t large enough ∵ μt → 0 as t →∞ while
p
(
1− δH) , p (k − 1) (1− δH (1− pM)) > 0 are bounded.
Therefore to verify that condition (50) holds it is enough to verify that
μt
δLpk
1− δL(1− p)m (zt) ≤
δH
1− δH μtBm (zt)
or after dividing both sides by μtm (zt) and substituting in B = p (1−δ
H)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) that
δLpk
1− δL(1− p) ≤
δH
1− δH p
(1− δH)k + δHp (k − 1)
1− δH(1− 2p) .
The left-hand side is clearly increasing in δL and δL < δ∗ = 1
1+p(k−1) by definition, so the
left-hand side is bounded from above by
δ∗pk
1− δ∗(1− p) =
1
1+p(k−1)pk
1− 1
1+p(k−1) (1− p)
= 1.
As for the right-hand side, let h
(
δH
)
= δ
H
1−δH p
(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) . Then h (δ
∗) = 1 and
dh
(
δH
)
dδH
=
(1 + (k − 1) p)2 k
p (k2 − 1) > 0 at δ
H = δ∗, and
d2h
(
δH
)
d (δH)2
= p
[
k−1
(1−δH)3 +
k+1
δH(1−δH(1−2p))3 − k+1δH(1−δH(1−2p))2
]
> 0 since k > 1 and 1− δH (1− 2p) ∈ (0, 1) .
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In other words, h
(
δH
)
or the right-hand side of our constraint is convex and increasing
at its minimum of h (δ∗) = 1, which was an upper bound for the left-hand side of the
constraint. Hence condition (50) is always satisfied for t large enough, and therefore a
sequence of zt would exist such that separation could be guaranteed if the agents believed
that their favor opportunities were independent while the game remained exactly as before
otherwise. Of course, if the favor opportunities were truly independent then the structure
of the game would change significantly because the model uses discrete time and hence we
would have to address the possibility that both agents received a favor opportunity in the
same round, which would change the incentive compatibility constraints and make it diffi-
cult to properly compare the model with mutually exclusive favor opportunities. However,
this thought exercise suggests that the impact of non-independent favor opportunities is to
make it harder to separate symmetrically.
2.4.2.2 Comparison of SS and DFFM equilibria: Next consider the welfare impli-
cations of the SS equilibria as compared to the DFFM equilibria. The appeal of the SS
equilibria is that if both agents are high types then separation is twice as fast as in the
DFFM equilibrium conditional on it occurring before the agents become too pessimistic.
In particular, ignoring a cutoff period for separation, the average times to it, T dffmsep and T sssep,
can be calculated using geometric series, namely,
T dffmsep = 1p + 2(1− p)p + 3(1− p)2p + ...
= p
∞∑
t=1
t(1− p)t−1 = 1
p
(51)
and
T sssep = 1(2p) + 2(1− 2p)(2p) + 3(1− 2p)2(2p) + ...
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= 2p
∑∞
t=1t(1− 2p)t−1 = 12p . (52)
But SS equilibria do not guarantee separation and the value of the post-separation
endgame depreciates over time during the initial separation phase unlike with the DFFM
equilibria. The expected payoffs for the latter have already been examined, but for the
former the expected payoff for a high type at the start of the game would be
uHsym = (1− μo) uHLsym + μouHHsym,
where uHLsym and uHsym are the expected payoffs under σ when facing a low type and a high
type, respectively. Fortunately uHLsym and uHHsym are symmetric to uHL−zt and u
HH
−zt from the
proof of Proposition 2.19, except that zt start from z1 instead of zt+1.
uHLsym = p−S∗1 where S∗1 = p
(
1−δH)∑∞i=0 (δH(1−p))i z1+i, and
uHHsym = p+S
∗
2 where S
∗
2 = p (k−1)
∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1−2p))i ((1−δH)z1+i+pδHm (z1+i)) .
In the last step we used that A + B = p(k − 1). Then
uHsym = (1− μo) (p− S∗1) + μo (p + S∗2)
= p− S∗1 + μo (S∗1 + S∗2) . (53)
Next we will go over two examples, the main point of which is that depending on the
parameters either SS or DFFM equilibrium may dominate the other.
Example 2.23 (SS dominates DFFM) Consider a game with two unknown type agents.
Suppose p = 0.45, δL = 0.6, δH = 0.8, k = 2, μo = 0.7. Then δ∗ = 11+p(k−1) = 0.69 =⇒
δL < δ∗ ≤ δH .
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Consider a DFFM equilibrium first and suppose that the agents randomize evenly over
who is to be the first favor maker. Since μok>1, this means that z should be maximized per
equation (43), so zˉ = min
{
1,
μoδHp((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}
= 1. And plugging in the values
to uHD from equation (44) yields uHD = 0.583. Assuming the designated first favor maker
is a high type, separation will take on average 2.22 rounds but it happens for sure and the
endgame will be a full EM game if both agents are high types.
Now compare these results to the SS equilibrium. From proposition 2.21 we have an
upper bound for the number of periods that separation may take
T = sup
{
t ∈ N : μo(1− 2p)
t−1
μo(1− 2p)t−1 + (1− μo)(1− p)t−1 ≥
1− δH
δHBM
}
.
Given the parameters the right-hand side of supremum function is 0.3794 while μa0 =
0.7 and μa1 = 0.2979 so T = 1. It is then straightforward to verify that z = (1, 0, 0, 0, ...)
maximizes the agents’ ex-ante payoffs. Remember that in a pure EM game with no desig-
nated first favor maker neither agent would make the first full favor by choice, however, the
difference in this example is that if the agent who receives the favor opportunity does not
do the favor, then the chance to separate is lost, so in essence she became the disadvantaged
agent as soon as she received the favor opportunity, and that is still better than an autarky
continuation payoff for the given parameters.
So in this case separation occurs with probability of 0.9 conditional on both agents
being high types and will lead to an endgame of full equality matching. The incentive
compatibility constraint is satisfied and the expected payoff from (53) is
uHsym = p− p
(
1− δH)+ μop ((1− δH)+ (k − 1) (1− δH (1− p))) = 0.599.
So in this example the SS equilibrium is clearly better than the best available DFFM
equilibrium, which makes sense since separation is .9 likely during the first period instead
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of just .45 likely, and the endgames are the same conditional on separation.
Example 2.24 (DFFM dominates SS) Consider two agents of unknown type who wish to
play a favor-trading game. Suppose p = 0.1, δL = 0.9, δH = 0.91, k = 2 and μo = 0.45.
Then δ∗ = 1
1+p(k−1) = 0.9091 =⇒ δL < δ∗ ≤ δH .
Consider a DFFM equilibrium first and suppose that the agents randomize over who
is to be the first favor maker. Since μok < 1, this means that z should be minimized per
(43), so z = μoδHpk
1−δL(1−p) = 0.4263. And plugging in the values to u
H
D from (44) yields
uHD = 0.1103, which is just above the autarky payoff of p = 0.1. Assuming the designated
first favor maker is a high type, separation will take on average 10 rounds but it happens for
sure sooner or later and the endgame will be a full EM game if both agents are high types.
Now compare these results to the SS equilibrium. From proposition 2.21 we have an
upper bound for the number of periods that separation may take
T = sup
{
t ∈ N : μo(1− 2p)
t−1
μo(1− 2p)t−1 + (1− μo) (1− p)t−1
≥ 1− δ
H
δHBM
}
.
Given the parameters the right-hand side of supremum function 1−δH
δHBM
= 0.4232 while
μa0 = 0.45 and μa1 = 0.4211 assuming no favor opportunity, and no favor was received,
so T = 1, separation has to occur within the first round of the game if at all. It is then
straightforward to verify that z = (1/M, 0, 0, ...) = (0.4263, 0, 0, ...) per condition (48)
maximizes the agents ex-ante payoff.
So in this case separation occurs with probability of .2 conditional on both agents being
high types and will lead to an endgame of full equality matching. The incentive compati-
bility constraint is satisfied and the expected payoff from (53) is
uHsym = p− p
(
1− δH)+ μop ((1− δH)+ (k − 1) (1− δH (1− p))) = 0.1037.
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So in this example the DFFM equilibrium is clearly better than any SS equilibrium,
which makes sense since separation is only .2 likely in the latter case whereas in the DFFM
equilibrium it happens with probability 1 sooner or later and the agents are fairly patient at
δH = 0.91.
2.5 Independent favor opportunities
In this section, unless otherwise stated, we assume favor opportunities arrive independently
across agents. In the model so far favor opportunities,wat andwbt , were modeled as mutually
exclusive. In particular, for p ∈ (0, 1/2) ,
P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (1, 0)
)
= P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (0, 1)
)
= p,
P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (0, 0)
)
= (1− 2p)
Because the favor opportunities were correlated they were also informative about the other
agent’s type. It would be fair to ask whether or not modeling favor opportunities as mutually
exclusive was a driving force behind any of the results and what impact this had on the
equilibria. To investigate these questions suppose that each agent still receives a favor
opportunity with probability p ∈ (0, 1), but this time the opportunities are independent of
each other. For the rest of this section, for p ∈ (0, 1) ,
P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (1, 1)
)
= p2
P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (1, 0)
)
= P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (0, 1)
)
= p(1− p)
P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (0, 0)
)
= (1− p)2
Note that the total autarky payoff remains the same as before if p is kept the same (p < 1/2).
If neither agent does favors the total average discounted value of the game is 2p as before.
Similarly, the first best outcome remains unchanged at 2pk if both do a favor whenever
possible. So have the results changed? The answer to this question with respect to equality
matching between two high type agents is no.
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Lemma 2.25 (EM with independent favor opportunities) In the complete information
environment, δH ≥ δ∗ is necessary and sufficient to implement any simple EM equilib-
rium that requires the disadvantaged agent to do a favor of size x, y ∈ (0, 1], regardless of
whether favor opportunities are independent or mutually exclusive.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as in the mutually exclusive case of lemma 2.4.
Below we go over the mathematics for the case of full equality matching (x = y = 1),
and explain why the result is the same as with mutually exclusive favor opportunities. A
complete proof is available in the appendix.
Suppose the advantaged agent’s EM payoff, uˉ′em, remains unchanged. Then it is imme-
diate that the disadvantaged agent’s payoff is also the same as before. If the disadvantaged
agent receives a favor opportunity (probability p), she does a full favor in return for a con-
tinuation promise of uˉ′em. If she does not receive a favor opportunity (probability 1 − p),
her continuation promise remains u′em. The equation, u′em = pδH uˉ′em + (1 − p)δHu′em
that defines u′em given uˉ′em is the same as its counterpart in the mutually exclusive favor
opportunities case, equation (1).
The incentive compatibility decision is between forgoing the cost of doing a (full) favor
today and receiving the autarky payoff as a continuation promise on the one hand, and doing
a full favor today in return for a continuation promise of uˉ′em. Whether or not the advantaged
agent has also received a favor opportunity that same period is clearly of no concern to the
disadvantaged agent’s utility trade-off decision. The autarky payoff is simply p, as before,
and the incentive compatibility constraint has not changed, so if uˉ′em is the same as in the
game with mutually exclusive favor opportunities, then so is the discount factor required
for cooperation; δH ≥ δ∗.
Therefore, it is enough to show that the advantaged agent’s EM payoff remains un-
changed. Writing uˉ′em in terms of the four events of the independent favor opportunity
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distribution yields
uˉ′em = p
2
((
1− δH) (k + 1) + δHu′em)+ p (1− p) (1−δH + δH uˉ′em)
+ (1− p)p ((1− δH) k + δHu′em)+ (1− p)2δH uˉ′em.
= p2
((
1− δH) (k + 1) + δHu′em)+ p (1− δH + δH uˉ′em)
− p2 (1− δH + δH uˉ′em)+ p ((1− δH) k + δHu′em)
− p2 ((1− δH) k + δHu′em)+ (1− 2p)δH uˉ′em + p2δH uˉ′em
= p
(
1− δH + δH uˉ′em
)
+ p
((
1− δH) k + δHu′em)+ (1− 2p)δH uˉ′em.
In the last step above, we canceled out the p2-terms to obtain the same equation as in the
case with mutually exclusive favor opportunities, equation (2). Therefore, it follows from
symmetry that uˉ′em = uˉem and u′em = uem, and so it follows that condition (5) is still the
correct bound for cooperation.
In subsection 2.4.2 we already discussed the problem of determining who is advantaged
and disadvantaged endogenously. With independent favor opportunities this matter is fur-
ther complicated by the possibility that both agents receive a favor opportunity in the same
period. One solution is formulate the strategy as follows: Agents are undesignated at the
start of the game. Undesignated agents are called to do a favor of size z. If an agent does
such a favor and the other agent does not, the former becomes advantaged and the latter
disadvantaged in a game of full equality matching that follows. If both undesignated agents
do a favor of size z, both remain undesignated and the stage game is repeated.
Lemma 2.26 (EM without initial designations) Consider a complete information envi-
ronment. Given z ∈ (0, 1], let t∗ := inf {s ∈ N|τs = (z, 0) or (0, z)}, denote the first
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(equilibrium) favor. Let (σ, μ) be defined as follows:
σi :=

I it = z1{wit=1} if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1, ωi = H and t ≤ t∗,
σiem (uem, uˉem)
from t = t∗ + 1 if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1,
ωi = H and τt∗ = (0, z),
σiem (uˉem, uem)
from t = t∗ + 1 if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1,
ωi = H and τt∗ = (z, 0),
σiaut otherwise,
(54)
μit :=

0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1
else if ∃n s.t. for j 6= i, Ijn =
 z if n ≤ t
∗
1 if n > t∗
(i.e. other agent has made the initial investment)
μit−1(1−p)
1−μit−1p otherwise.
(55)
Then (σ, μ) is a PBE for z ≤ 1/2.
Proof. In appendix. A rough outline of the proof and some results are presented below.
Once designations are determined, the game will be exactly the same as the one an-
alyzed in lemma 2.25. In particular, payoffs and incentive compatibility constraints will
be the same, so it is enough to evaluate the incentive compatibility constraint for an un-
designated agent. Let uˆzem denote her payoff. Then we can write uˆzem in terms of the four
possible combinations of favor opportunity events:
uˆzem = p
2
[(
1− δH) (1 + (k − 1) z) + δH uˆzem]
+ p(1− p) [(1− δH) (1− z) + δH uˉem]
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+ (1− p)p [(1− δH) kz + δHuem]+ (1− p)2δH uˆzem.
Proof. We already know uˉem and uem from the previous lemma, so the above equation
only has one unknown, solving for which yields,
uˆzem = p + C1 + C2z, where (56)
C1 ≡ δH(1−p)p2(k−1)1−δH+2δHp(1−p) and C2 ≡ (1−δ
H)p(k−1)
1−δH+2δHp(1−p)
The incentive compatibility constraint is
ICCndem : p
((
1− δH) (1 + (k − 1) z) + δH uˆzem)+ (1− p) ((1− δH) (1− z) + δH uˉem)
≥ p ((1− δH) (1 + kz) + δHuem)+ (1− p) (1− δH + δH uˆzem) .
When ICCndem binds we can solve for δH . Call the solution,
δHz :=
2z
2z + p [p− 3z + k(1− z − p(1− 2z))+√
(p− z)2 + k2(1− p− z + 2pz)2 + 2k(1− p− z)(z + p(1− 2z))
]

(57)
Alternatively we can solve for z given δH :
z = min
{
1,
δHp(p(1− δH + δHp) + k(1− p− δH(1− 3(1− p)p)))(
1− δH + δH(1 + k)p− 2δHkp2) (1− δH(1− 2p))
}
. (58)
Plugging in δH = δ∗, we obtain the bound z ≤ 1/2. Naturally this is the least upper
bound because agents with higher discount factors are willing to pay a higher cost for
future benefits. Finally, it is straightforward to verify that beliefs are consistent with σ and
Bayesian updating when applicable, so (σ, μ) is a PBE for z ≤ 1/2.
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Observe that setting z = 1/2 and implementing the strategy profile in lemma 2.26 is
equally efficient to designating one of the do the first favor in a full equality matching game.
The former strategy initially implements only half size, but with twice the likely as with
full equality matching, so the efficiency gain over autarky in both is p (k − 1). In particular,
uˆ1/2em =
1
2
p (k + 1) = p + 1
2
p (k − 1) . (59)
However, for δH > δ∗ we can implement a z > 1/2 determined by equation (58), and
thereby obtain an efficiency gain over EM with a designated disadvantaged agent from the
start. In particular, for z = 1, we need
δH ≥ δH1 :=
1
1− 2p+p2 (k + 1) > δ
∗. (60)
Note that (60) cannot be satisfied for any δH if p (k + 1) < 2, which roughly speaking
rules out cases in which both p and k are high. However, when (60) is satisfied, the initial
periods of symmetric favor strategies implement the first best outcome. The next corol-
lary follows by symmetry from the proposition 2.13 (the equivalent result for the case of
mutually exclusive favor opportunities), and is presented mainly as a formality.
Corollary 2.27 Let strategy profile (σ, μ) be such that
σa :=

σaem(z) (u, uˉ) if ht−1∈H∗t−1, ωa=H and t= inf {s∈N : was=1},
σaem (uˉ, u) from t=1+ inf {s∈N : was=1} if ht−1∈H∗t−1, ωa=H ,
σaaut otherwise,
(61)
σb :=
 σ
b
em (uˉ, u) from t=1+ inf {s∈N|τs= (z, 0)} if ht−1∈H∗t−1, ωb=H ,
σbaut otherwise,
(62)
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μat :=

0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1 if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and ∃n < t s.t. τn = (0, 1) ,
μo if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and @n ≤ t s.t. τn = (z, 0) ,
μat−1(1−p)
1−μat−1p otherwise,
(63)
μbt :=

0 if ht−1 /∈H∗t−1,
1 if ht−1∈H∗t−1 and ∃n<t s.t. τn= (z, 0) ,
μbt−1(1−p)
1−μbt−1p
otherwise,
(64)
z ∈ [z, zˉ] :=
[
μoδLpk
1−δL(1−p) , min
{
1,
μoδHp[(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)]
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}]
. (65)
Then (σ, μ) is a PBE profile.
Proof. Immediate from symmetry with proposition 2.13.
Proposition 2.28 (SS equilibria and independent arrivals) Denote the time of the first
favor with t∗ := inf{s ∈ N : τs = (zs, zs), (zs, 0) or (0, zs)} where inf{∅} ≡ ∞, and let
(σ, μ) be defined as follows for i ∈ {a, b} :
σi :=

I it = zt1{wit=1}
if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and ωi = H, t<t∗
(no one has done a favor yet),
I it = 1{wit=1}
starting at t = t∗ + 1 if τt∗ symmetric and
ending at n>t∗ + 1 s.t. τn−1 6= (1, 1) and
only if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and ωi = H,
σiem (uˉem, uem)
starting after first non-symmetric τt−1 if a did the
favor, and only if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and ωi = H,
σiem (uem, uˉem)
starting after first non-symmetric τt−1 if b did the
favor, and only if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and ωi = H,
σiaut otherwise,
(66)
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μit :=

0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1
if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1, t > t∗ and j 6= i did the
first favor or reciprocated,
μit−1(1−p)
1−μit−1p
otherwise.
(67)
Then if δH satisfies condition (60), there exists a sequence z = {zs}∞s=0 ∈ (0, 1]∞ such
that (σ, μ) is a separating PBE profile. If both agents are high types, σ will implement
separation with probability one.
Proof. Details in appendix.
2.6 Conclusion
We have shown that using a simple EM mechanism, immediate separation can be imple-
mented in favor-trading games with one-sided incomplete information with only the min-
imal requirement that δL < δ∗ for the low types. We also describe necessary conditions
for immediate separation into more profitable equilibria, and a workable strategy to reach
them over time if an immediate move is not possible. In the case of two-sided incomplete
information, separation can be guaranteed with probability 1 if one of the agents is des-
ignated to be the first favor maker at the beginning of the game. However, in numerical
testing symmetric equilibria with no designated first favor maker tended to perform better
even though these equilibria have the unfortunate characteristic that separation has to take
place within a fixed period at the beginning of the game before the gap between potential
beliefs about each other becomes too wide. With independent favor opportunities beliefs
remain symmetric until someone does a favor, and therefore separation under symmetric
equilibria is not limited to a finite period.
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2.7 Appendix A
Proof. (Lemma 2.7: Necessary and sufficient condition for separation under one-sided
incomplete information)
Suppose we start the game with agent b as the advantaged agent, and the level of trust
is z ∈ (0, 1]; that is agent a does a favor of size x = z if she receives a favor opportunity,
and does no further favors until the other agent, in this case agent b, reciprocates by doing
a favor of size y = z. It follows that in terms of average discounted payoffs
uem(z) = p
((
1− δH) (1− z) + δH uˉem(z))+ (1− p)δHuem(z)
= p
(1−δH)(1−z)+δH uˉem(z)
1−δH(1−p) .
uˉem(z) = p
((
1− δH)+ δH uˉem(z))
+ p
((
1− δH) kz + δHuem(z))+ (1− 2p)δH uˉem(z)
= p
(1−δH)(1+kz)+δHuem(z)
1−δH(1−p) .
The two equations above are in two unknowns, uem(z) and uˉem(z). Solving for these yields,
uem(z) = p + p
−(1−δH)+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z (68)
= p + Az where A≡p−(1−δ
H)+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) (69)
uˉem(z) = p + p
(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z (70)
= p + Bz where B≡p (1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) . (71)
For z fixed, as δH ranges from δ∗ to 1, uem(z) ranges from p top + 12p (k − 1) z and uˉem(z)
from p + p(k − 1)z to p + 1
2
p (k − 1) z. In particular, for any δH ∈ [δ∗, 1),
uem(z) + uˉem(z) = 2p + p(k − 1)z, or
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= p (k + 1) for z = 1. (72)
Agent a’s incentive compatibility constraint is
ICCaem(z) :
(
1− δH) (1− z) + δH uˉem(z) ≥ (1− δH)+ δHuem(z)
⇐⇒ uˉem(z) − uem(z) − (
1−δH)
δH
z ≥ 0,
which using equations (68) and (70) is equivalent to
p + p (1−δ
H)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z − p− p
−(1−δH)+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z ≥
(1−δH)
δH
z
solving for δH =⇒ 1
1+p(k−1) ≤ δH .
Recall that δ∗ = 1
1 + p (k − 1) so δ
∗ ≤ δH is necessary and sufficient to implement any
simple EM strategy profile. x = y = 1 ensures the greatest gains from cooperation.
Proof. (Lemma 2.8: HSSGL payoff to advantaged low types)
Let vLs denote agent b’s continuation payoff s periods after the game starts conditional
on b not having received a favor yet. Let vLs denote agent b’s continuation payoff s periods
after she has received a favor. And let xˉs and xs denote the favors as specified by (16) and
(17) that agent a will do following states associated with vLs and vLs , respectively. From
equation (11) we already know that x0 = 1 and x0 = δ
H−δ∗
δH+δ∗ . Given the notation, we may
write agent b’s expected payoff as follows,
vL0 = p
((
1− δL) kx0 + δLvL0 )+ (1− p)((1− δL) p1−p + δLvL1)
= p
(
1− δL)+ pδLvL0 + p (1− δL) kx0 + (1− p) δLvL1
= p
(
1− δL)+ pδLvL0 + p (1− δL) kx0
+ (1− p)δL (p (1− δL)+ pδLvL0 + p (1− δL) kx1 + (1− p)δLvL2 )
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= p
(
1− δL) (1 + (1− p)δL)+ pδLvL0 (1 + (1− p)δL)
+ p
(
1− δL) k (x0 + (1− p)δLx1)+ ((1− p)δL)2 vL2
= p
(
1− δL) (1 + d + d2 + ...)+ pδLvL0 (1 + d + d2 + ...)
+ p
(
1− δL) k (x0 + dx1 + d2x2 + ...) where d = (1− p)δL
= p1−δ
L
1−d +
pδL
1−dv
L
0 + p
(
1− δL) k ∞∑
t=0
dtxt. (73)
To proceed further, we need to calculate vL0 and xt.
Claim 2.8a: Let uˉ (t) denote the HSSGL continuation promise to an advantaged agent
t periods since the last favor in a game of complete information. Then,
uˉ (t) = p +
(δH)
t+1
(1−δ∗)+(1−δH)(δ∗)t+1
(δH)tδ∗(δH+δ∗)
, (74)
xt =
δH+(δ∗/δH)
t
δ∗
δH+δ∗ . (75)
Proof of claim 2.8a: By (14) and (15),
uˉ = u +
2(1−δH)
δH+δ∗ = p +
δH−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1
δ∗ +
2(1−δH)
δH+δ∗
= p +
δH(1−δ∗)+(1−δH)δ∗
δ∗(δH+δ∗) = uˉ (0) .
Suppose (74) holds for some s ∈ N, then by (17),
uˉ (s + 1) = δ∗
(
uˉ(s)−(1−δH)p
δH
+ u(1−δ
∗)
δ∗
)
= δ∗
(
1
δH
(
p+
(δH)
s+1
(1−δ∗)+(1−δH)(δ∗)s+1
(δH)sδ∗(δH+δ∗)
)
−p1−δH
δH
+
(
p+ δ
H−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1
δ∗
)
1−δ∗
δ∗
)
= δ∗
(
1
δH
−1−δH
δH
+1−δ
∗
δ∗
)
p+ δ
∗
δH
(δH)
s+1
(1−δ∗)+(1−δH)(δ∗)s+1
(δH)sδ∗(δH+δ∗) +(1−δ∗) δ
H−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1
δ∗
= p +
(δH)
s+2
(1−δ∗)+(1−δH)(δ∗)s+2
(δH)s+1δ∗(δH+δ∗)
= uˉ (s + 1) .
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Given that equation (74) holds for s+1 if it holds for s, and we know it holds for s = 0,
then by induction (74) must hold for all s ∈ N. Last, it is a straightforward computation to
verify that if we apply (16), the equation to compute HSSGL favors from payoffs, to (74),
the hypothetical payoff to a high type, and simplify, formula (75) results. [¥]
Claim 2.8b: Let u (t) denote the HSSGL continuation promise to a disadvantaged
agent t periods since the last favor in the complete information game. Then,
u (t) = p +
(δH)
t+1
(1−δ∗)−(1−δH)(δ∗)t+1
(δH)tδ∗(δH+δ∗)
(76)
xt =
δH−(δ∗/δH)tδ∗
δH+δ∗ (77)
Proof of claim 2.8b: By (14), u = p + δH−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1
δ∗ = u (0). Suppose (76) holds for some
s ∈ N, then by (17)
u (s + 1) = δ∗
(
u(s)−(1−δH)p
δH
+ u(1−δ
∗)
δ∗
)
= δ
∗
δH
(
p +
(δH)
s+1
(1−δ∗)−(1−δH)(δ∗)s+1
(δH)sδ∗(δH+δ∗)
)
− 1−δH
δH
p +
(
p + δ
H−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1
δ∗
)
1−δ∗
δ∗
= δ∗
(
1
δH
− 1−δH
δH
+ 1−δ
∗
δ∗
)
p + δ
∗
δH
(δH)
s+1
(1−δ∗)−(1−δH)(δ∗)s+1
(δH)sδ∗(δH+δ∗) +
δH−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1−δ∗
δ∗
= p +
(δH)
s+2
(1−δ∗)+(1−δH)(δ∗)s+2
(δH)s+1δ∗(δH+δ∗)
.
Given that (76) holds for s + 1 if it holds for s, and we know it holds for s = 0, then by
induction (76) must hold for all s ∈ N. Last, it is a straightforward computation to verify
that if we apply (16), the equation to calculate favors from payoffs, to (76), the hypothetical
payoff to a high type, and simplify, and simplify, formula (77) results. [¥]
Claim 2.8c: Let d = (1− p)δL, then
vL0 = p + pk (1− d)
∞∑
t=0
dtxt (78)
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Proof of claim 2.8c: Proceeding as before.
vL0 = p
((
1− δL) kx0 + δLvL0 )+(1− p)((1− δL) p1−p + δLvL1)
= p
(
1− δL)+ pδLvL0 + p (1− δL) kx0 + (1− p)δLvL1
= p
(
1− δL)+ pδLvL0 + p (1− δL) kx0
+ (1− p)δL ((1− δL) p + pδLvL0 + p (1− δL) kx1 + (1− p)δLvL2 )
= p
(
1− δL) (1 + (1− p)δL)+ pδLvL0 (1 + (1− p)δL)
+ p
(
1− δL) k (x0 + (1− p) δLx1)+ ((1− p)δL)2 vL2
= p
(
1− δL) (1 + d + d2 + ...)+ pδLvL0 (1 + d + d2 + ...)
+ p
(
1− δL) k (x0 + dx1 + d2x2+...) where d = (1− p)δL
=
p(1−δL)
1−d +
pδL
1−dv
L
0 + p
(
1− δL) k∑∞t=0dtxt
= p + pk(1− d)∑∞t=0dtxt
This proves (78). [¥]
We can now return to equation (73) for vL0 and substituting in for vL0 from (78) yields,
vL0 =
p(1−δL)
1−d +
pδL
1−d
(
p + pk (1− d)
∞∑
t=0
dtxt
)
+ p
(
1− δL) k ∞∑
t=0
dtxt
=
p(1−δL)
1−d +
p2δL
1−d + p
2kδL
∞∑
t=0
dtxt + p
(
1− δL) k ∞∑
t=0
dtxt
= p + pk
∞∑
t=0
dt
(
pδLxt +
(
1− δL) xt)
Using (75) and (77) for xt and xt, respectively, we can write the last equation as
vL0 = p + pk
∞∑
t=0
dt
(
pδL
δH−(δ∗/δH)tδ∗
δH+δ∗ +
(
1− δL) δH+(δ∗/δH)tδ∗
δH+δ∗
)
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= p + pk
∞∑
t=0
dt
(δH)
t+1
(1−δL(1−p))+(δ∗)t+1(1−δL−δLp)
(δH)t(δH+δ∗)
= p + pk
∞∑
t=0
dt
1−δL(1−p)+αt+1(1−δL−δLp)
1+α
where α = δ
∗
δH
= p + pk 1−δ
L(1−p)
(1+α)(1−d) + pk
α(1−δL−δLp)
(1+α)(1−αd) .
Next we substitute d = (1− p) δL and α = δ∗/δH back in,
vL0 = p + pk
1−δL(1−p)
(1+δ∗/δH)(1−(1−p)δL) + pk
(δ∗/δH)(1−δL−δLp)
(1+δ∗/δH)(1−(δ∗/δH)(1−p)δL)
= p + pk
δH(δH+δ∗−2δLδ∗)
(δH+δ∗)(δH−δLδ∗(1−p)) .
This concludes the proof.
Proof. (Simple lower bound for δˉL)
Suppose agent b is a low type, then b’s incentive compatibility constraint to do the first
favor is
ICCLhssgl : δ
LvL0 ≥
(
1− δL)+ δLp
Substituting in for vL0 from equation (22) yields
δL
(
p + pk
δH(δH+δ∗−2δLδ∗)
(δH+δ∗)(δH−δLδ∗(1−p))
)
≥ 1− δL + δLp (79)
The above inequality implicitly defines the exact upper bound necessary to deter low types
from pooling with high types. Call this bound δˉL. Cancel δLp on both sides of inequal-
ity (79), multiply what is left on the right side by the denominator of the left side, take
everything to the left side and write the inequality as a polynomial of δL, then
δ∗
(−δH − δ∗ + δHp + δ∗p− 2δHpk) (δL)2
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+
(
δH + δ∗
) (
δH + δ∗ − δ∗p + δHpk) δL − δH (δH + δ∗) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ − δ
∗(δH+δ∗−δHp−δ∗p+2δHpk)
δH(δH+δ∗)
(
δL
)2
+
(δH+δ∗)(δH+δ∗−δ∗p+δHpk)
δH(δH+δ∗) δ
L−1 ≥ 0
⇐⇒
≡Aˆ︷ ︸︸ ︷
−α(1+α(1−p)+p(2k−1))
(1+α)
(
δL
)2
+
≡Bˆ︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1+α (1−p) +pk)δL−1 ≥ 0
where α=δ∗/δH
(80)
Let Q
(
δL
)
:=
(
δL
)2
Aˆ + δLBˆ − 1 for Aˆ and Bˆ defined above. (81)
If the inequality (80) binds, expressions (80)-(81) define a quadratic equation for the upper
bound of δL with the following two solutions,
δˉL =
2
Bˆ ±
√
Bˆ2 + 4Aˆ
(82)
where Aˆ and Bˆ refer to expressions from equation (80). First we need to verify that Bˆ2 +
4Aˆ>0 so that our solutions are real numbers
Bˆ2 + 4Aˆ = (1 + α(1− p) + pk)− 4α(1+α(1−p)+p(2k−1))
1+α
> 0
= 1
1+α
(1− α− α2 + α3 + 2αp− 2α3p + 2kp− 4αkp)
+ α2kp + α2p2+α3p2 − 2αkp2−2α2kp2 + k2p2 + αk2p2) > 0
= 1
1+α
(
(1− α)2(1 + α) + 2(1− α) (α(1 + α)
+k(1− α)) p + (1 + α)(k − α)2p2) > 0,
the above expression is positive since every term in it is clearly positive. In addition, Aˆ <
0, Bˆ > 0, so the denominator, and hence both roots defined by (82), are also real and
positive. Since Aˆ < 0, we know the quadratic equation Q
(
δL
)
defined by (81) is strictly
concave with two positive, real roots. Since we are interested in the least upper bound for
δL, the appropriate solution to Q
(
δL
)
= 0, or alternatively, the left side of ICCLhssgl (the
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deviation), exceeds the right side after if δL is greater than
δˉL =
2
Bˆ +
√
Bˆ2 + 4Aˆ
. (83)
where Aˆ and Bˆ are defiend in expression 80.
Proof. (Corollary 2.12: From EM to HSSGL) If a low type does a full favor y = 1,
then for the next T periods it will be optimal for her to play the autarky strategy instead
of exchanging favors according to the simple EM mechanism as was shown in section 2.
Therefore we may ignore favor opportunities she receives during those T periods as far as
the incentive compatibility constraint is concerned because she would have received these
opportunities had she chosen not to deviate by doing a favor of size y = 1. However, we
do have to calculate the expected amount she will receive in reciprocation from agent a.
Namely, in the first period after separation agent a will receive a favor opportunity with
probability p and do a full favor worth k, but she will not do any further favors during the
rest of the T periods since agent b does not reciprocate. With probability (1 − p)p agent
a will not receive a favor opportunity during period 1, but will do so in period 2, and thus
does a full favor, but no more until reciprocation for the rest of the T periods. And so forth
for the other T periods. Let vL be her expected payoff from deviating minus the (autarky)
favor costs saved during the first T periods,
vL =
(
1− δL) (pk + δL (1− p) p + (δL)2 (1− p)2pk + . . .
+
(
δL
)T−1
(1− p)T−1pk
)
+
(
δL
)T
(1− p)T vL + (δL)T (1− (1− p)T ) vL,
where the
(
δL
)T
-terms are the continuation payments after T periods pass. With probabil-
ity (1 − p)T agent a did not receive income during any of the T periods and was thus not
able to reciprocate which is why agent b remains advantaged and receives the continuation
promise vL. Otherwise a has reciprocated and is currently the advantaged agent, so b’s
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continuation promise is vL.
Note that the above equation contains a geometric series that can be written more com-
pactly, and using the fact that vL≤vL we know
vL ≤ (1− δL) pk∑T−1t=0 (δL − δLp)t + (δL)T (1− p)T vL + (δL)T vL − (δL)T (1− p)T vL
= pk
(1−δL)
(
1−(δL−δLp)T
)
1−δL(1−p) +
(
δL
)T
vL. (84)
The incentive compatibility constraint for the low type not to pool is δLvL ≤ 1 − δL +(
δL
)T+1
p. Note that both sides of the inequality exclude T -terms after the initial favor by
agent b since they cancel each other out. Then according to condition (84) it is sufficient to
show that
δL
(1−δL)pk
(
1−(δL−δLp)T
)
1−δL(1−p) +
(
δL
)T+1
vL ≤ 1− δL + (δL)T+1 p.
Since
(
1− (δL − δLp)T)<1 and vL<p (k + 1) by (26) from the proof of lemma 2.10 it is
enough to show that
δL
(1−δL)pk
1−δL(1−p) +
(
δL
)T+1
p (1 + k) ≤ (1− δL)+ (δL)T+1 p
⇐⇒ δL (1−δ
L)pk
1−δL(1−p) ≤ 1− δL −
(
δL
)T+1
pk
⇐⇒ δL pk
1−δL(1−p) ≤ 1−
(δL)
T+1
1−δL pk. (85)
To enforce the inequality we need to construct a T sufficiently high that it holds. To this
end observe that since δL < δ∗ there exists ε > 0 such that
δL pk
1−δL(1−p) + ε = δ
∗ pk
1−δL(1−p) =
pk
(1+p(k−1))(1−δL(1−p)) .
Choose T to be the least integer such that pk
(
δL
)T+1
/
(
1− δL) ≤ ε/2. Simplifying the
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last expression, it is straightforward to show that
pk
(1+p(k−1))(1−δL(1−p)) <
pk
(1+p(k−1))(1−δ∗(1−p)) = 1,
so we have that the left-hand side of (85) is strictly than 1 − ε and the right-hand side is
greater than 1 − ε/2, therefore (85) holds, which implies that the incentive compatibility
constraint is satisfied and therefore the low type will not pool for this choice of T.
Proof. (Proposition 2.13: DFFM equilibria) Consider the agent designated to do the first
favor of size z. Let uHz and uH−z denote the expected payoffs, respectively, for a high type
who did and did not do the initial z favor. Similarly, for a low type let uLz and uL−z = p
denote the analogous payoffs. The latter payoff is equal to p, the autarky payoff, since we
are considering just one shot deviations and if the low type does not deviate in the given
period by mimicking the high type then she just falls back to the specified equilibrium
autarky strategy. Then for the specified equilibrium to work the incentive compatibility
constraints for the designated high and low types, respectively, require that
ICCHD :
(
1− δH) (1− z) + δHuHz ≥ 1− δH + δHuH−z (86)
ICCHD :
(
1− δL) (1− z) + δLuLz ≤ 1− δL + δLp (87)
and the continuation payoffs uHz , uH−z and uLz can be expanded into the component when
facing a low type and the component when facing a high type. Namely,
uHz = (1− μo) p + μouˉem, (88)
uH−z = (1− μo) uHL−z + μouHH−z , (89)
uLz = (1− μo) p + μouLHz . (90)
75
As before, uˉem denotes the equality matching payoff expected by an advantaged high type
facing another high type. So for example, if a high type does a favor of size z this period,
then her continuation payoff is just the autarky payoff p with probability (1− μo) since that
is the likelihood he is facing a low type that will not return any favors, and with probability
μo he is facing another high type agent so her continuation value is uˉem. Payoffs uHL−z
and uH−z denote the continuation values for a high type agent who didn’t do the favor this
turn (i.e. deviated from the proposed equilibrium strategy), but will at the next available
opportunity when facing a low type agent and a high type agent, respectively, since we are
just considering one-shot deviations. Finally, uLHz denotes the expected payoff for a low
type who mimicked a high type by doing a favor of size z; namely the expected value of
a one-time full favor from the high type agent at the next available opportunity combined
with the agent’s own favor opportunities for the rest of the game. In other words
uHL−z = p
((
1− δH) (1− z) + δHp)+ (1− p)δHuHL−z
= p
(1−δH)(1−z)+δHp
1−δH(1−p) , (91)
uHH−z = p
((
1− δH) (1− z) + δH uˉem)+ (1− p)δHuHH−z
= p
(1−δH)(1−z)+δH uˉem
1−δH(1−p) , (92)
uLHz = p
((
1− δL) k + δLp)+ p (1− δL + δLuLHz )+ (1− 2p)δLuLHz
= p
(1−δL)(k+1)+δLp
1−δL(1−p) . (93)
To find the lower bound for z, substitute the expression for uLz from (90) and substitute it
into the incentive compatibility constraint for the low type given by (87), which yields
(
1− δL) (1− z) + δL ((1− μo) p + μouLHz ) ≤ 1− δL + δLp.
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We use (93) to replace uLHz ,
(
1− δL) (1− z) + δL((1− μo) p + μo(p(1−δL)(k+1)+δLp1−δL(1−p) )) ≤ 1− δL + δLp.
And solve for z and simplify to obtain the following lower bound,
z ≥ μoδLpk
1−δL(1−p) ≡ z. (94)
At first it might look like the above lower bound could violate feasibility constraints for k
large enough, but condition (5), δ∗ > δL = 1
1+p(k−1) , rules this out, which will be shown
later, since as k grows large, the upper bound for δL grows proportionally small. So we
need z ≥ z to deter the low types from mimicking the high types. Next we need to solve
for the highest z a designated high type agent would be willing to do a favor in order to
signal her type and become the advantaged agent in an equality matching game if the other
agent also turns out to be a high type. To this end we need to substitute the expressions for
uHz and uH−z from (88) and (89), respectively, into the incentive compatibility constraint for
the high type (86) which yields
(
1− δH) (1− z) + δH ((1− μo) p + μouˉem) ≥ 1− δH + δH ((1− μo) uHL−z + μouHH−z )
Next substitute in expressions for uHL−z and uHH−z from (91) and (92), respectively,
(
1− δH) (1− z) + δH ((1− μo) p + μouˉem) ≥ 1− δH
+ δH
(
(1− μo) p(1−δ
H)(1−z)+δHp
1−δH(1−p) + μop
(1−δH)(1−z)+δH uˉem
1−δH(1−p)
)
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And also substitute in for uˉem from (4) to get
(
1− δH) (1− z) + δH ((1− μo) p + μo p(1−δH(1−p))(1+k)1−δH(1−2p) ) ≥ 1− δH
+ δH
(1− μo) p(1−δH)(1−z)+δHp1−δH(1−p) + μop(1−δH)(1−z)+δH p(1−δ
H (1−p))(1+k)
1−δH (1−2p)
1−δH(1−p)

Finally solve for the z and simplify, which results in
z ≤ min
{
1,
μoδHp((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}
≡ zˉ. (95)
The last step is to verify that zˉ ≥ z. To this end, we show that z from (94) is increasing in
δL :
∂z
∂δL
= μopk
(1−δL(1−p))2 > 0
=⇒ z ≤ z|δL=δ∗ =
μoδ
Lpk
1− δL (1− p)
∣∣∣∣
δL=
1
1+p(k−1)
= μo.
So it is enough to verify that zˉ ≥ μo and incidentally this also proved that z ≤ 1.To show
that zˉ ≥ μo proceed as before:
∂zˉ
∂δH
= μop
(1−δH)2k+2δHp(1−δH(1−p))(k−1)
(1−δH)2(1−δH(1−2p))2 > 0
=⇒ zˉ ≥ zˉ|δL=δ∗ = μoδHp (
1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
∣∣∣∣
δL= 1
1+p(k−1)
= μo.
In other words, zˉ ≥ z, so this equilibrium is incentive compatible for both types for any
pre-agreed z ∈ [z, zˉ] as specified by equations (94) and (95).
Proof. (Lemma 2.17: First period separating equilibria) First, observe that the belief
system simply states each agent begins the game assuming that the other is a high type with
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probability μo, and if the other agent makes an observable deviation from the equilibrium
path (ht−1 /∈H∗t−1), she is believed to be a low type. If there has been no public deviation and
the other agent has either done a favor of size z1 in the first period, or size 1 as reciprocation
in some other period (ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and ∃n ≤ t s.t. τ1 =
(
Ij1 , 0
)
or
(
0, Ij1
)
for j = a or
b, respectively), she is believed to be a high type. Note that Ij1 > 0 must be z1 in the first
period) or subsequently 1 otherwise it would be off-equilibrium path. Next if the agent
receives a favor opportunity this period or did so in the first period without doing a favor
(ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and {wit = 1 or wi1 6= τ1 = 0}), the other agent cannot do a favor or will
not do a favor per σ so beliefs about her remain as they were last period. In the latter
case, they would remain μo forever. Another possibility is that the agent received no favor
opportunity and no favor during the first period
(
ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and wi1 = τ1 = 0
)
so both
agents revert to autarky and there will be no more informative signals on the equilibrium
path. Therefore, her belief about the other agent will just be updated once from μo to
μo(1−2p)
1−(1+μo)p forever. The last possibility (”otherwise”) is that the agent did an initial favor and
is now waiting for reciprocation, and each period she does not receive either reciprocation
or a favor opportunity, her previous belief about the other agent is updated according to
Bayes’ rule. It is easy to see that this belief system is consistent with strategy profile σ
provided that the low types do not attempt to pool with the high types, and that the high
types do not choose the autarky strategy because their favor could be wasted on a low type.
Therefore, it is sufficient to check that z1 is high enough so that a low type has no incentive
to mimic a high type, and that a high type would not be better off choosing the autarky
strategy. Let uLz denote the expected continuation payoff for a low type, say agent b, who
does a favor of size z1.
E
(
uLz |ωa = H
) ≡ u = p ((1− δL)+ δLu)+ p ((1− δL) k + δLp)+ (1− 2p)δLu
= p
(1−δL)(1+k)+δLp
1−δL(1−p) .
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Using the above equation, it follows that
uLz = P (ω
a = L) p + P (ωa = H) E
(
uLz |ωa = H
)
= (1− μo) p + μoE
(
uLz |ωa = H
)
= (1− μo) p + μop(1−δ
L)(1+k)+δLp
1−δL(1−p) . (96)
The incentive compatibility constraint for a low type who has received a favor opportunity
in the first period not to mimic the high type is
ICCLz :
(
1− δL) (1− z1) + δLuLz ≤ (1− δL)+ δLp
⇐⇒ uLz − p ≤
(
1− δL) z1/δL
⇐⇒ (1− μo) p + μop(1−δ
L)(1+k)+δLp
1−δL(1−p) − p ≤ 1−δ
L
δL
z1 by (96)
=⇒ z1 ≥ μoδLpk1−δL(1−p) ≡ z1 (97)
Observe that z1 = μoδLpk/
(
1− δL(1− p)) < μoδ∗pk/ (1− δ∗(1− p)) = μo < 1. Next
consider a high type, say agent a, who receives a favor opportunity in period 1. Let uHz
denote the expected continuation payoff to a high type who does a favor of size z1. Then
uHz = (1− μo) p + μouˉem = (1− μo) p + μo
p(1−δH(1−p))(1+k)
1−δH(1−2p) using (4)
The incentive compatibility constraint for the high type who received a favor opportunity
in the first period to do a favor of size z1 is,
ICCHz :
(
1− δH) (1− z1) + δHuHz ≥ (1− δH)+ δHp
⇐⇒ (1− μo) p + μo p(1−δ
H(1−p))(1+k)
1−δH(1−2p) − p ≥ 1−δ
H
δH
z1
=⇒ z1 ≤ μoδ
H((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
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∴ let zˉem1 ≡ min
{
1,
μoδH((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}
(98)
To finish the proof it is necessary to show that [z1, zˉ1] 6= ∅. Recall that z1 < μo, so if
zˉ1 = 1, then it is immediate that [z1, zˉ1] 6= ∅. Therefore suppose that zˉ1 < 1, then it is
enough to show that zˉ1 − z1 > 0. To this end
zˉ1 − z1 =
μoδH((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p)) − μoδ
Lpk
1−δL(1−p)
=
δH((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p)) − δ
Lpk
1−δL(1−p)
The expression above shows that the existence of a separating equilibrium in this game does
not depend on μo, the fraction of high types. Still supposing zˉ1 < 1, taking the derivative
of zˉ1 with respect to δH in equation (98) and rearranging yields
dzˉ1
dδH
= μop
(1−δH)2k+2δHp(k−1)(1−δH(1−p))
(1−δH)2(1−δH(1−2p))2
From the above expression it is easy to see that dzˉ1/dδH > 0 since k − 1 > 0. Therefore
zˉ1 is minimized at δH = δ∗ = 1/ (1 + p (k − 1)). Substituting 1/ (1 + p (k − 1)) for δH in
the expression for zˉ1 and simplifying yields zˉ1 = μo. Therefore [z1, zˉ1] 6= ∅. (Again recall
that z1 < μo).
Proof. (Proposition 2.19: Separation between high types time restricted by mutually
exclusive favor opportunity distribution) Suppose to the contrary of proposition 2.19 that
for each period there exists [zt, zˉt] 6= ∅, zt > 0 of potential first favors, and an equilibrium
strategy profile (σ, μ), such that if an agent does a favor of size zt in period t, and that is
the first favor in the game, then the other agent believes she is facing a high type with prob-
ability one. Furthermore, suppose (σ, μ) subsequently implements an EM game between
high types at level m (zt), for some function m : [0, 1] → [0, 1], and that the initial favor
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maker (presumed high type) is the first advantaged agent in the EM game. And suppose
(σ, μ) specifies the autarky strategy for low types.
To prove that (σ, μ) or any equivalent profile cannot be an equilibrium, suppose, without
loss of generality, that agent b, is a low type. Then if b deviates from the autarky strategy,
and does a favor of size zt, she would receive a continuation payoff of p if she is facing
another low type, and vLHzt if she is facing a high type, where
vLHzt = p
((
1− δL) (1 + k m (zt)) + δLp)+ (1− p)δLvLHzt
= p
(1−δL)(1+k m(zt))+δLp
1−δL(1−p) = p +
p(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p)m (zt) , (99)
so her expected continuation payoff would be
vLzt =
(
1− μbt
)
p + μbtv
LH
zt
=
(
1− μbt
)
p + μbtp + μ
b
t
p(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p)m (zt)
= p + μbt
p(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p)m (zt) (100)
And if agent b does not do the favor, her continuation payoff is p if agent a is a low type,
and vLH−zt if a is a high type, where
vLH−zt = p
(
1− δL + δLvLH−zt+1
)
+ p
((
1− δL) kzt+1 + δLp)+ (1− 2p)δLvLH−zt+1
= p
(
1− (1− p)δL)+ p (1− δL) k︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b
zt+1 + (1− p)δL︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡a
vLH−zt+1
= p (1− a) + bzt+1 + a
(
p (1− a) + bzt+2 + a
(
vLH−zt+2
))
,
iteratively expanding each vLH. and collecting like terms
produces the following geometric sums
= p (1− a) (1 + a + a2 + ...)+ b (zt+1 + azt+2 + a2zt+3 + ...)
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= p + b
∑∞
i=0a
izt+1+i = p + p
(
1− δL) kSLH ,
where SLH =
∑∞
i=0
(
(1− p)δL)i zt+1+i.
Then it follows that
vL−zt =
(
1− μbt
)
p + μbt
[
p + p
(
1− δL) kSLH]
= p + μbtp
(
1− δL) kSLH (101)
In order for agent b not to pool with high types we need zt large enough that her incentive
compatibility constraint to follow the autarky strategy instead of deviating is satisfied for
all t.
ICCLz :
(
1− δL) (1− zt) + δLvLzt ≤ (1− δL)+ δLvL−zt
⇐⇒ zt ≥ δL1−δL
(
vLzt − vL−zt
)
Substituting in for vLzt and v
L
−zt from (100) and (101) yields,
zt ≥ δL(1−δL)
(
p + μbt
p(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p)m (zt)− p− μbtp
(
1− δL) kSLH)
= μbt
δLp(1−δL)k
1−δL
(
m(zt)
1−δL(1−p) − SLH
)
= μbtδ
Lpk
(
m(zt)
1−δL(1−p) − SLH
)
,
=
μbtδ
Lpk
1−δL(1−p)
(
m (zt)− zLHt
)
, where zLHt ∈ (0, zˉt+1) is s.t.∑∞
i=0
(
(1− p)δL)i zt+1+i = ∑∞i=0 ((1− p)δL)i zLHt = zLHt1−δL(1−p) . (102)
The incentive compatibility constraint needs to hold for every t and every possible
history, so consider the history that maximizes the right-hand side, hbt = {1, 1, ..., 1}, and
a public history of no favors assuming agent b follows the autarky strategy as specified
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by σ for low types. Then μbt = μo and the right-hand side of the low type’s incentive
compatibility constraint satisfies
μbtδ
Lpk
1−δL(1−p)
(
m (zt)− zLHt
) ≤ μoδLpk
1−δL(1−p)
(
m (zt)− zLHt
)
=
m (zt)− zLHt
M
by def’n of M from (48).
Then zt must satisfy
zt ≥ m (zt)− z
LH
t
M
, ∀t, (103)
or else there exists a set of histories, that occur with strictly positive probability, such that a
low type would could profit by mimicking a high type. Conversely, if (103) holds, the low
types will never pool with high types, and given a sequence z ≡ {zt}∞t=1, condition (103)
represents the greatest lower bound on the individual terms of the sequence z. Rearranging
we obtain condition
m (zt) ≤ Mzt + zLHt , ∀t, (104)
for the least upper bound on m (zt) conditional on sequence z specified by (σ, μ). And
independent of z,
m (zt) < Mzt + zˉt+1 since zLHt ∈ (0, zˉt+1)
=⇒ m (zt) < Mzt + 1, ∀zt and m (zˉt) < (M + 1) zˉt (105)
since zˉt is decreasing in t. Furthermore, if z is a decreasing sequence, (104) implies that
m (zt) ≤ Mzt + zt
=⇒ m (zt)
zt
≤ M + 1. (106)
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Observe that the above condition rules out functions of the form m (zt) = c ∈ (0, 1]
(constant bounds), for example. Given a sequence of zt, let t∗ = inf
{
t ∈ N : zt∗ ≤ cM+1
}
and suppose hbt∗ = {1, 1, ..., 1}, then μbt∗ = μo so the low type’s incentive compatibility
constraint to follow the autarky strategy would be violated. In this example, the violation
would occur with probability greater than pt∗ . Also, note that t∗ 6= ∞ since zt → 0 as
t → ∞ because a high type grows more pessimistic each period that goes by without an
initial favor, and therefore the largest favor she is willing to do to separate must also be
decreasing.4 If m (zt) is chosen appropriately, for example m (zt) = min {(M + 1) zt, 1},
then low types would have no incentive to mimic high types even if they knew they were
facing one with certainty. However, we still need to consider the incentive compatibility
constraints for the high type, say, without loss of generality, for agent a:
ICCHz :
(
1− δH) (1− zt) + δHuHzt ≥ (1− δH)+ δHuH−zt ,
where uHzt and u
H
−zt are the expected continuation payoffs for a high type if she does a favor
of size zt and if she does no favor, respectively. Then these payoffs can be broken down
into two separate components, the payoffs when facing a high and a low type, respectively,
uHzt = (1− μat ) uHLzt + μat uHHzt , and
uH−zt = (1− μat ) uHL−zt + μat uHH−zt .
Clearly uHLzt = p, the autarky payoff, since σ dictates that agent a, who did the first favor, do
no more favors until reciprocation is received, and that agent b, a low type in this instance,
do no favors. If b is a high type, a’s expected payoff is uHHzt = uˉem(m(zt)) = p + B m (zt)
per (71). To compute the components of uH−zt recall that we are considering just one-shot
4The initial favors under (σ, μ) that are incentive compatible for a high type could be weakly decreasing
at first (sequence of full favors), but must become strictly decreasing once the high type grows sufficiently
pessimistic that her incentive compatibility constraint binds.
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deviations, so next period agent a is assumed to do a favor of size zt+1 if she receives a
favor opportunity, or she could receive a favor of size zt+1 from agent b if b is a high type,
and so forth. Namely,
uHL−zt = p
((
1− δH) (1− zt+1) + δHp)+ (1− p) δHuHL−zt+1
= p
(
1− (1− p) δH)− p (1− δH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b
zt+1 + (1− p) δH︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡a
uHL−zt+1
= p (1− a)− bzt+1 + a
(
p (1− a)− bzt+2 + a
(
uHL−zt+2
))
,
iteratively expanding each vHL. and collecting like
terms produces the following geometric sums
= p (1− a) (1 + a + a2 + ...)− b (zt+1 + azt+2 + a2zt+3 + ...)
= p1−a
1−a − b
∑∞
i=0a
izt+1+i = p− p
(
1− δH)SHL,
where SHL =
∑∞
i=0
(
(1− p)δH)i zt+1+i.
Performing a similar calculation for uHH−zt yields
uHH−zt = p
((
1− δH) (1− zt+1) + δH uˉem(m(zt+1)))
+ p
((
1− δH) kzt+1 + δHuem(m(zt+1)))+ (1− 2p)δHuHH−zt+1
= p
(
1− δH)+ pδH (uˉem(m(zt+1)) + uem(m(zt+1)))
+ p
(
1− δH) (k − 1) zt+1 + (1− 2p) δHuHH−zt+1
= p
(
1− δH)+ pδH (2p + p (k − 1) m (zt+1))
+ p
(
1− δH) (k − 1) zt+1 + (1− 2p) δHuHH−zt+1 by (72)
= p
(
1− δH(1− 2p))
+ p (k − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b
(
pδHm (zt+1) +
(
1− δH) zt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡n(zt+1)
+ (1− 2p)δH︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡a
uHH−zt+1
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= p (1− a) + bn (zt+1)
+ a
(
p (1− a) + b n (zt+2) + a uH−zt+2
)
. Iteratively expanding each uH. and
collecting like terms produces the following geometric sums
= a
(
1 + a + a2 + ...
)
+ b
(
n (zt+1) + a n (zt+2) + a
2n (zt+3) + ...
)
= p1−a
1−a + b
∑∞
i=0a
in (zt+1+i) = p + p (k − 1) SHH , where
SHH =
∑∞
i=0
(
(1− 2p)δH)i n (zt+1+i)
=
∑∞
i=0
(
(1− 2p)δH)i (pδHm (zt+1+i) + (1− δH) zt+1+i)
Putting the pieces together, we have
uHzt = (1− μat ) p + μat (p + Bm (zt)) , and
uH−zt = (1− μat )
(
p− p (1− δH)SHL)+ μat (p + p (k − 1) SHH) .
Now rearranging ICCHz and plugging in the above values for uHzt and u
H
−zt we have
zt ≤ δH1−δH
(
uHzt − uH−zt
)
= δ
H
1−δH (1− μat )
(
p− (p− p (1− δH)SHL))
+ δ
H
1−δH μ
a
t
(
p + B m (zt)−
(
p + p (k − 1) SHH))
= (1− μat ) p δHSHL + μat δ
H
1−δH
(
B m (zt)− p (k − 1) SHH
)
. (107)
Because zˉt is decreasing,
pδHSHL = pδH
∑∞
i=0
(
(1− p)δH)i zt+1+i ≤ pδH∑∞i=0 ((1− p)δH)i zˉt = pδH1−δH(1−p) zˉt.
87
And because SHH > 0,
zt ≤ (1− μat ) pδ
H
1−δH(1−p) zˉt + μ
a
t
δHB
1−δH m (zt) ≤ (1− μat ) pδ
H
1−δH(1−p) zˉt + μ
a
t
δHB
1−δH m (zˉt) .
The last inequality must hold for all t and all zt ∈ [zt, zˉt], otherwise we would have a
contradiction to our initial supposition, and the proof would be over. So let zt = zˉt, then
the following must hold
zˉt ≤ (1− μat ) pδ
H
1−δH(1−p) zˉt + μ
a
t
δHB
1−δH m (zˉt)
< czˉt + μ
a
t d m (zt) for c ≡ δ
Hp
1−δH(1−p) , d ≡ δ
HB
1−δH
=⇒ 1−c
d
< μat
m(zt)
zt
≤ μat M by (48). (108)
It is easy to verify that 1−c
d
> 0. Namely from (71),
d = δ
H
1−δH B =
δH
1−δH p
(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) > 0 and δ
H < 1
=⇒ δHp < 1− δH(1− p) =⇒ c = δHp
1−δH(1−p) < 1
∴ 1−c
d
> 0.
Furthermore, 1−c
d
and M are fixed while μat → 0 in probability as t →∞ unless separation
takes place, so we know that with some positive probability condition (108) will be violated
producing a contradiction to our supposition that (σ, μ) was a PBE. To compute the exact
time we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.19a: Let s denote the number of periods agent i has received neither a favor
opportunity, nor a favor from the other agent, then
μis =
μo (1−2p)s
μo (1−2p)s + (1−μo) (1−p)s . (109)
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Proof of lemma 2.19a: For s = 1, we know that
μi1 =
μo(1− 2p)
1− (1 + μo) p =
μo(1− 2p)1
μo(1− 2p)1 + (1− μo) (1− p)1
Suppose (109) for some s ∈ N, then
μis+1 =
μis(1−2p)
1−(1+μis)p =
μis(1−2p)
1−p−pμis per (2.7 (iv))
=
μo(1−2p)s
μo(1−2p)s+(1−μo)(1−p)s (1−2p)
1−p−p μo(1−2p)s
μo(1−2p)s+(1−μo)(1−p)s
= μo(1−2p)
s+1
(1−p)(μo(1−2p)s+(1−μo)(1−p)s)−pμo(1−2p)s
= μo(1−2p)
s+1
(1−2p)μo(1−2p)s+(1−p)(1−μo)(1−p)s
= μo(1−2p)
s+1
μo(1−2p)s+1+(1−μo)(1−p)s+1
So if (109) holds for some s ∈ N, it holds for s + 1. We know it holds for s = 1, so by in-
duction it must hold for all s ∈ N. Let t∗ := inf
{
t ∈ N : μo(1−2p)t−1
μo(1−2p)t−1+(1−μo)(1−p)t−1 <
1−a
bM
}
and suppose hat∗ = {0, ..., 0, 1} and Ht∗ = {0, ..., 0}, then μat∗ = μo(1−2p)
t∗−1
μo(1−2p)t∗−1+(1−μo)(1−p)t∗−1
< 1−a
bM
by (109) and by definition of t∗ so that the incentive compatibility constraint for the
high type is violated by period t∗ if she does not receive any favor opportunities or fa-
vors before then. Hence separation has to occur within t∗ − 1 or fewer periods or it will
never take place. The belief function follows from Bayesian updating and must have this
form given a history of no favor opportunities until now and no favors in order for μ to
be consistent with σ. Thus separation cannot be guaranteed with probability 1 in any SS
equilibria.
Proof. (Lemma 2.25: EM with independent favor opportunities) Suppose we start the
game with agent b as the advantaged agent, and the level of trust is z ∈ (0, 1], that is agent
a does a favor of size x = z if she receives a favor opportunity, and then does no further
favors until the other agent, in this case agent b, reciprocates by doing a favor of size y = z.
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It follows that in terms of average discounted payoffs
uem(z) = p
((
1− δH) (1− z) + δH uˉem(z))+ (1− p)δHuem(z)
= p(
1−δH)(1−z)+δH uˉem(z)
1−δH(1−p)
uˉem(z) = p
2
((
1− δH) (kz + 1) + δHuem(z))+ p(1− p) ((1− δH) (1− z) + δH uˉem(z))
+ (1− p)p
((
1− δH) kz + δHuem(z))+ (1− p)2δH uˉem(z)
= p2
((
1− δH) (kz + 1) + δHuem(z))+ p ((1− δH) (1− z) + δH uˉem(z))
− p2 ((1− δH) (1− z) + δH uˉem(z))+ p((1− δH) kz + δHuem(z))
− p2
((
1− δH) kz + δHuem(z))+ (1− 2p)δH uˉem(z) + p2δH uˉem(z)
= p
((
1− δH) (1− z) + δH uˉem(z))+ p((1− δH) kz + δHuem(z))
+ (1− 2p)δH uˉem(z)
= p(
1−δH)(1+kz)+δHuem(z)
1−δH(1−p) .
Equations for uem(z) and uˉem(z) are identical to their counterparts from the mutually ex-
clusive favor opportunities case (see proof of lemma 2.1), and the incentive compatibility
constraint is also the same, so by symmetry:
uem(z) = p + Az where A ≡ p
δHp(k−1)−(1−δH)
1−δH(1−2p) ,
uˉem(z) = p + Bz where B ≡ p δHp(k−1)+(1−δH)k1−δH(1−2p)
and δH ≥ δ∗ = 1
1+p(k−1) is necessary and sufficient to implement any simple EM strategy
profile, and setting x, y = 1 ensures the greatest gains from cooperation.
Proof. (Lemma 2.26: EM without initial designations) Once agent designations are
determined, the game will be exactly as before in 2.25. In particular, the payoffs and
incentive compatibility constraints are the same as before. Therefore we can focus on the
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initial stage of the game before designations are determined. Let uˆzem denote the expected
payoff for an agent with no designation. Then,
uˆzem = p
2
((
1− δH) (1 + (k − 1) z) + δH uˆzem)
+ p(1− p) ((1− δH) (1− z) + δH uˉem)
+ (1− p) (p ((1− δH) kz + δHuem)+ (1− p)δH uˆzem)
=
(1−δH)p(1−z+kz)+δH(p−p2)(uem+uˉem)
1−δH+2δHp−2δHp2
= (1−δ
H)p(1−z+kz)+δH(p−p2)p(k−1)
1−δH+2δHp−2δHp2
= p + δ
H(1−p)p2(k−1)
1−δH+2δHp(1−p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C1
+ (1−δ
H)p(k−1)
1−δH+2δHp(1−p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C2
z. (110)
The incentive compatibility constraint for an undesignated agent to do a favor of size z is
ICCndem : p
((
1− δH) (1 + (k − 1) z) + δH uˆzem)+ (1− p) ((1− δH) (1− z) + δH uˉem)
≥ p ((1− δH) (1 + kz) + δHuem)+ (1− p) ((1− δH)+ δH uˆzem)
⇐⇒ p ((1− δH) (−z) + δH (uˆzem − uem))
+ (1− p) ((1− δH) (−z) + δH (uˉem − uˆzem)) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ pδH (uˆzem − uem) + (1− p) δH (uˉem − uˆzem)−
(
1− δH) z ≥ 0
⇐⇒ pδH (uˆzem − uem) + (1− p) δH (uˉem − uˆzem)−
(
1− δH) z ≥ 0
substituting in for uˆzem, uem and uˉem from (110), (69) and (71) yields
pδH (p + C1 + C2z − p−A) + (1− p)δH (p + B − p− C1 − C2z)−
(
1− δH) z ≥ 0
⇐⇒ pδH (C1 + C2z −A) + (1− p)δH (B − C1 − C2z)−
(
1− δH) z ≥ 0
Solving for δH from the above constraint is complicated, but we can we solve for z and
show that z ≤ 1/2, is required when δH = δ∗. In particular, solving for z from the previous
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inequality yields
z ≤ δ
Hp(p(1−δH(1−p))+k(1−δH−p+3δHp−3δHp2))
(1−δH(1−2p))(1−δH(1−(1+k)p+2kp2)) ≤ 1/2 for δH = δ∗.
It follows immediately that the upper bound on z is increasing with δH since the more
patient agents are the higher cost they will pay for tomorrow’s continuation promise.
Proof. (Proposition 2.28: SS equilibria with independent favor opportunities) The
incentive compatibility constraint for a high type to do a favor of size zt in period t if
Ht−1 = {0, 0, ..., 0} is provided below.
ICCHiss:
(
1− δH) (1− zt) + (1− μt) δHp
+ μt
(
p
((
1− δH) kzt + δH uˆem)+ (1− p)δH uˉem)
≥ 1− δH + (1− μt) δH uˆHL−zt
+ μt
(
p
((
1− δH) kzt + δHuem)+ (1− p)δH uˆH−zt)
=⇒ δH
1−δH (μtp (uˆem − uem)
+ μt(1− p)
(
uˉem − uˆHH−zt
)
+ (1− μt)
(
p− uˆHL−zt
)) ≥ zt, (111)
where μit = μt for both agents regardless of type since neither one has done a favor yet
and private favor opportunities are uninformative about the type of the other agent since
favor opportunities are independent. Payoffs uˆHH−zt and uˆ
HL
−zt denote the continuation values
implemented by (σ, μ) for a high type agent who did not do or receive a favor in period t
facing a high type and a low type, respectively. As for the low type, the following incentive
compatibility constraint has to be satisfied for her not to mimic a high type.
ICCLiss :
(
1− δL) (1− zt)
+ μt
(
p
((
1− δL) kzt + δLuˉLem)+ (1− p)δLuˉLem)+ (1− μt) δLp
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≤ (1− δL)+ μt (p ((1− δL) kzt + δLp)+ (1− p)δLuˆLH−zt)+ (1− μt) δLp
=⇒ δL
1−δL μt
(
p
(
uˉLem − p
)
+ (1− p) (uˉLem − uˆLH−zt)) ≤ zt, (112)
where uˉLem denotes the expected payoff to an advantaged low type facing a high type in an
EM game of full trust, and uˆLH−zt denotes the continuation payoff a low type if she is facing
a high type in period t. That is, her autarky payoff and one time small favor as soon as the
high type receives a favor opportunity. Per inequalities (111) and (112), it is necessary to
prove that
μtδH
1−δH
(
p (uˆem − uem) + (1− p)
(
uˉem − uˆHH−zt
))
+ (1−μt)δ
H
1−δH
(
p− uˆHL−zt
)
≥ μtδL
1−δL
(
p
(
uˉLem − p
)
+ (1− p) (uˉLem − uˆLH−zt)) , ∀t (113)
and for zt ∈ (0, 1].First, we need to solve for uˆHH−zt , uˆHL−zt , uˉLem and uˆLH−zt .
uˉLem = p
(
1− δL)+ p ((1− δL) 1
2
k + δLp
)
+ (1− p)δLuˉLem
= p + (1−δ
L)pk
1−δL(1−p) . (114)
Repeating the calculation for uˆLH−zt :
uˆLH−zt = p
(
1− δL)+ p ((1− δL) kzt+1 + δLp)+ δL (1− p) uˆLH−zt+1
= p
(
1− δL (1− p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡a1
+ p
(
1− δL) k︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡a2
zt+1 + δ
L(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡dL
uˆLH−zt+1
= a1 + a2zt+1 + dL
(
a1 + a2zt+2 + dLuˆ
LH
−zt+2
)
= a1
(
1 + dL + d
2
L + ...
)
+ a2
(
zt+1 + dLzt+2 + d
2
Lzt+3 + ...
)
= a1
1−dL + a2
∞∑
i=0
diLzt+1+i =
p(1−δL(1−p))
1−δL(1−p) + a2
∞∑
i=0
diLzt+1+i
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= p +
(
1− δL)SiLH for SiLH ≡ pk ∞∑
i=0
(
δL(1− p))i zt+1+i. (115)
The math remains the same for uˆHL−zt :
uˆHL−zt = p
((
1− δH) (1− zt+1) + δHp)+ δH(1− p)uˆHL−zt+1
= p
(
1− δH (1− p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b1
− p (1− δH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b2
zt+1 + δ
H(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡dhl
uˆHL−zt+1
= b1 − b2zt+1 + dhl
(
b1 − b2zt+2 + dhluHL−zt+2
)
+ b1
(
1 + dhl + d
2
hl + ...
)− b2 (zt+1 + dhlzt+2 + d2hlzt+3 + ...)
= b1
1−dhl − b2
∞∑
i=0
dihlzt+1+i =
p(1−δH(1−p))
1−δH(1−p) − b2
∞∑
i=0
dihlzt+1+i
= p− (1− δH)SiHL for SiHL ≡ p ∞∑
i=0
(
δH(1− p))i zt+1+i. (116)
And finally for uˆHH−zt :
uˆHH−zt = p
2
((
1− δH) (1 + (k − 1) zt+1) + δH uˆem)
+ p(1− p) ((1− δH) (1− zt+1) + δH uˉem)
+ (1− p)p ((1− δH) kzt+1 + δHuem)+ (1− p)2δH uˆHH−zt
= p2
((
1− δH)+ δH uˆem)+ p(1− p) ((1− δH)+ δH (uˉem + uem))
+ p2
(
1− δH) (k − 1) zt+1 + p (1− p) (1− δH) (k − 1) zt+1 + (1− p)2 δH uˆHH−zt
= p
(
1− δH)+ pδH (uˉem + uem) + p2δH (uˆem − (uˉem + uem))
+ p
(
1− δH) (k − 1) zt+1 + (1− p)2 δH uˆHH−zt .
Recall from (71) that uˉem + uem = p (k + 1), so
uˆHH−zt = p
(
1− δH)+ pδHp (k + 1) + p2δH(uˆem − p (k + 1))
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+ (1− δH)p(k − 1)zt+1 + (1− p)2δH uˆHH−zt
= p
(
1− δH)+ p2δH ((k + 1) (1− p) + uˆem)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡c1
+ (1− δH)p(k − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡c2
zt+1 + δ
H(1− p)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡dhh
uˆH−zt
= c1 + c2zt+1 + dhh
(
c1 + c2zt+2 + dhhu
HL
−zt+2
)
= c1
(
1 + dhh + d
2
hh + ...
)
+ c2
(
zt+1 + dhh zt+2 + d
2
hhzt+3 + ...
)
= c1
1−dhh + c2
∑∞
i=0d
i
hhzt+1+i = p +
(
1− δH)α + (1− δH)SiHH (117)
for SiHH ≡ p(k − 1)
∞∑
i=0
(
δH(1− p)2)i zt+1+i, and
α ≡
c1
1−dhh
−p
(1−δH) =
δH(k−1)p2(1−δH(1−p(2−(3−p)p)))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−p)2)(1−δH(1−2(1−p)p))
We are now ready to return back to inequality (113) that needs to hold for the result to hold.
Take all the terms to the left side and call the resultant function, Q.
Q := μtδ
H
1−δH
(
p (uˆem − uem) + (1− p)
(
uˉem − uˆHH−zt
))
+ (1−μt)δ
H
1−δH
(
p− uˆHL−zt
)
− μtδL
1−δL p
(
uˉLem − p
)− μtδL
1−δL (1− p)
(
uˉLem − uˆLH−zt
)
.
Substituting in for payoffs from (69), (71), (117), (116), (114), (115) yields
Q = μtδ
Hp
p(k(1−δH(1−p)2)−δHp2)
(1−δH(1−2p))(1−δH(1−2(1−p)p))
+ μtδ
H p(1−p)
2
(
2(k−1)
1−δH(1−p)2 +
k+1
1−δH+2δHp − k−11−δH(1−2(1−p)p)
)
− μtδHp(1− p)(k − 1)
∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1− p)2)i zt+1+i
+ (1− μt) δHp
∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1− p))i zt+1+i − μtδLpk1−δL(1−p)
+ μtδ
Lpk(1− p)∑∞i=0 (δL(1− p))i zt+1+i.
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Observe that for converging series there exists zω =
∑
diωzi∑
diω
and zi decreasing, then d1 ≤
d2 =⇒ z1 ≥ z2 so we can write Q as,
Q =
μtδHp2(k(1−δH(1−p)2)−δHp2)
(1−δH(1−2p))(1−δH(1−2(1−p)p))
+ μtδ
Hp(1−p)
2
(
2(k−1)
1−δH(1−p)2 +
k+1
1−δH+2δHp − k−11−δH(1−2(1−p)p)
)
− μtδLpk
1−δL(1−p) +
μtδLpk(1−p)
1−δL(1−p) zL − μtδ
Hp(1−p)(k−1)
1−δH(1−p)2 zˉH +
(1−μt)δHp
1−δH(1−p)zH
where
zL =
∑∞
i=0(δL(1−p))
i
zt+1+i∑∞
i=0(δ
L(1−p))i
=
(
1− δL(1− p))∑∞i=0 (δL(1− p))i zt+1+i ∈ (0, zt) (118)
zˉH =
(
1− δH(1− p)2)∑∞i=0 (δH(1− p)2)i zt+1+i ∈ (0, zt) (119)
zH =
(
1− δH(1− p))∑∞i=0 (δH(1− p))i zt+1+i ∈ (0, zt) (120)
observe that zˉH > zH and 0 < zL, zH , zˉH ≤ 1.
Next we show that Q is decreasing in δL and increasing in δH .
∂Q
∂δL
= −μt pk(1−(1−p)zL)(1−δL(1−p))2 < 0 since zL ∈ (0, 1) .
Since we want to prove that Q ≥ 0 for all values of δL ∈ (0, δ∗), and Q is decreasing in δL,
it is enough to prove that Q ≥ 0 for δL = δ∗. Next we show that Q is increasing in δH .
∂Q
∂δH
=
1
2
p
(
−μt (k−1)(1−2p)(1−δH+2δHp−2δHp2)2 + μt
(k+1)
(1−δH(1−2p))2
+ μt
2(k−1)(1−p)(1−zˉH)
(1−δH(1−p)2)2 + (1− μt) 2(1−δH(1−p))2 zH
)
=
1
2
pμt
>0 per claim 2.7
(
︷ ︸︸ ︷
k+1
(1−δH(1−2p))2 − (k−1)(1−2p)(1−δH(1−2p+2p2))2
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+ μt
2(k−1)(1−p)(1−zˉH)
(1−δH(1−p)2)2 + (1− μt) 2(1−δH(1−p))2 zH) > 0. (121)
Since Q is increasing in δH , it is enough to prove that Q ≥ 0 for δH = δH1 . To that end, let
Q∗ = Q s.t. δL = δ∗ and δH = δH1 = 11−2p+p2(k+1) . Then
Q∗ =
μt(1− p)(k − 1)
pk
(1− zˉH) + 1− μt
p(k + 1)− 1zH + μt(1− p)zL > 0.
Recall that condition (60) implies that p(k + 1) ≥ 2, so the second term of Q∗ is positive
and bounded, and the zˉH , zH , zL ∈ (0, 1), so Q∗ > 0 ⇒ Q > 0 for all δL∈ (0, δ∗) and
δH ∈ [δH1 , 1).Furthermore, the constraint is slack, so it follows that we could find equilibria
for lower δH . Last, let QL denote the part of Q that represents ICCLiss That is,
QL =
μtδ
Lpk
1− δL(1− p) −
μtδ
Lpk(1− p)
1− δL(1− p) zL.
Since ∂Q
∂δL
< 0 =⇒ ∂QL
∂δL
> 0, so QL is increasing in δL as is to be expected. Since
δL ∈ (0, δ∗), it follows that
QL ∈ (QL∣∣
δL=0
, QL
∣∣
δL=δ∗
)
= (0, μt(1− (1− p)z∗L))
=
(
0, μt
(
1− (1− p) (1− δ∗(1− p))∑∞i=0 (δ∗(1− p))i zt+1+i)) by (118)
=
(
0, μt − μt (1−p)pk1+p(k−1)
∑∞
i=0
(
1−p
1+p(k−1)
)i
zt+1+i
)
by (5)
=
(
0, μt − μtpk
∑∞
i=0
(1−p)i+1
(1+(k−1)p)i+1 zt+1+i
)
=
(
0, μt
(
1− p + p2) z˜L) for z˜L ∈ (0, zt) ⊆ (0, 1]
⊂ (0, μt (1− p + p2)) .
That is, the lower bound for zt is well-defined. Next, let QH denote the part of Q that
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represents ICCHiss.
QH =
μtδHp2(k(1−δH(1−p)2)−δHp2)
(1−δH(1−2p))(1−δH(1−2(1−p)p)) − μtδ
Hp(1−p)(k−1)
1−δH(1−p)2 zˉH +
(1−μt)δHp
1−δH(1−p)zH
+ μtδ
Hp(1−p)
2
(
2(k−1)
1−δH(1−p)2 +
k+1
1−δH+2δHp − k−11−δH(1−2(1−p)p)
)
.
Since ∂Q
∂δH
> 0 =⇒ ∂QH
∂δH
> 0, so QH is increasing in δH as is to be expected. Since
δH ∈ (δH1 , 1), it follows that
QH ∈
(
QH
∣∣
δH=δH1
, QH
∣∣
δH=1
)
=
(
μt
k−1+p
pk
− μt (k−1)(1−p)pk zˉH + (1−μt)p(k+1)−1zH ,
μt
(
k
2
+ (k−1)p
2
4(1−p)(2−p)
)
− μt (k−1)(1−p)2−p zˉH + (1− μt)zH
)
.
The simplifications for z’s can be found at the end,
QH ∈
(
μt
k−1+p
pk
+
≡(∗)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1−μt)
p(k+1)−1zH − μt (k−1)(1−p)pk zˉH ,
(1− μt)zH − μt (k−1)(1−p)2−p zˉH︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡(∗∗)
+ μt
4k+3kp2−6kp−p2
4(p−1)(p−2)
)
. (122)
Then there exists z˜h1, z˜h2 ∈ (0, zt) such that
QH ∈
(
μt
k−1+p
pk
+
(
1
p(k+1)−1 + μt
k(1−2p)−(1−p)(1+p(k2−1))
pk(p(k+1)−1)
)
z˜h1,
μt
(
k
2
+ (k−1)p
2
4(1−p)(2−p)
)
+
(
1− μt(k(1−p)+1)
2−p
)
z˜h2
)
.
That is, the upper bound for zt is well-defined.
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Proof. (Inequality 121):
k+1
(1−δH(1−2p))2 >
(k−1)(1−2p)
(1−δH(1−2p+2p2))2
⇐⇒ (1−δ
H(1−2p+2p2))2
(1−δH(1−2p))2 >
(k−1)(1−2p)
k+1
⇐⇒ 1−δH(1−2p)−2δHp2
1−δH(1−2p) >
√
(k−1)(1−2p)
k+1
⇐⇒ 1− 2δHp2
1−δH(1−2p) >
√
(k−1)(1−2p)
k+1
(123)
The left-hand side of (123) is minimized at δH = 1, so it is enough to verify that
1− p >
√
(k−1)(1−2p)
k+1
⇐= (k + 1) (1− p)2 − (k − 1)(1− 2p) > 0
⇐⇒ p2k − 4p + p2 + 2 > 0
⇐= p2k − 4p + p2 + 2 ≥ 2p2 − 4p + 2 = 2 (p− 1)2 > 0.
Therefore, the inequality used in step (121) of the proof of proposition 2.28 holds.
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Chapter 3
3 Favor-trading with Concave Utility FunctionsFavor-trading it Concave U ility Fu ctions
3.1 Introduction
To date the prominent models of favor-trading assume agents have linear preferences and
favors are intrinsically of greater benefit than cost. In this chapter informal favor-trading
is considered to be a form of insurance. We assume agents have concave utility functions
and favors derive their value from risk sharing. With sufficiently concave utility functions,
agents can beneficially trade favors at some level for any discount factors. This is in contrast
to the linear case in which the incentive compatibility of the favors traded is independent
of the size of the favors because agents are essentially risk-neutral with respect to favors.
Furthermore, if utility functions are linear and agents’ discount factors are just large enough
to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint for equality matching, the best the agents
can do is to equality match full favors. If the same agents have concave utility functions, we
show that the equivalent equality matching equilibria are dominated by equilibria involving
a smaller than full first favor, followed by a small second favor if reciprocation has not
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been received by the time the agent receives the second consecutive favor opportunity.
Consequently, the assumption of linear preferences drives some of the results in prominent
favor-trading models.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We first introduce the relevant literature
at the end of this section. Section 3.2 introduces the model. Section 3.3 describes equal-
ity matching with concave utility functions and generalizes equality matching to multiple
states. In section 3.3.1 we construct two parametric models to numerically analyze multi-
state equilibria. The first model simulates a large sample of games, derives payoff functions
from the simulations, and uses them to solve for the optimal strategy. The second model
solves directly the system of simultaneous payoff equations associated with an equality
matching game and uses the results to find the optimal strategy. Section 3.3.2 presents the
results of the numerical tests and a number of conjectures based on them. We describe
certain unexpected outcomes in multi-state equality matching including favors above the
efficient stage game levels (beyond full-sharing) and optimal multi-state equality matching
favor sequences that are not decreasing. We also argue against the efficiency of infinite
state equality matching strategies. Section 3.4 repeats the analysis for strategies we call
pseudo-highest symmetric self-generating line equilibria that emulate analogously named
strategies from the linear favor-trading literature. Section 3.5 discusses preliminary work in
strategies involving favor-depreciation and other remaining issues. Section 3.6 concludes
chapter 3. An appendix and reference sections follow.
3.1.1 Relevant literature
The major contributions to the favor-trading literature by Mo¨bius [12], Hauser and Hopen-
hayn [8], and Abdulkadirog˘lu and Bagwell [1] (AB for short), are all linear models in
terms of agents’ preferences with intrinsically efficient favors. Summaries of these models
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are available in section 2.2.3. The model we introduce next retains the fundamental infor-
mation structure of these models; that is, all information is complete but not always public,
but we endogenize the value of favors by assigning agents concave utility functions so that
favors may be used to share risk. Furthermore, we assume the absolute cost of doing a favor
is equal to the absolute benefit generated. In other words, favors have no intrinsic value in
our model. As in chapter 2, we take a simplified version of the favor-trading model by AB
[1] as our benchmark for comparisons.
Outside of the favor-trading literature, our model overlaps with the insurance litera-
ture. In particular, Kocherlakota [9] investigates the “Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing
without Commitment” as we do, but he uses a macroeconomic model whereas we restrict
attention to a two agent game. To our knowledge, this setup has not been covered by any
major works in economics or closely related fields.
3.2 The Model
Since concave functions include linear functions and strictly concave functions can be ar-
bitrarily close to linear functions, we restrict attention to a subclass of concave functions
we call α-concave. These functions are “sufficiently concave” for meaningful analysis of
the differences concavity can make in favor-trading models. However, we do not claim that
concavity alone is sufficient for meaning differences. On the contrary, we believe that the
results of linear models could generally be replicated with arbitrary proximity with strictly
concave utility functions that are arbitrarily close to their linear counter-parts. However,
our goal is to investigate the difference sufficient concavity can make relative to linear
models. To that end we define α-concave functions below. The domain and range have
each been normalized to the unit interval for simplicity. Unless otherwise stated, any future
references to concave utility functions imply α-concave utility functions.
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Definition 3.1 Suppose function u : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is such that u (x) = xα for α ∈ (0, 1) .
Then we call u an α-concave function.
Consider two identical agents, a and b. Each agent has utility function u(x) = xα for
some α ∈ (0, 1). The agents play an infinitely repeated stage game with the following
structure: At the beginning of each period nature allocates an opportunity, normalized to
size 1, either to agent a or b (but not both), each with probability p ∈ (0, 1/2), or to neither
with probability 1 − 2p. Opportunities are private information. An agent who receives an
opportunity may either use it privately and receive a flow payoff of u (1) = 1 or share some
or all of it. The amount shared is denoted by x and y for agents a and b, respectively. If
agent a receives an opportunity and shares amount x of it, the flow payoffs to (a, b) are
((1− x)α , xα). Similarly, if agent b does the sharing, payoffs are (yα, (1− y)α). Because
side payments are not allowed, and reciprocation cannot be explicitly conditioned on future
opportunities since they are not publicly observable, shared opportunities are called favors.
Favors, including their size, are public information. The stage game is repeated in each
subsequent period.
To see how favor-trading works consider the following game called equality matching
(EM). In EM of level z ∈ (0, 1/2], one agent is called advantaged, the other disadvantaged.
The disadvantaged agent is said to owe the advantaged agent a favor of size z. If the disad-
vantaged agent does a favor of size z, she becomes advantaged and the other disadvantaged.
If she does no favor, she remains disadvantaged. Favors of size other than z are not part of
equilibrium play and can be deterred by Nash reversion. When z = 1/2 (full sharing), the
game is called full equality matching.
Consider a game of full equality matching between two agents. Suppose agent a is dis-
advantaged, b advantaged. Let (uem, uˉem) denote the average discounted payoffs expected
by agents (a, b), or more generally by disadvantaged and advantaged agents, respectively.
Let σem (uem, uˉem) =
(
σaem (uem, uˉem) , σ
b
em (uem, uˉem)
)
denote the EM strategy profile
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that implements the payoff pair (uem, uˉem). Under σem the payoffs are
uem = p ((1− δ)u(1− 1/2) + δuˉem) + (1− p)δuem
= p ((1− δ)(1/2)α + δuˉem) + (1− p)δuem, (124)
uˉem = p ((1− δ)u(1) + δuˉem) + p ((1− δ)u(1/2) + δuem) + (1− 2p)δuˉem
= p (1− δ + δuˉem) + p ((1− δ)(1/2)α + δuem) + (1− 2p)δuˉem. (125)
The first equation consists of two events: (i) with probability p agent a receives an
opportunity, does a full favor (x = 1/2) and becomes the advantaged agent; that is, agent
a receives flow payoff (1/2)α and continuation promise uˉem, (ii) with probability (1 − p)
agent a receives no opportunity, so her flow payoff is zero and her continuation promise
remains uem along with her disadvantaged status. The equation for payoff uˉem consists
of three events that occur with probabilities p, p and 1 − 2p, respectively: (i) agent b
receives an opportunity, does no favor and receives a flow payoff of 1 and her continuation
promise remains uˉem as she is still advantaged, (ii) agent a receives an opportunity, shares
it (x = 1/2) so agent b receives a flow payoff of (1/2)α but her continuation payoff drops
to uem because she now owes agent a the next favor, and (iii) neither agent receives a favor
opportunity so agent b’s flow payoff is zero and her continuation payoff remains uˉem.
The two previous equations contain two unknowns, uem and uˉem, with solutions:
uem =
p (1− δ+δp (2 + 2α))
2α (1− δ(1− 2p)) , (126)
uˉem =
p ((1− δ) (1 + 2α) + δp (2 + 2α))
2α (1− δ(1− 2p)) . (127)
For the EM strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) in each stage game, neither
agent can have a profitable deviation available to her. It is trivial that the advantaged agent
has no profitable deviation as she just waits for reciprocation, but does no favors. Public
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(observable) off-equilibrium path deviations, such as the advantaged agent doing a favor
or one of the agents doing the wrong size favor, can easily be deterred by the threat of
autarky (no more favors). Therefore, we only need to check that a one-shot deviation for
the disadvantaged agent consisting of doing no favor despite having the opportunity to do
so followed by σem play as usual is not profitable. Agent a’s discount factor has to be high
enough that the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) below is satisfied.
ICCaem : (1− δ) 12α + δuˉem ≥ 1− δ + δuem
⇐⇒ uˉem − uem ≥ 1−δδ
(
1− 1
2α
)
.
Using equations (126) and (127) we may write ICCaem as
p((1−δ)(1+2α)+δp(2+2α))
2α(1−δ(1−2p)) − p(1−δ+δp(2+2
α))
2α(1−δ(1−2p)) ≥ 1−δδ
(
1− 1
2α
)
⇐⇒ δp
1−δ(1−2p) ≥ 1− 12α
⇐⇒ δ ≥ 2α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α) ≡ δα (128)
Figure 3 shows δα as p and α vary between (0, 1/2) and (0, 1), respectively.
Figure 3: δα(p, α) for full EM with u(x) = xα
We start with equality matching because that is the easiest and most basic way to im-
plement cooperation in the linear model, in particular, in AB [1]. Before proving several
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differences, we summarize the notation, and introduce the information structure and the
equilibrium concept to be used.
3.2.1 Summary of notation and structure
The summary that follows is meant for reference, but we also need it in the next subsection
to formally define several equilibrium concepts. Payoffs are in average discounted values.
Model parameters:
i ∈ {a, b} : Agents.
δ ∈ (0, 1) : Discount factor.
p ∈ (0, 1/2) : Probability that agent i ∈ {a, b} receives a favor opportunity.
α ∈ (0, 1) Preference convexity parameter.
Actions:
x, y ∈ [0, 1] : Size of favor by agents a, b, respectively.
Payoffs:
(u, v) : Current payoffs to agents (a, b).
(uo, vo) : Continuation payoffs to (a, b) when no one does a favor.
(ui, vi) : Continuation payoffs to (a, b) when i ∈ {a, b} does a favor.
Table 2: Summary of notation with concave utility functions
3.2.1.1 Information structure: Let t = 1, 2, . . . denote the time index. If agent i re-
ceives a t-period favor opportunity, wit = 1 and 0 otherwise. Agent i privately observes
W it = {wiz}tz=1. Let τt = (x, y) denote favors (x, y) ∈ (0, 1]2 agents a and b, respec-
tively, do in period t. If neither agent does a favor, then let τt = 0. Both agents observe
Tt = {τz}tz=1. Private history of agent i and public history up to and including period t are
denoted by hit = W it ∈ Hit and Ht = Tt ∈ Ht, respectively. A strategy for agent i, denoted
by σi, consists of a favor decision, I it , for each period based on i’s private history up to
period t, and public history up to period t − 1. More formally, I it : Hit×Ht−1 → [0, 1] s.t.
I it (∙, ∙) = 0 when wit = 0.
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3.2.2 Strategies and equilibrium concepts
For our solution concept we will use public perfect equilibrium (PPE) following Fuden-
berg, Levine and Maskin [5]. A strategy for agent i ∈ {a, b} is public if it depends only
on her current period private information and the public history. In the favor-trading game
under study, private information consists of whether or not the agent received a favor op-
portunity, and public information consists of (public) favors done up to and including the
last period. A PPE is a profile of public strategies that form a Nash equilibrium for each pe-
riod and the corresponding public history. Since the payoff pair (uem, uˉem) is enforceable
(implementable), it follows by symmetry that (uˉem, uem) is also enforceable, and therefore
any utility pair on the line connecting (uem, uˉem) and (uˉem, uem) is enforceable with the
use of a public randomization device. Off-equilibrium path moves can be deterred by the
threat of Nash reversion (autarky). This brings us to the following two definitions.
Definition 3.2 Let σiaut be such that I it = 0, ∀t.
Definition 3.3 Let H∗t be the set of all public on-equilibrium path histories up to and in-
cluding period t.
For example, if two agents are playing a full EM game and agent a is the initial disad-
vantaged agent, any history such that agent b did the first favor, one of the agents did two
consecutive favors or a partial favor, would not be in H∗t . However, histories that include
only private deviations, that is, a disadvantaged agent does not do a favor when she has the
opportunity, would still be inH∗t . Next we define EM formally.
Definition 3.4 Given z ∈ (0, 1], σiem(z) is such that I it = z if agent i is disadvantaged,
wit = 1 and ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1, otherwise I it = 0. Let σiem(1) ≡ σiem.
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3.2.3 Basic properties of concave favor-trading games
The lemmas in this section state for the record that the model always has at least the autarky
equilibrium and that the first-best outcome is not enforceable.
Claim 3.5 In a favor-trading game with preferences u (x) = xα, equilibria always exist.
Proof. Immediate. Autarky is always an equilibrium.
Claim 3.6 First-best outcome is not enforceable in equilibrium.
Proof. To achieve the first-best outcome both agents have to share every favor opportunity
equally, that is regardless of whether the other agent has reciprocated. But then each agent
has a profitable deviation to not do a favor, which the other agent could not observe as favor
opportunities are private information.
3.3 Multi-state equality matching (n-EM)
In this section we generalize equality matching to multiple states.
Lemma 3.7 (EM is always possible) Given δ and α, there exists z ∈ (0, 1/2] such that
EM at level z is implementable as a PPE.
Proof. In appendix.
The proof for this lemma follows immediately from the utility function’s form u (x) =
xα. Marginal utility cost of doing an infinitesimal favor goes to a bounded constant:
u′(1− z) = −α
z1−α
→ −α as z → 0,
while the marginal benefit to the recipient goes to infinity:
u′(z) =
α
z1−α
→∞ as z → 0.
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That is, we can make the cost of doing a favor relative to the benefit arbitrarily small by
choosing a small enough size for the favor. This is in contrast to the linear case in which
the cost-to-benefit ratio is always k ∈ (1,∞) and consequently discount factors need to
exceed a certain threshold for EM to be implementable.
In EM games with linear preferences, full equality matching also represents the most
efficient incentive compatible form of favor-trading (on symmetric self-generating lines) in
the special case of δ = δ∗. The equivalent form of EM with concave preferences consists
of matching half-sized favors as opposed to full-sized ones because maximal efficiency is
achieved by sharing the opportunity equally due to α-concave utility functions. Such an
EM game is shown in Figure 4 (left). We refer to it as a 2-state EM game because agents
alternate between the two states: a advantaged, b disadvantaged, (A,D), and b advantaged,
a disadvantaged, (D,A). Similarly, we refer to an EM game with 3-states as a 3-state EM
game, such as the one shown in Figure 4 (right). State (∅, ∅) refers to a neutral, or even
state.
2-state full EM game
(A,D)
(D,A)
1-p
1-p
p px = 1
2
y = 1
2
(A,D): Agent a advantaged, agent b disadvantaged
(D,A): Agent a disadvantaged, agent b advantaged
(∅,∅): Neutral state
3-state EM game
(A,D)
(D,A)
(∅,∅)
p
p
p
p
1-p
1-p
1-2p1-2p
x1 =
1
2
− ²
x2 = ² y1 =
1
2
− ²
y2 = ²
Figure 4: 2-state and 3-state EM automata
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Next we show that 3-state EM strategies dominate 2-state EM strategies when δ = δ∗.
To make the demonstration more concrete, we offer a parametric example of 2-state vs.
3-state EM strategies using values α = 0.6 and p = 0.3. The threshold discount factor, δα,
is determined by substituting these values into equation (128):
δα ≡ 2
α − 1
2α − 1 + p (2− 2α) = 0.7802. (129)
We then substitute our values for α, p and δ = δα into equations (126) and (127) to find our
benchmark payoffs:
uem =
p (1− δ+δp (2 + 2α))
2α (1− δ(1− 2p)) = 0.3, (130)
uˉem =
p ((1− δ) (1 + 2α) + δp (2 + 2α))
2α (1− δ(1− 2p)) = 0.39585, (131)
uem + uˉem = 0.69585. (132)
To find the equivalent values for a 3-state EM strategy we need to solve the following
system of 3 payoff equations in 3 unknown payoffs,
uˉ = p ((1− δ) + δuˉ) + p ((1− δ) (1
2
− ε)α + δuo)+ (1− 2p) δuˉ,
uo = p ((1− δ) (1− ε)α + δuˉ) + p ((1− δ) εα + δu) + (1− 2p)δuo,
u = p
(
(1− δ) (1
2
+ ε
)α
+ δuo
)
+ (1− p) δu.
To simplify the arithmetic, we first replace the utility function terms as follows:
A ≡ εα, B ≡ (1
2
− ε)α , C ≡ (1
2
+ ε
)α
, D ≡ (1− ε)α (133)
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For mnemonic reasons, we chose A < B < C < D for ε small. In terms of A, B, C and
D, the 3-state EM payoffs are
uˉ = p ((1− δ) + δuˉ) + p ((1− δ) B + δuo) + (1− 2p) δuˉ,
uo = p ((1− δ) D + δuˉ) + p ((1− δ) A + δu) + (1− 2p)δuo,
u = p ((1− δ) C + δuo) + (1− p)δu.
Solving and simplifying:
uˉ = p
1+B+((3+A+3B+D)p−2(1+B))δ+(1+B−(3+A+3B+D)p+(1+A+B+C+D)p2)δ2
(1−(1−p)δ)(1−(1−3p)δ) ,
uo = pA+D+(−A−D+(1+A+B+C+D)p)δ
1−(1−3p)δ ,
u = p
C+((A+3C+D)p−2C)δ+(C−(A+3C+D)p+(1+A+B+C+D)p2)δ2
(1−(1−p)δ)(1−(1−3p)δ) .
For later use, the payoff differences between adjacent states are
uˉ− uo = p (1− δ) (1−A+B−D−(1−A+B−D+(−2+A−2B+C+D)p)δ)
(1−(1−p)δ)(1−(1−3p)δ) ,
uo − u = p (1− δ) (A−C+D+(−A+C−D+(1+A+B−2C+D)p)δ)
(1−(1−p)δ)(1−(1−3p)δ) , (134)
uˉ− uo
uo − u =
1−A+B−D−(1−A+B−D+(−2+A−2B+C+D)p)δ
A−C+D−(A−C+D−(1+A+B−2C+D)p)δ ,
= (1−δ(1−p))(1−A+B−D)+pδ(1+B−C)
(1−δ(1−p))(A−C+D)+pδ(1+B−C) . (135)
With three states, we have two incentive compatibility constraints. To move from the disad-
vantaged state to the neutral state requires a favor of size 1/2−ε in return for a continuation
promise of uo:
ICC1 : (1− δ) C + δuo ≥ 1− δ + δu
=⇒ δ
1− δ ≥
1− C
uo − u
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=⇒ δ∗ = 1− C
1− C + uo − u. (136)
To move from the neutral state to the advantaged state requires a favor of size ε in return
for a continuation promise of uˉ :
ICC2 : (1− δ)D + δuˉ ≥ 1− δ + δuo
=⇒ δ
1− δ ≥
1−D
uˉ− uo
=⇒ δ∗ = 1−D
1−D + uˉ− u∗ . (137)
Below we show that if ICC2 holds, then ICC1 holds, and therefore it is enough to only
verify ICC2.
Claim 3.8 ICC2 ≥ 0 =⇒ ICC1 ≥ 0.
Proof (by contradiction). Suppose to the contrary that ICC2 ≥ 0 but ICC1 < 0. Then
∃ε, δ > 0 such that δ
1−δ ≥ 1−Duˉ−uo and δ1−δ < 1−Cuo−u .
=⇒ δ ≥ 1−D
1−D+uˉ−uo and δ <
1−C
1−C+uo−u
=⇒ 1−D
1−D+uˉ−uo <
1−C
1−C+uo−u
=⇒ (1− C) (1−D) + (1−D) (uo − u) < (1− C) (1−D) + (1− C) (uˉ− uo)
=⇒ uo − u−D (uo − u) < uˉ− uo − C (uˉ− uo)
=⇒ C (uˉ− uo)−D (uo − u) < uˉ− 2uo + u
=⇒ D (uˉ− 2uo + u) < uˉ− 2uo + u
=⇒ D > 1 since uˉ − 2uo + u < 0 by strict concavity of u(∙). The last inequality
contradicts the definition of D ≡ (1− ε)α < 1.
Returning to our example, it is sufficient per claim 3.8 to find an ε > 0 such that ICC2
binds. Substituting in α = 0.6, p = 0.3 and δ = δα = 0.7802 from the 2-state problem
into our 3-state payoff functions and solving ICC2 = 0 for ε yields ε = 0.2176. Using
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these values A ≡ εα = 0.4005, B ≡ (1
2
− ε)α = 0.4683, C ≡ (1
2
+ ε
)α
= 0.8195,
D ≡ (1− ε)α = 0.8631 and uo − u= 0.498(3.821−δ)(1−δ)
(10−δ)(1.429−δ) . We can now solve for δ1 from
ICC1 : δ1 ≥ 1−C1−C+uo − u .
Substituting in values for A,B,C and D =⇒ δ1 ≥ 1−(0.5+ε)
α
1−(0.5+ε)α+0.498(3.820−δ1)(1−δ1)
(10−δ1)(1.429−δ1)
.
Substituting in values for a, ε and solving for δ1 =⇒ δ1 ≥ 1−0.819
1−0.819+
0.498(2δ21−2.402δ1+1.903)
δ21−11.43δ1+14.29
=⇒ δ1 ≥ 0.7452.
That is, if we fix δ = δ∗ from the two state problem, and increase ε until ICC2 binds,
then ICC1 will be slack for those ε and δ. In particular, we need δ ≥ 0.7802 to satisfy
ICC2 in the example above, whereas ICC1 holds for δ ≥ 0.7452. The payoffs for our
example are as follows: uˉ = 0.39941 > 0.39585 = uˉem, uo = 0.36084 and u = 0.30515 >
0.3 = uem, where uem and uˉem, from (131) and (130), respectively, are the corresponding
payoffs with the 2-state EM strategy. Observe that the total value of the game is higher with
the 3-states. Furthermore the total payoff in the 3-state game is higher when the agents are
in the middle state: uem + uˉem = 0.69585 < u + uˉ = 0.70456 < 2uo = 0.72168.
The example demonstrates a general contrast between favor-trading games with linear and
concave utility functions.
We are now ready to generalize equality matching for multiple states. Note that (138)
below also implies reversion to autarky if either agent deviates from the equilibrium path
(ht−1 /∈H∗t−1).
Definition 3.9 Suppose that for i ∈ {a, b}, s ∈ S ≡ {1, 2, ..., n} and t ∈ N, strategy
profile σ is such that
ys ≡ xn+1−s ∈ (0, 1) and I is :=

xs if s 6=n,wat = 1, ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1,
xn+1−s if s 6=1, wbt = 1, ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1,
0 otherwise,
(138)
113
st+1 :=st + 1{τt=(xst ,0)} − 1{τt=(0,yst)}. (139)
Then we call σ an n-state EM strategy profile and denote it by σemn .
Definition 3.10 (Special case of σemn) Suppose that for i ∈ {a, b}, s ∈ Z and t ∈ N,
strategy profile σ is such that
y−s ≡ xs ∈ (0, 1) and I is :=

xs if wat = 1, ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1,
ys if wbt = 1, ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1,
0 otherwise,
(140)
s0 ≡ 0, st+1 := st + 1{τt=(xst ,0)} − 1{τt=(0,yst)}. (141)
Then we call σ an ∞-state EM strategy profile and denote it by σem∞.
For the subsequent definitions and lemmas, we refer to random variables with uppercase
letters, realizations of random variables with lowercase letters, and probability distributions
with calligraphic (or script uppercase) letters. U refers to the uniform distribution. P refers
to the distribution of favor opportunities. ρs,t ≡ ρ(s, t) is the transition probability from
state s to t. If a stationary distribution exists, πs ≡ π(s) denote the associated probabilities.5
Definition 3.11 Given an n-state strategy profile σ, let πs(σ) denote the stationary proba-
bility for state s = 1, 2, ..., n, respectively, consistent with σ. If the game has no stationary
distribution consistent with σ, let π(σ) ≡ ∅. For convenience, let πs(σ) ≡ πs ≡ π(s) when
no ambiguity exists about σ.
Definition 3.12 Given an n-state strategy profile σ, let s0 ∈ S ≡ {1, 2, ..., n} denote the
starting state, then
us(σ) := E0 [u(σ) : s
0 = s] , s = 1, 2, ..., n,
5A stationary probability may also be thought of as the fraction of time spent asymptotically in a given
state, or the number of visits to state s in a game with t periods as t →∞.
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defines the expected average discounted payoff to agent a in state s, and
u(σ) = E [(1− δ)∑∞t=0 δt ((1−X t)α + (Y t)α)],
represents the overall expected average discounted payoff to agent a, where X t and Y t are
random variables of period t favors by agents a and b, respectively. Let vs and v be the
equivalent payoffs to agent b. If π 6= ∅, P (s0 = s) = πs, or undefined, and σ is symmetric
(ys ≡ xn+1−s for s ∈ N or ys ≡ x−s for s ∈ Z), we claim without proof that for finite
n∗-EM equilibria
u(σ) ≡ u(x) = 1−δ
2
∑n
s=1 πs ((1− xs)α + (ys)α),
and we define the value of σ to be T (σ) := u + v ≡ 2u(x).
We now return to finish our 2-state vs. 3-state EM comparison for the general case of
δ > δ∗ or for its α-concave equivalent; δ > δα.
Lemma 3.13 (3-state EM strategy) For δ > δα there exists a 3-state EM equilibrium
profile, call it σ′em3 , that has strictly higher value than any 2-state EM profile. That is,
T
(
σ′em3
)
> T (σem2), ∀α, p, σem2 .
Proof. δα is defined as the discount factor at which full equality matching becomes incen-
tive compatible in a 2-state EM game (definition 128). Therefore the only σem2 strategy
profile we need to consider consists of full favors by the disadvantaged agent and no favors
by the advantaged agent. Call this profile σ∗em2 .
T
(
σ∗em2
)
= uem (δα) + uˉem (δα) = p (1 + (1− x)α + yα) = p (1 + 21−α).
For 3-state EM,
T
(
σ′em3
)
= 2 (π1u1 + π2u2 + π3u3), where π = (π1, π2, π3) .
π denotes the stationary probabilities. Let m be a matrix of transition probabilities between
states induced by a 3-state EM strategy, then π is determined by
mᵀπ = π and π1 + π2 + π3 = 1 where m =
[ 1−p p 0
p 1−2p p
0 p 1−p
]
=⇒ π = (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
.
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It is enough to prove the claim for δ = δα since for δ > δα we can use the “δ = δα”-solution
because it is incentive compatible for δ ≥ δα. The ICC for σ′em3 are:
(1− δα) (1− x1)α + δαu2 ≥ 1− δ + δαu1, (142)
(1− δα) (1− x2)α + δαu3 ≥ 1− δ + δαu2. (143)
Suppose for our candidate solution we pick x1 and x2 such the ICC (142) and (143)
bind. Treating the inequality signs in (142) and (143) as equalities and solving yields
x2 = (1− 2x1) /2. The arithmetic required for the last step and for an expression for
T
(
σ′em3
)
is in the appendix. We just need one point so let x1 = 1/3 =⇒ x2 = 1/6. Then
T (σ′em3) =
2
3
p
(
1 +
(
1− 1
3
)α
+
(
1
3
)α
+
(
1− 1
6
)α
+
(
1
6
)α)
= 2
3
p
(
1 +
(
2
3
)α
+
(
5
6
)α
+
(
1
3
)α
+
(
1
6
)α)
.
A comparison of T
(
σ∗em2
)
to T
(
σ′em3
)
shown in figure 5 concludes the proof.
Figure 5: T (σ′em3) in red, T (σ∗em2) in blue, and p =
1
2
by normalization
To finish this section we show that the uniform stationary distribution we found in the
3-state EM example holds in general for multi-state EM, except for infinite state strategies.
For the latter we show that now stationary distribution exists. Finally, we define locally and
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globally efficient multi-state equilibria.
Lemma 3.14 πs (σemn) = 1/n, s = 1, 2, ..., n.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix. The proof is a generalized version of the transforma-
tion matrix calculation we did in the proof of lemma 3.13 to compute the fractions of time
agents spent in each state in a 3-state EM game.
Lemma 3.15 π (σem∞) = ∅.
Proof. By (141) of definition 3.10 the stochastic process associated with σem∞ is a simple
randomwalk on Z1 with transition probabilities ρ (s, s + 1) = ρ(s, s−1) = p and ρ(s, s) =
1−2p. We say that ρ is irreducible since any state t ∈ Z is reached with positive probability
from any state s ∈ Z in a finite number of steps. Furthermore, each s ∈ Z is visited
infinitely often so each s is recurrent, but there are infinitely many states so the fraction
of total visits to s has measure 0. That is, s is null recurrent and therefore no stationary
distribution exists over s ∈ Z consistent with σem∞ . A proof of the last statement can be
found in Durrett [3] (p. 307, but the details are beyond the scope of this paper).
Definition 3.16 Suppose σemn˜ is an n˜-state EM strategy profile such that neither agent has
a profitable deviation. Then we call σemn˜ an n˜-state EM equilibrium (n˜-EM equilibrium).
If T (σemn˜) ≥ T
(
σ′emn˜
)
, for all n˜-EM equilibria, σ′emn˜ , we call σemn˜ a locally efficient
n˜-state EM equilibrium, and denote it by σ∗emn˜ . If T (σemn˜) ≥ T (σemn) for all n ∈ N and
σemn , we call σemn˜ a globally efficient multi-state equality matching equilibrium (n∗-EM
or globally efficient n˜-EM equilibrium), and denote it by σ∗emn .
3.3.1 Globally efficient n-EM equilibria (n∗-EM): Numerical methods
Imposing concavity on the linear favor-trading model substantially complicates the equi-
librium analysis. At this point we are unable to solve the model further in closed-form and
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therefore in this section we turn to numerical techniques to characterize n∗-EM equilibria.
Subsection 3.3.1.1 introduces our numerical analysis approach and provides an overview
of the parametric models we have constructed to carry out the analysis. Details of the
two models follow in subsections 3.3.1.2 and 3.3.1.4, respectively. We characterize n∗-
EM equilibria properties in section 3.3.2 based on the results of our numerical analysis.
However, our solution methods themselves may be of greater interest to some readers than
the actual solutions in so far as these techniques may be used to solve other applied game
theory problems.
3.3.1.1 Summary of parametric models: Conjectures in later sections are based on
results from two types of parametric computer models; games with simulated payoffs (SP)
and games with computed payoffs (CP). The computer code for each model is Mathematica
7 based, and consists of a favor solver engine and a favor solver frame. Given numerical
values of α, δ, p and n (number of states), the favor solver engine finds a representation for
payoffs, u =
∑n
s=1 πsus, and incentive compatibility constraints, ICCs, in terms of x, then
solves the constrained nonlinear optimization problem:6
max
x=0
u(x)
subj. to ICCs(x)≥0, ∀s∈S.
(144)
The favor solver frame is essentially a series of loops built around the engine code that
feeds the engine a set of user-specified values for α, δ and p, and increments n until u stops
increasing. The frame also records the results for the optimal n, denoted by n∗, for each
triplet (α, δ, p) and constructs user-specified tables and plots out of these results.
The difference between the simulated payoffs model and the computed payoffs model
6In EM optimization problems x ≡ {x1, ..., xn−1} in (144) because xn = 0 by definition of n-EM and
therefore drops out of u(x) and ICCs(x). For other strategies (with xn > 0), x in (144) should be treated as
x ≡ {x1, ..., xn}.
118
is the part of the engine code that finds us(x). The SP-model’s engine generates a large
set of random favor opportunity sequences, computes the path of the game (sequence of
states) consistent with strategy profile σemn for each favor opportunity sequence and for
each possible starting state, computed the discounted sums agent a’s flow payoffs along
each path, and takes the averages per starting states to determine us(x), ∀s. The CP-
model’s engine finds us(x) directly by solving the set of n simultaneous payoff equations
that characterize σemn .
Both models useMathematica’s built-in optimization algorithms to solve problem (144)
and the CP-model uses Mathematica’s built-in numerical solver to solve the sets of simulta-
neous payoff equations. The Mathematica code for each model is available in the appendix.
3.3.1.2 Simulated payoffs (SP) model: The SP-model consists of the following steps:
1. Choose simulation and parameter values: The user specifies the number of games
per state (I) and rounds per game to simulate (J), and either point values or ranges for
model parameters α (concavity), δ (discount factor), and p (probability of favor opportu-
nity).
2. Simulate data: The model generates a matrix of random favor opportunities W ≡
[wi,j ]I×J with elements wi,j ∼ P {a, b, ∅}.
3. Process data to estimate payoff functions: We need to mapW to payoffs consistent
with σemn(α, δ, p). To this end, the model defines operators
%(s, w) :=s + 1{w=a,s 6=n} − 1{w=b,s 6=1}, (145)
υ(s, w)(x, y) :=1{w=a}(1− xs)α + 1{w=b}(ys)α
⇐⇒ υ(s, w)(x) :=1{w=a}(1− xs)α + 1{w=b}(xn+1−s)α by def’n 3.9 (146)
si,j = %(si,j−1, wi,j) iteratively determines the path of game i consistent with σemn given
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a starting state si,0 ∈ S. υ maps each state along game i’s path to a flow payoff function
(of x). We want to find us(x) for state s so we apply the following functionals to W given
starting state si,0
si,0 × [wi,j ]I×J 7→ si,0 × [% (si,j−1, wi,j)]I×J ≡ [si,j−1]I×J , (147)
[si,j−1]I×J × [wi,j ]I×J 7→ [υ (si,j−1, wi,j) (x)]I×J ≡
[
υ (x)i,j−1
]
I×J
(s). (148)
In words, [υ(x)i,j−1]I×J (s) is an I×J matrix of flow payoffs in terms of x initiated from
state si,0 = s, ∀i. To find total payoffs the model computes discounted sums along the rows
of [υ(x)i,j−1]I×J . We multiply the result by (1 − δ) to convert total payoffs into average
discounted payoffs:
(1− δ)
([
υ (x)i,j−1
]
I×J
(s) ∙ [δj−1]
J×1
)
= [u˜s(x)i]I×1 , (149)
where u˜s(x)i = (1− δ)
∑J
j=1δ
j−1υ(x)i,j−1.
We use tilde to differentiate estimated payoffs from the true payoffs. However for J = ∞,
u˜s(x) =
1
I
∑I
i=1u˜s(x)i →p us(x) as I →∞ (150)
by law of large number. u˜s(x) contains a small truncation error, ²si,J = δJusi,J (x), for each
game i because J < ∞. We could use u˜s(x) = 11−δJ 1I
∑I
i=1 u˜s0,j=s(x)i to compensate, but
at the moment the SP-model does not implement any correction scheme for the truncation
error. Instead we chose J sufficiently large that errors factored by δJ are insignificant.
The model produces u˜s(x) for all s ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} using the same W . Therefore the
simulation generates nI payoff samples in total, and the overall value of the σemn is esti-
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mated as
u˜(x) + v˜(x) = 2u˜(x) by symmetry, and
u˜(x) =
∑n
s=1πsu˜s(x) by def’n 3.12
=
1
n
∑n
s=1u˜s(x) by def’n 3.14. (151)
4. Optimization: Our goal is to find the optimal number of states, n∗, and efficient
multi-state EM favors x∗ ≡ {x∗1, x∗2, ..., x∗n∗} for the specified values of α, δ, p and a set of
random favor opportunities W . To do so the model performs following steps:
a. Increment n by 1 or start with n = 2 if this is the first round.
b. Apply operators % and υ defined by (145) and (146) to W and transformations
(147)-(149) to the results to find u˜s (x) for s = 1, 2, ..., n as defined in (150).
c. To find x1, ..., xn−1 (xn = 0 by definition of σemn), numerically solve the following
formulation of nonlinear optimization problem (144):
max
x1,...,xn−1>0
1
n
∑n
s=1u˜s (x1, ..., xn−1)
subj. to xn=0 and (1−δ)((1−xs)α−1)+δ(u˜s+1(x)−u˜s(x))≥0, s=1,...,n−1.
(152)
d. Let u˜(n) and x˜(n) denote the solutions to (152). Record these values as well as
the corresponding u˜s(n), ∀s, and other desired data.
e. If n = 2 or u˜(n−1) < u˜(n), repeat from step a. Else n∗ = n−1 and x∗ = x(n−1).
We defer the technical details concerning Mathematica’s optimization algorithms and
their scope to subsection 3.3.1.4 and the appendix.
5. Output: A single point solution is not of particular importance to us, so we run the
SP-model on a set of points (α, δ, p) ∈ (0, 1)2 × (0, 1/2) that cover the parameter space.
The output is retrieved in tables and plots that describe the general behavior of n∗-EM
equilibria. For example, figure 6 depicts globally efficient x∗s for s = 1, 2, ..., n∗ − 1 as a
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functions of p. The exact code for this demonstration is available in the appendix.
Figure 6:
Simulated payoffs: n∗-EM(p) equilibria
Algorithm: Interior point
Points: α = 0.5, δ = 0.8, p = 0.05, 0.1, ..., 0.45
3.3.1.3 SP-model versus CP-model: The CP-model is more efficient (faster) and more
accurate but requires the extra step of solving n simultaneous payoff equations. When that
is not possible, the SP-model can fill in the gap. We used the SP-model mainly to double
check our results, but we present it here to offer another tool for the continuing research
into favor trading equilibria and for other similar problems.
3.3.1.4 Computed payoffs (CP) model: The CP-model has similar steps to the SP-
model:
1. Choose parameter values: The user specifies point values or ranges for model
parameters α (concavity), δ (discount factor), and p (probability of favor opportunity).
2. Setup simultaneous payoff equation problem: Given n, we can describe us (σemn)
with following set of simultaneous equations:
u1 = p ((1− δ)(1− x1)α + δu2) + (1− p)δu1,
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un = p(1− δ + δun) + p ((1− δ)(yn)α + δun−1) + (1− 2p)δun,
us = p ((1− δ)(1− xs)α + δus+1) + p ((1− δ)(ys)α + δus−1)
+ (1− 2p)δus for s = 2, ..., n − 1.
Substituting ys = xn+1−s per definition 3.9 and simplifying
us :=

p (1−δ)(1−x1)
α+δu2
1−(1−p)δ , s=1,
p
(1−δ)((1−xs)α+xαn+1−s)+δ(us−1+us+1)
1−(1−2p)δ , s=2,...,n-1,
p
(1−δ)(1+xα1 )+δun−1
1−(1−p)δ , s=n.
(153)
3. Solve payoff equations to find payoff functions: Given parametric values for α, δ
and p, and the number of states n, Mathematica can numerically solve (153). Let u˜s(x),
s = 1, ..., n, denote the solution.
4-5. Optimization and output: Same as in the SP-model, except u˜s(x), s = 1, ..., n,
in 4(b) comes from solving (153) instead of simulation based estimates of us(x).
Technical details: We used Mathematica’s NSolve command to solve the payoff equa-
tions in the CP-model and the NMaximize and FindMaximum commands for optimization.
FindMaximum looks for a local optimum with an interior point algorithm while NMax-
imize uses Differential Evolution or Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm to solve for global
optima. Simulated Annealing and Random Search algorithms were also available, but the
other methods performed better. FindMaximum was significantly faster and more robust in
many cases than the global methods, so we used it to investigate particular aspects of the
global equilibria uncovered by the NMaximize. A description of each global algorithm is
available in the appendix courtesy of Wolfram Research [21].
Limitations: Limiting factors to arbitrarily high numerical accuracy are time and com-
puting power. In practice this means that characterizing asymptotic behavior of the model
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is not possible or reliable using numerical techniques. Closed-form solutions would of
course be preferable.
3.3.2 Numerical analysis of n∗-EM equilibria
In this section we present a number of conjectures derived from numerical testing using the
models from section 3.3.1. To support these conjectures we refer to a number of figures
and tables interpolated from sets of parametric solutions. The rest of the section illustrates
n∗-EM equilibrium behavior as p, δ and α are varied in turn.
3.3.2.1 Results and resulting conjectures: The following conjectures concern glob-
ally efficient multi-state EM equilibria. That is, n-EM equilibria that are optimal across the
number of states (n) and favors (x1, x2, ..., xn−1). In our conjectures we sometimes use
the expression “for all” (in quotes) in the context of numerical results to refer to an entire
parameter range that we covered at close increments rather than at every actual point. For
example, if a numerical result was interpolated from solutions for p = 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.49,
we may refer to it as a result “for all” p.
Conjecture 3.17 Let n∗(α, δ, p) be the number of states associated with σ∗emn given α, δ
and p. Then the finite difference functions (discrete derivatives) for α, δ and p, respectively,
are (i) Δα|Δn∗=1,Δδ=Δp=0 < 0 and increasing in n∗ (decreasing in absolute value),
(ii) Δδ|Δn∗=1,Δα=Δp=0 > 0 and decreasing in n∗ (smaller δ-steps per unit Δn∗),
(iii) Δp|Δn∗=1,Δα=Δδ=0 > 0 and approximately constant.
Support for conjecture. The conjectured relationships were observed in all our numerical
tests. Please refer to figures 11, 13, and 15 for plots of n∗ (p) , n∗ (δ) and n∗ (α), respec-
tively. Figure 7 shows the globally efficient number of states, n∗, as a function of δ and p.7
7Each grid point in figure 7 corresponds to a Mathematica solution for given values of δ and p. We
used Mathematica’s interior point algorithm to find the optimal favors, x∗1, ..., x∗n, for each n = 2, 3, ... until
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We suggest further numerical tests to verify these relationships for a wider set of parameter
values, and we believe that further analysis of the system of n-EM payoff equations may
provide a closed-form solution.
Figure 7: Globally efficient n-EM equilibria: n∗(δ, p) where α = 0.5
Conjecture 3.18 Let x∗ = {x∗1, x∗2, ..., x∗n∗} =
{
y∗n∗ , y
∗
n∗−1, ..., y
∗
1
}
be the set of favors as-
sociated with σ∗emn . Define s as the first state with x∗s smaller than its successor x∗s+1 where
s = n∗ if none are smaller. That is, s(α, δ, p) := inf {s ∈ S : x∗s < x∗s+1 where x∗n∗+1 ≡ 1} .
Then given δ, p ∃α ∈ (0, 1) such that s < n∗ for α < α, otherwise s = n∗.
Support for conjecture. The relationship was observed in all our numerical tests. Sub-
section 3.3.2.2 covers the conjecture 3.18 “for all” p with δ fixed when α ≥ α (see figure
8). Subsection 3.3.2.3 does the same “for all” δ with p fixed (see figure 12). Subsection
3.3.2.4 illustrates the behavior of x∗ as α varies from values below α to values above it
u (x∗1, ..., x
∗
n) stopped increasing. n∗ was chosen as the n for which u (x∗1, ..., x∗n) peaked. The grid points
consist of α = 0.5, δ = 0.4, 0.41, ..., 0.95 and p = 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.49.
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(see figure 14) and supports our conjecture that such an α exists. Figure 16 illustrates in-
equality s < n∗ in more detail. It would be natural to expect, or at least we expected, the
optimal favor sequence to be decreasing so this came as a surprise. At the moment we do
not attempt to explain this anomaly, but we do confirm it by solving the same model with
the additional restriction that favors have to be decreasing. The resulting equilibria favors
x˙ = {x˙1, x˙2, ..., x˙n} are dominated by the original x∗ solution; u(x∗) > u(x˙). Subsection
3.3.2.5 offers a numerical analysis with figures and tables of case with α < α. In particular,
figures 17 and 18 illustrate the case “for all” p and “for all” δ, respectively, with α fixed
below α.
Claim 3.19 Consider x∗ discussed in conjecture 3.18. For n∗ > 2 n∗-EM equilibria may
include (i) favors that are above the socially optimal stage game level of 1/2 (full sharing),
and (ii) favor sequences that are non-decreasing.
Proof. Both findings surprised us which is why we state them above in a claim. We offer
the proofs in the form of numerical examples. Please refer to table 3 for results of an n∗-EM
equilibrium solution for α = 0.5, δ = 0.9 and p = 0.3, 0.31, ..., 0.49. Observe that all of the
solutions include x∗1 > 1/2 and x∗2 > 1/2, and toward the higher p-values, x∗3 > 1/2. We
ran the exact same parametric model was with the same values, except with an additional
restriction of xs ≤ 1/2 (instead of xs ≤ 1). The results are in table 4. Both tables display
expected payoff to agent a in the first column under heading u. (Recall that T = u+v = 2u,
by symmetry). A comparison of the two tables shows that the unrestricted n∗-EM strategies
generate slightly higher payoffs. Examples of non-decreasing favor sequences are available
in subsection 3.3.2.5.
Conjecture 3.20 For n∗ and s discussed in conjectures 3.17 and 3.18, s (n∗) has approxi-
mately the same relationship to p, δ and α as n∗ has to p, δ and α, respectively.
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Support for conjecture. When s (n∗) = n∗, the result is trivially true. Therefore we only
need to consider case (iii) of conjecture 3.18, that is, when s < n∗. Figures 16, 17 and 18 in
subsection 3.3.2.5 show the behavior of s when α < α. Recall that x∗n∗ = 0 by definition of
an n-EM strategy. Therefore the outer edge in the figure that forms a geometric ridge in the
plots, represents second to last favor by agent a. The referenced plots show this ridge for
x∗n∗−1 (α), xn∗−1 (p) and x∗n∗−1 (δ), respectively. Along each ridge runs a “concave canal”
that is formed by the set of smallest nonzero favors x∗s(n∗) (α), x∗s(n∗) (p) and x∗s(n∗) (δ),
respectively. It is apparent from the plots that x∗s(n∗) varies in tandem with x∗n∗−1 favors in
terms of position, and hence it follows that Δs
Δα
≈Δn∗
Δα
,
Δs
Δp
≈Δn∗
Δp
and Δs
Δδ
≈Δn∗
Δδ
.
3.3.2.2 Efficient favors as p varies: Figure 8 was interpolated from a set of globally
optimal EM favor sequences (x∗) for α = 0.5, δ = 0.85 fixed, while p was varied from
p = 0.03, 0.07, ..., 0.47. The plot shows the globally efficient size of favors (x) across states
(s) as the probability of favor opportunities varies from 0 to 0.5. Because the number of
states is a discrete variable and favors are optimized across states, this causes the magnitude
of each favor to increase as p increases until it becomes optimal to add another state. At
this point the size of the favors in the older states tends to fall slightly. The favor levels then
climb to and above their previous levels until it becomes optimal to add yet another state,
and so forth. This gives the favor surface a jagged outline along the p-axis. The surface
would appear even more jagged had we used a larger number of points for p ∈ (0, 1/2).
Along the s-axis favors are decreasing for the given α, however, later we show that this is
not necessarily the case for α sufficiently low. The plot also demonstrates lemma 3.7 in
that for any value of p, at least some level of equality matching dominates autarky when
utility functions are α-concave.
The corresponding numbers for figure 8 are shown in figure 9 and can found in more detail
in the appendix in tables 6 and 7, respectively.
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Figure 8:
n∗-EM favor sequence: x∗1(p), x∗2(p), ..., x∗n∗(p)
Algorithm: Differential evolution
Points: α = 0.5, δ = 0.85, p = 0.03, 0.07, ..., 0.47
Figure 9: Figure 8 data: Multi-state EM x∗s(p)
The slack in incentive compatibility constraints associated with figure 8 are available
in table (figure) 10. The ICC are virtually all tight suggesting the solution may represent a
second best strategy profile in at least some situation or for some parameter values.
Figure 11 depicts how n∗ changes with p. The step function was interpolated from a
set of solutions for α = 0.5, δ = 0.9 and p = 0.005, 0.01, ..., 0.495. The other function
is a generic linear approximation. The figure illustrates that steps in p are approximately
constant.
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Figure 10: ICC for figure 8: Multi-state EM x∗s(p)
Figure 11: n∗(p) for n-EM equilibria
3.3.2.3 Efficient favors as δ varies: Figure 12 was interpolated from the multi-state
EM solution sequences (favors) for points (α, δ, p) = (0.6, 0.37, 0.4), (0.6, 0.41, 0.4),...,
(0.6, 0.93, 0.4). The regions for δ < 0.37 and δ > 0.93 were excluded from the plots
because they would have made the plots visually less informative.8 x∗s (δ) displays many
of the same characteristics as the corresponding plot for x∗s (p) (figure 8); x∗s (δ) are jagged
along the δ-axis because number of states is a discrete variable, and for δ fixed, x∗s (δ)
decreases along s for the given α, or for α high enough which we show later. A closer
inspection of the plots and the data shows that the dependence of n∗ and x∗s, s = 1, ..., n∗
8Solutions for δ < 0.37 each consist of one tiny nonzero favor (x∗1 < 0.1) and subsequently would only
have added flat space into our plots. The number of nonzero favors increase exponentially in as δ → 1 so
including the tail end would have dominated the rest of the plot, and obscured other details.
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on p is (direct) linear, and (direct) convex on δ for α sufficiently high.
Figure 12:
n∗-EM behavior w.r.t. δ: x∗1(δ), x∗2(δ), ..., x∗n∗(δ)
Algorithm: Nelder-Mead simplex
Points: α = 0.6, p = 0.4, δ = 0.37, 0.41, ..., 0.93
The data points for figure 12 are available in the appendix in table 8. The corresponding
payoffs and incentive compatibility constraints are also available (table 9). As before the
incentive compatibility constraints are all tight within round off error. Figure 13 depicts
how n∗ changes with δ. The step function was interpolated from a set of solutions for
α = 0.5, p = 0.3 and δ = 0.1, 0.11, ..., 0.9. The other function is a generic approximation.
The figure illustrates that steps in δ are decreasing.
3.3.2.4 Efficient favors as α varies: Figure 14 was interpolated from a set of favor
sequences x∗ = {x∗1, x∗2, ..., x∗n∗} obtained by optimizing σ∗emn (x∗) for δ = 0.8 and p =
0.4 fixed, while α was varied from α = 0.2, 0.24, ..., 0.8. Both the differential evolution
and Nelder-Mead algorithms converged to the same set of global solutions, but performed
poorly for smaller α. Later on we use an interior point algorithm to find (local) x∗ solutions
consistent with σ∗emn when α < 0.2 (high concavity case). However figure 14 already
supports conjecture 3.18, which states that for α high enough x∗ (α) is decreasing, but for
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Figure 13: n∗(δ) for n-EM equilibria
α sufficiently low, x∗ (α) fails to remain decreasing toward the end of the sequence. As
with x∗(p) in p and x∗s (δ) in δ, figure 14 shows that x∗ (α) is jagged in α because the
number of states, s, is treated as a continues variable (for visual effect) even though s ∈ N
is discrete.
Figure 14:
n∗-EM favor sequence: x∗1(α), x∗2(α), ..., x∗n∗(α)
Algorithm: Differential evolution
Points: δ = 0.8, p = 0.4, α = 0.2, 0.24, ..., 0.8
The Mathematica code used to compute the data points and to plot figure 14 is avail-
able in the appendix. The data points and associated payoffs and incentive compatibility
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constraints may also be found there in tables 10 and 11. The ICC are all close to zero.
Figure 15 depicts how n∗ changes with α. The step function was interpolated from a set of
solutions for δ = 0.7, p = 0.3 and α = 0.1, 0.11, ..., 0.9. The other function is a generic
approximation. The figure illustrates that steps in α are increasing.
Figure 15: n∗(α) for n-EM equilibria
3.3.2.5 Analysis of special n∗-EM cases (α < α): For small α we used Mathemat-
ica’s interior point algorithm that solves for local optima, but in our case local optima
are also global optima. The interior point algorithm is more stable and can handle more
variables (longer favor sequences) than Mathematica’s global algorithms. Therefore it lets
us solve σ∗emn (x∗) for smaller α and gives us a closer look at the behavior of x∗ (α) se-
quences in low α cases. Figure 16 depicts globally efficient x∗ (α) sequences for α < α
that were interpolated from n∗-EM solutions for α = 0.08, 0.09, 0.10, ..., 0.35 (the re-
sults for α = 0.2, 0.3 are consistent with the results obtained by differential evolution and
Nelder-Mead algorithms). The n∗-EM solution data is available in table 12 in the appendix.
Of course the sudden jump in favor sizes toward the very end of the globally efficient
series of favors shown in figure 16 could be an error of some sort, perhaps a short-coming
in the numerical algorithms employed by Mathematica? However, it seems exceedingly
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Figure 16:
n∗-EM behavior for α < α: x∗1(α), x∗2(α), ..., x∗n∗(α)
Algorithm: Interior point
Points: δ = 0.85, p = 0.4, α = 0.08, 0.09, ..., 0.35
unlikely that three different algorithms (Differential evolution, Nelder-Mead, and interior
point) would all produce identical errors. But just to be sure we reran the experiment
show in figure 16 with one exception; favors were constrained by 0 ≤ xs ≤ xs−1, ∀s
where x0 ≡ 0, instead of the standard feasibility constraint 0 ≤ xs ≤ 1, ∀s. The results
are available in table 13 and figure 27 in the appendix. The plot looks identical to its
counterpart with unconstrained favor sizes except for the jump in favor values at the end
of favor sequences. The payoffs corresponding to the constrained favor sequences were
smaller by about 0.02% on average, but more importantly the xs ≤ xs−1 constraints bound
where xs > xs−1 previously instead of converging to completely different fixed points.
Figure 17 shows the n∗ and x∗ (p) associated with a globally efficient n∗-EM equilib-
rium as a function of p ∈ (0, 1/2) when α < α. The plot was interpolated from parametric
solutions for α = 0.2, δ = 0.85 and p = 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.49. The corresponding numbers
are available in the appendix in table 14. The key take-away from the figure is that while an
increase in the probability of favor opportunities (p) increases the number of favors that are
optimal as before, it does not eliminate or change the “canal” of minimal nonzero favors
defined by s in conjecture 3.18 that appears in the interior of the optimal favor sequence,
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that is, s < n∗. Furthermore, s (p) appears to be directly proportional to n∗(p).
Figure 17:
n∗-EM behavior for α < α : x∗1(p), x∗2(p), ..., x∗n∗(p)
Algorithm: Interior point
Points: α = 0.2, δ = 0.85, p = 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.49
Figure 18 shows the same figure with respect to changing δ. The plot was interpolated
from parametric solutions for α = 0.3, p = 0.3 and δ = 0.6, 0.61, ..., 0.96, and the cor-
responding numbers are available in the appendix in table 15. As before, the “canal” of
minimal nonzero favors defined by s remains in the interior of the optimal favor sequence;
s < n∗ and s (δ) appears to be directly proportional to n∗ (δ).
3.3.2.6 Partial results and resulting speculation: The conjectures in this subsections
are more speculative than the earlier conjectures in this section.
For finite dimensional EM strategies we defined the value of a strategy profile as the
sum of average discounted state payoffs for both agents weighted by the stationary proba-
bilities of each state (definition 3.12). If the starting state is random, this value is also equal
to the strategy profile’s dynamically defined value. For infinite dimensional EM strategy
profiles this is not the case as ∞-EM strategies have no stationary distribution (lemma
3.15). Therefore the value of σem∞ has to be computed dynamically and the only sensible
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Figure 18:
n∗-EM behavior for α < α : x∗1(δ), x∗2(δ), ..., x∗n∗(δ)
Algorithm: Interior point
Points: α = 0.3, p = 0.4, δ = 0.6, 0.61, ..., 0.96
starting is state 0. This makes comparisons with finite σemn trickier, but our preliminary
results suggest that∞-EM strategies cannot be incentive compatible. If an∞-EM equilib-
rium exists, it would be dominated by a truncated (finite) version of that ∞-EM strategy
profile. The core intuition is that in EM equilibria the value of the game is the average
value of all the states, favors are efficient (up to full sharing) so the bigger the favors, the
greater the value of the game. But favors generally have to decrease to provide agents with
an incentive to keep doing them. This in turn means that in a game with infinite states there
would also be infinitely many low favor (low value) states. Truncating the game at some
point ensures that the game is played in high value territory except for two boundary states
that nonetheless map the game back into the higher favors region. Eliminating a boundary
state may provide a higher return for that point in the game, but it would extend the game
into states with lower values until adding another state would be inefficient.
Conjecture 3.21 σem∞ are never globally efficient and may not even exist.
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We define the expected (average discounted) value in an iterative fashion then expand.
T (σem∞) := 2 (1 − δ) v0, where vs := p (1−xs)
α+(ys)
α+δ(vs−1+vs+1)
1−(1−2p)δ , s ∈ Z (154)
To make the expansion easier, let pˆ ≡ p
1−(1−2p)δ , δˆ ≡ δ1−(1−2p)δ , xˆs ≡ (1− xs)α +(y−s)α ≡
(1−xs)α + (x−s)α, and in these terms vs := pˆxˆs + δˆ (vs−1 + vs+1) for s ∈ Z. Expanding
v0 iteratively:
v0 = pˆxˆ0 + δˆ (v−1 + v+1)
= pˆxˆ0 + δˆ
(
pˆxˆ−1 + δˆ (v−2 + v0)
)
+ δˆ
(
pˆxˆ1 + δˆ (v0 + v2)
)
= pˆxˆ0 + pˆδˆxˆ−1 + pˆδˆxˆ1 + δˆ2 (v−2 + 2v0 + v2)
= pˆxˆ0 + pˆδˆxˆ−1 + pˆδˆxˆ1 + δˆ2
(
pˆxˆ−2 + δˆ (v−3 + v−1)
)
+ 2δˆ2
(
pˆxˆ0+δˆ (v−1 + v+1)
)
+ δˆ2
(
pˆxˆ2 + δˆ (v1 + v3)
)
= pˆxˆ0
(
1 + 2δˆ2
)
+ pˆδˆxˆ−1 + pˆδˆxˆ1 + pˆδˆ2xˆ−2 + pˆδˆ2xˆ2 + δˆ3 (v−3+3v−1+3v+1 + v3)
= ...
To further condense the expansion, let xˇ0 := xˆ0, xˇj := xˆj + xˆ−j for t ∈ N. Then
v0 = pˆ
(
1 + 2δˆ2
)
xˇ0 + pˆδˆxˇ1 + pˆδˆ
2xˇ2 + δˆ
3 (v−3+3v−1+3v+1 + v3)
= pˆ
(
1 + 2δˆ2 + 6δˆ4 + 20δˆ6 + ...
)
xˇ0 + pˆ
(
δˆ + 3δˆ3 + 10δˆ5 + 35δˆ7 + ...
)
xˇ1
+ pˆ
(
δˆ2 + 4δˆ4 + 15δˆ6 + 56δˆ8 + ...
)
xˇ2 + pˆ
(
δˆ3 + 5δˆ5 + 21δˆ7 + 84δˆ9 + ...
)
xˇ3 + ...
The xˇj coefficients, say Cˇj , consist of discounted sums of binomials. Taking their limits
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shows that Cˇj have 2F1 Hypergeometric9 form
Cˇj =
∞∑
i=0
pˆ
(
2i + j
i + j
)
δˆ2i+j = pˆδˆj2F1
(
1+j
2
,2+j
2
; 1 + j; 4δˆ
2
)
=⇒ Cˇ0 = pˆ√
1−4δˆ2
, Cˇ1 = pˆ
1−
√
1−4δˆ2
2δˆ
√
1−4δˆ2
, Cˇ2 = pˆ
1−2δˆ2−
√
1−4δˆ2
2δˆ2
√
1−4δˆ2
, ...
∴ T (σem∞) = 2 (1− δ) pˆ
∞∑
j=0
2F1
(
1+j
2
,2+j
2
; 1 + j; 4δˆ
2
)
xˇj
= 2(1−δ)p
1−(1−2p)δ
1√
1− 4δ2
(1−(1−2p)δ)2
(1− x0)α + (x0)α
+ 4(1−δ)p
1−(1−2p)δ
∞∑
j=1
2F1
(
1+j
2
,2+j
2
; 1 + j; 4δ
2
(1−(1−2p)δ)2
)
((1− xj)α + (x−j)α)
The hypergeometric function is well-suited for numerical and analytical work but we leave
further analysis of T (σem∞) for the future.
Speculation supporting conjecture 3.21. Suppose an∞-EM equilibrium exists. We as-
sume the values of the associated favors would have to be decreasing for both theoretical
and empirical reasons. In theory we expect favors to decrease to provide agents with an
incentive to keep doing them (do a big favor today in return for the promise of bigger
reciprocal favors tomorrow). Empirically (numerical testing) we found that favors were
decreasing, except in special cases that involved a jump toward the end of the favor se-
quence. If the sequence is infinite it has no end (to state the obvious), so there would be
no reason to expect any jump either. Furthermore, our numerical algorithm worked by op-
timizing the value of the game for n states, comparing the value to the n − 1 state value,
and adding another state and repeating if the n state value was higher than the n − 1 state
value. The solutions were of course finite, but moreover they were well-behaved in terms
of the optimal number of states (see figure 7), and show almost surely that the number of
states does not diverge to infinity within the interior of the parameter space. That said,
9
“The” Hypergeometric function is defined as 2F1(a, b; c; z) =
∑∞
k=0(a)k(b)k/(c)k z
k
/
k!
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numerical analysis is not well-suited for analysis of asymptotic behavior we so cannot rule
out anomalous behavior as α → 1, δ → 1 or p → 1/2.
Conjecture 3.22 The globally efficient n∗-EM equilibrium exists and is unique up to a
measure zero in parameter space. That is, there may be pairs of points (zero measure) in
the parameter space for which the n∗ and n∗ + 1 state values of the game are equal.
Speculation supporting conjecture 3.22. Our numerical tests always produced unique
n∗-EM outcomes, however, the parameters live on continuous intervals while the optimal
number of states is discrete. Let n˜ be the efficient number of states for a triplet of val-
ues
(
α˜, δ˜, p˜
)
. Suppose we decrease α, or increase δ or p continuously while the globally
efficient multi-state solution is updated until n∗ = n˜ turns to n∗ = n˜ + 1. At that point
T
(
σ∗emn˜
)
= T
(
σ∗emn˜+1
)
, so by definition 3.16 both are globally efficient multi-state equi-
libria. For any integer pair (n, n + 1) with n ≥ 2, we should be able to create three dis-
tinct pairs of such non-unique EM equilibria (one pair for each parameter), but they would
have measure zero mass. It might be possible to use a similar technique to create lines or
planes of n-EM intersections by increasing one parameter while lowering another subject to
T (σ∗emn) = T
(
σ∗emn+1
)
, however there is no reason to suspect that T (σ∗emn) would remain
constant.
3.4 Pseudo-highest symmetric self-generating line (pseudo-HSSGL)
equilibria
In this section we discuss an analog of AB’s [1] highest symmetric self-generating line
(HSSGL) equilibrium concept for favor-trading with concave utility functions. Our version
of HSSGL called pseudo-HSSGL involves finite number of states, whereas AB used infi-
nite states, but in the interior both have the same automata representation (see figure 19).
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Figure 19: Automata for 6-state pseudo-HSSGL strategy
Another difference between AB’s HSSGL and our pseudo-HSSGL is that we do not limit
our analysis onto lines (symmetric or otherwise). We call a pseudo-HSSGL strategy with
n states an n-state pseudo-HSSGL (n-HSSGL) strategy, and denote it with σhssgln .
3.4.1 Globally efficient n-HSSGL equilibria (n∗-HSSGL)
We use the same approach as with n∗-EM strategies to numerically optimize problem (144).
As before, it is enough to solve the optimization problem for agent a because we impose
symmetry on it by replacing vs and ys with u−s and x−s, respectively, where the state space
is S ≡ {−n, ...,−1, 1, ..., n}. The objective is simply u(x) = u−1(x)+u1(x)
2
because the
HSSGL game starts from either state 1 (agent b fully advantaged) or state -1 (agent a fully
advantaged). Individual payoffs are described by equation (155) and incentive compatibil-
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ity constraints by equation (156).
us :=

p ((1− δ)(1− x−n)α + δu−1)
+p ((1− δ)(y−n)α + δu1) + (1− 2p)δu−n
s=-n
p ((1− δ)(1− xs)α + δu−1)
+p ((1− δ)(ys)α + δu1) + (1− 2p)δus−1
s=1-n,...,-1,
p ((1− δ)(1− xs)α + δu−1)
+p ((1− δ)(ys)α + δu1) + (1− 2p)δus+1
s=1,...,n-1,
p ((1− δ)(1− xn)α + δu−1)
+p ((1− δ)(yn)α + δu1) + (1− 2p)δun
s=n.
(155)
ICCs(x) :=

u−1 − u−n − 1−δδ (1− (1− x−n)α) s=-n,
u−1 − us−1 − 1−δδ (1− (1− xs)α) s=1-n,...,-1,
u−1 − us+1 − 1−δδ (1− (1− xs)α) s=1,...,n-1,
u−1 − un − 1−δδ (1− (1− xn)α) s=n.
(156)
The problem is computationally harder than optimizing n-EM strategies, so we used the
CP-model with interior point algorithm and applied it to well-behaved regions of the pa-
rameter space.
3.4.2 Numerical analysis of n∗-HSSGL equilibria
For low values of p, our computed n∗-HSSGL results are approximately consistent with
AB’s original HSSGL equilibria. That is, the size of the “small” favor owed (interest
payment) by the advantaged agent grows as periods of no favors pass, while the “large”
favor owed by the disadvantaged agent decreases. However, for larger p the optimal n∗-
HSSGL strategy appears to converge to four states: large favors in the inner states, and
small favors in the outer states.
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Figure 20: n
∗
-HSSGL favors as p varies: View 1
Points: α = 0.3, δ = 0.9, p = 0.14, 0.16, ..., 0.46
Figure 21: n
∗
-HSSGL favors as p varies: View 2
Points: α = 0.3, δ = 0.9, p = 0.14, 0.16, ..., 0.46
For the parameter values used to construct figures 20 and 21, the n∗-HSSGL equilibria
produce higher payoffs than n∗-EM equilibria for p = 0.42, 0.44, 0.46 and lower payoffs
otherwise. If we lower δ by 0.1, n∗-HSSGL dominates n∗-EM for all p in our sample. If we
lower α by 0.1 n∗-HSSGL dominates n∗-EM for p = 0.14, 0.16 and p ≥ 0.34. However, in
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each case the n∗-HSSGL dominance increases as p increases, and is insignificant (within
margin of error) for low p values.
Figures 28-31 in the appendix illustrate n∗-HSSGL equilibrium behavior as δ and α
vary per our CP-model and the (local) interior point algorithm. However, even these nu-
merical solutions were difficult to find in terms of error free parameter space coverage and
starting points for the interior point algorithm.
For the δ variation analysis we used δ = 0.65, 0.67,..., 0.95 while α = p = 0.3. All n∗-
HSSGL equilibria involved 8 or fewer states without strong patterns. However, we also ran
the same optimization exercise using n∗-EM strategies, and it turned out that T (σ∗emn) >
T
(
σ∗hssgln
)
for δ < 0.8 and n∗-HSSGL in turn outperformed n∗-EM increasingly for δ >
0.8.
To investigate n∗-HSSGL responsiveness to changes in concavity, we used α = 0.1,
0.12, ..., 0.74 while δ = 0.9 and p = 0.3. As the game became more linear (α approached
1) the optimal n∗-HSSGL solution included a greater number of states and began to re-
semble AB’s HSSGL strategy. This suggests that pure-form symmetric line equilibria are
optimal in the linear model (for some parameter values), but not in the concave model.
In comparison to n∗-EM, n∗-HSSGL produced higher payoffs for low α values and lower
payoffs for high α.
3.5 Equilibria with favor-depreciation (FD equilibria)
Consider a strategy that involves a small probability q ∈ [0, 1/2] that if the disadvantaged
agent does not do a favor in the boundary state, the game moves inwards by one state. The
idea is to choose q high enough that the agents would do a small favor at the boundary
state to avoid the chance of punishment in the form of having to do a positive (bigger)
favor next period. We call this mechanism favor-depreciation. It is our initial attempt to
design equilibria similar to HSSGL equilibria by AB [1] for a multi-state environment, or
142
equilibria in continuous time by Hauser and Hopenhayn [8] for a discrete time environment.
In numerical testing, globally efficient (to use the EM definition 3.16) equilibria with
favor-depreciation (FD equilibria) were only marginally better than corresponding n∗-EM
equilibria. When the maximum number of states was bound exogenously, FD equilibria
performed somewhat better against their locally efficient n-EM counterparts. Figures 22
and 23 show the results of FD equilibria bounded by a maximum of 4 states with α = 0.1,
δ = 0.5 and p = 0.07, 0.11, ..., 0.47. The corresponding results for locally efficient n-
EM equilibria are in figures 24 and 25. Column %(FD − EM) in figure 25 shows the
percentage difference between an example set of 4-state FD and EM equilibria payoffs.
This was consistent with our expectation since favor-depreciation strategies remove some
of the inefficiency involved with boundary states, however we were not expecting as much
of a difference for low values of p when the constraint on the number of states is not even
binding. The payoff difference starts at 5.4% for p = 0.07 and steadily increases to 9% as
the probability of favor opportunities is increased to p = 0.47. Perhaps the lack of a greater
difference is due to a fundamental inefficiency in FD strategies; the (fully) disadvantaged
agent is punished with probability q even when she does not do a favor simply because she
did not receive a favor opportunity. In our numerical tests, estimates of optimal q were very
small for small p (around 0.01) but grew larger (to 0.066) as p increased. The larger p is,
the higher the number of efficient states is, and hence the greater the effect of the bound on
states.
3.5.1 Remaining questions
Other potential equilibria to investigate include a EM-HSSGL hybrids and equilibria in-
volving punishment phases. For example, if no one does a favor, a strategy profile could
specify that neither agent do a favor next period either as punishment. The infinite dimen-
sional EM strategies also require more work as we did not have time to apply the expression
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Figure 22:
4-state FD equilibria: x∗1(p), x∗2(p), ..., x∗n∗(p)
Algorithm: Interior point
Points: α = 0.1, δ = 0.5, p = 0.07, 0.11, ..., 0.47
Figure 23: 4-state FD equilibria: Data for figure 22
for T (σem∞) that we derived. For finite dimensional strategies, we believe we could gen-
erate a full set of data in all dimensions, fit an approximating curve to it, and use the result
for comparative statistics and other analysis. It may be possible to analyze the system of
simultaneous n-EM payoff equations implicitly, for example, by the use of perturbation
analysis.
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Figure 24:
4-EM equilibria: x∗1(p), x∗2(p), ..., x∗n∗(p)
Algorithm: Interior point
Points: α = 0.1, δ = 0.5, p = 0.07, 0.11, ..., 0.47
Figure 25: 4-EM equilibria: Data for figure 24
3.6 Conclusion
By choosing a concave utility function that is arbitrarily close to a linear utility line, we can
obtain equilibria and outcomes that are arbitrarily close to the linear case of favor-trading.
Therefore we focused on the family of α-concave functions to emphasize the impact that
sufficient concavity can have on favor-trading games. In particular, favor-trading becomes
possible for all δ at some level and multi-state strategies become more valuable. For ex-
ample, when discount factors are just high enough to equality match full favors doing so
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maximizes expected utility in the linear case within a large class of incentive compatible
equilibria, whereas in the concave case we can do better by lowering the favor size and
using the generated slack in the incentive compatibility constraints to enforce a second
smaller consecutive favor.
In the rest of the paper, we generalized AB’s [1] equality matching to multiple states
or alternatively, we generalized Mo¨bius’ “chips mechanism” to divisible chips. We defined
multi-state equality matching for equilibria that were locally efficient for a given number
of states, and then for equilibria that were globally efficient across any number of states.
We also defined infinite state equality matching strategies, but argued that they either were
not incentive compatible or that they would be dominated by finite state equality matching
equilibria. We constructed two parametric models to numerically analyze globally efficient
multi-state equilibria. The first model simulates a large sample of games, derives pay-
off functions from the simulations, and finds the number and size of favors that would be
optimal for the constructed payoff functions. The second model solves the system of si-
multaneous payoff equations associated with an equality matching game directly, and uses
the results to find the optimal favor sequence given a general strategy profile such as multi-
state equality matching or pseudo-highest symmetric self-generating line strategies. We
used these models to compute sets of solutions that spanned the parameter space and then
interpolated general equilibria characteristics from those results. We further constructed a
version of AB’s highest symmetric self-generating lines equilibria that followed the same
automata except in the border states and was not restricted to lines or infinite number of
states. And we also extended the multi-state equality matching model to a class of equi-
libria that involve favor-depreciation and that dominate globally efficient multi-state equi-
libria. All strategies were analyzed using our parametric models, but not in as much depth
as multi-state equality matching strategies. Further research is needed to find closed-form
solutions to these various strategy profiles and to investigate hybrid and other strategies for
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favor-trading with concave utility functions.
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3.7 Appendix B
3.7.1 Proofs
Proof. (Lemma 3.7: EM equilibrium always exists)
Consider a simple (2-state) EM strategy profile σem consisting of favors x = y = ε,
and payoffs uε and uˉε for the disadvantaged and advantaged agents, respectively. We use
a direct proof to show that given any α, δ and p, there exists an ε small enough that the
incentive compatibility constraint for simple EM is satisfied.
The payoffs are
uε = p ((1− δ)(1− ε)α + δuˉε) + (1− p)δuε
= p
(1− δ) (1− ε)α + δuˉε
1− δ(1− p)
uˉε = p ((1− δ) + δuˉε) + p ((1− δ)εα + δuε) + (1− 2p)δuˉε
= p
(1− δ) (1 + εα) + δuε
1− δ(1− p)
To obtain explicit equations for uε and uˉε the solve the two equations above in two
unknowns,
uε = p
(1− δ)(1− ε)α + pδ (1 + (1− ε)α + εα)
1− (1− 2p)δ
uˉε = p
(1− δ) (1 + εα) + pδ (1 + (1− ε)α + εα)
1− (1− 2p)δ
=⇒ uˉε − uε =
p(1− δ) (1− (1− ε)α + εα)
1− (1− 2p)δ (157)
The incentive compatibility constraint is
(1− δ) (1− ε)α + δuˉε ≥ 1− δ + δuε
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=⇒ δ ≥ 1− (1− ε)
α
1− (1− ε)α + uˉε−uε
We substitute for uˉε − uε from equation 157,
δ ≥ 1− (1− ε)
α
1− (1− ε)α + p(1−δ)(1−(1−ε)α+εα)
1−(1−2p)δ
and solve for δ (here we skip several steps of straightforward simplification),
δ ≥ 1
1− p + p εα
1−(1−ε)α
→ 0 as ε → 0. (158)
because α ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (0, 1/2) are fixed and limε→0 εα1−(1−ε)α = ∞. And since u (ε) =
εα is continuous for α > 0 and ε > 0, we can always find an ε sufficiently small that
inequality 158 is satisfied.
Proof. (Lemma 3.13: δ > δα =⇒ ∃σ′em3 such that T
(
σ′em3
)
> T (σem2))
We first have to solve system of 3-state EM payoff equations when δ = δα :
u3 = p ((1− δα) + δαu3) + p ((1− δα) yα1 + δαu2) + (1− 2p)δαu3,
u2 = p ((1− δα) (1− x2)α + δαu3) + p ((1− δα) yα2 + δαu1) + (1− 2p)δαu2,
u1 = p ((1− δα) (1− x1)α + δαu2) + (1− p)δαu1.
Recall that δα = 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α) and by definition of multi-state EM strategies y1 = x2
and y2 = x1 :
u3 = p
((
1− 2α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)
)
+ 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u3
)
+ p
((
1− 2α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)
)
xα2 +
2α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u2
)
+ (1− 2p) 2α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u3,
149
u2 = p
((
1− 2α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)
)
(1− x2)α + 2α−12α−1+p(2−2α)u3
)
+ p
((
1− 2α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)
)
xα1 +
2α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u1
)
+ (1− 2p) 2α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u2,
u1 = p
((
1− 2α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)
)
(1− x1)α + 2α−12α−1+p(2−2α)u2
)
+ (1− p) 2α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u1.
Solving
u3 = p
−1+32α−4α+(4−4x1)α+(1−x1)α−21+α(1−x1)α−(1−32α+4α)xα1 +(2−2x2)α−(1−x2)α+(2α−1)xα2
21+α−1 ,
u2 = p
−1+2α+(2−2x1)α−(1−x1)α+(2α−1)xα1 +(1−x2)α+xα2
21+α−1 ,
u1 = p
1−21+α+4α−(4−4x1)α+3(2−2x1)α−(1−x1)α+(2α−1)2xα1 +(2−2x2)α−(1−x2)α+(2α−1)xα2
21+α−1 .
And taking the differences and the sum average, and simplifying
u3 − u2 = p (2− 2α) 2
α−(2−2x1)α+(1−x1)α+2αxα1−(1−x2)α−xα2
21+α−1
u2 − u1 = p (2− 2α) 2
α−1−(2−2x1)α+(2α−1)xα1 +(1−x2)α+xα2
21+α−1
T (σ′em3) =
2
3
(u3 + u2 + u1)
= 2
3
p (1 + (1− x1)α + xα1 + (1− x2)α + xα2 )
The incentive compatibility constraints for σ′em3 are
(1− δα) (1− x1)α + δα u2 ≥ 1− δα + δα u1
=⇒ δα
1−δα (u2 − u1) ≥ 1− (1− x1)
α
(1− δα) (1− x2)α + δα u3 ≥ 1− δ + δα u2
=⇒ δα
1−δα (u3 − u2) ≥ 1− (1− x2)
α
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Suppose the ICC inequalities bind. Substitute δα
1−δα =
1
p
2α−1
2−2α and the values for u3− u2
and u2 − u1 into the ICC and simplify
(2α−1)(2α−(2−2x1)α+(1−x1)α+2αxα1−(1−x2)α−xα2 )
21+α−1 = 1− (1− x1)α
(2α−1)(2α−(2−2x1)α+(1−x1)α+2αxα1−(1−x2)α−xα2 )
21+α−1 = 1− (1− x2)α
Solving yields x2 = (1− 2x1) /2.
Proof. (Lemma 3.14: πs (σemn) = 1/n, s = 1, 2, ..., n)
Let π∗ = (π∗1, π∗2, . . . , π∗n), where π∗1 + π∗2 + . . . + π∗n = 1, denote the fraction of time
spent in the corresponding states, and let m denote the transformation matrix of agents
between states if they follow σemn . In equilibrium, π∗ has to satisfy the following equations,
m′π∗ = π∗ and π∗1 + π
∗
2 + . . . + π
∗
n = 1,
writing out the m-matrix and π∗-vectors,

1− p p 0 ∙ ∙ ∙ 0
p 1− 2p p 0 ...
0 p 1− 2p p
.
.
. 0 p 1− 2p
.
.
. 0 p 0
.
.
.
.
.
. p
0 ∙ ∙ ∙ 0 p 1− p


π∗1
π∗2
.
.
.
π∗n

=

π∗1
π∗2
.
.
.
π∗n

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multiplying out the terms,
(1− p)π∗1 + pπ∗2
pπ∗1 + (1− 2p)π∗2 + pπ∗3
pπ∗2 + (1− 2p)π∗3 + pπ∗4
.
.
.
pπ∗n−2 + (1− 2p)π∗n−1 + pπ∗n
pπ∗n−1 + (1− p)π∗n
= π∗1
= π∗2
= π∗3
.
.
.
= π∗n−1
= π∗n
Solving such that π∗1 + π∗2 + . . . + π∗n = 1 =⇒ π∗ =
(
1
n
, 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
)
.
3.7.2 Mathematica code
The following Mathematica code offers a compact example of using simulated payoffs
(section 3.3.1.2) with α = 0.5, δ = 0.8 and p = 0.05, 0.1, ..., .45. The code constructs
payoff functions from the simulated data and solves the n∗-EM optimization problem for
those payoff functions and the associated triplet of parameter values (α, δ, p) . The solution
set is used to interpolate 3D-plot of the optimal favor sequences for the parameter space
that was covered (see figure 6).
(* Clear old variables and set new values *)
Clear[”Global‘*”];α=.5;δ=.8;II=100;J=10000;
tr1:=p;tr1a=”p”;tr2:=α;tr2a=”α”;tr3:=δ;tr3a=”δ”;Col=1;
v0=1/20;v1=9/20;vInc=1/20;
For[p=v0,p≤v1,p+=vInc,
PrintTemporary[ToString[tr1a]<>”=”<>ToString[N[tr1]]];
Clear[avU,xSeq,ICCa];n=1;u[0]=p;
While[n<3||avU[n-1]<avU[n],n++;
Clear[x];x[0]=1;x[n+1]=0;x[n]=0;
(* generate data *)
W=RandomChoice[{p,p,1-2p}→{1,-1,0},{J,II}];
Do[S[k]=Drop[FoldList[Max[1,Min[n,Plus[#1,#2]]]&,k,#]&/@W,None,-1],
{k,1,n}];
(* derive payoffs and define objective *)
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Do[u[k]=(1-δ)Mean[(Map[(1-x[#])ˆα&,S[k](W/.-1→0),{2}]+Map[x[n+1-#]ˆα&,
-S[k](W/.{1→0}),{2}]).Array[δˆ(#-1)&,II]],{k,1,n}];
objective=Sum[u[k],{k,1,n}]/n;
(* define incentive and feasibility constraints *)
ICCa[n]=Table[0≤(1-δ)((1-x[k])ˆα-1)+δ (u[k+1]-u[k]),{k,1,n-1}];
constraints=And@@Join[Table[0≤x[k]≤1,{k,1,n-1}],ICCa[n]];
(* choose starting points and solve for optimal favors *)
variables=Table[{x[t],Min[2*p,.55]*δ*tˆ(-α)},{t,1,n-1}];
{avU[n],xSeq[n]}=FindMaximum[{objective,constraints},variables]
];
nMax=Ordering[Array[avU,n-1,2],-1][[1]]+1;
Col=Max[Col,Count[xSeq[nMax][[All,2]], ]];
optimalX0[tr1]=Join[xSeq[nMax][[All,2]],Table[0,{i,30}]]
];
gg={Black,24,”Helvetica”};
data=Flatten[Table[{vv,nn,optimalX0[vv][[nn]]},{vv,v0,v1,vInc},{nn,1,Col}],1];
ListPlot3D[data,AxesLabel→{Text[Style[ToString[tr1a],gg]],Text[Style[”s”,gg]],
Text[Style[”x”,gg]]},ColorFunction→(ColorData[”LakeColors”][#3*5/3]&)]
Our second example applies the computed payoffs model (section 3.3.1.4) and the dif-
ferential evolution algorithm to find globally efficient equilibrium favors and associated
payoffs for α = 0.2, .24, ..., .8 while δ = .8 and p = .4. The results are available in figure
14 and table 10.
(* Clear old variables and set new values *)
Clear[”Global‘*”];δ=4/5;p=2/5;Col=1;
tr1:=α;tr1a=”α”;tr2:=δ;tr2a=”δ”;tr3:=p;tr3a=”p”;
(* Define set of system of payoff equations and the ICC *)
equ[n ]:=Join[Table[
u[s]==(p (δ u[s-1]+δ u[1+s]+(1-δ)(x[1+n-s]α+(1-x[s])α)))/(1-(1-2 p)δ),
{s,2,n-1}],{u[1]==(p (δ u[2]+(1-δ) (1-x[1])α))/(1-(1-p) δ),
u[n]==(p (δ u[n-1]+(1-δ) (1+x[1]α)))/(1-(1-p) δ)}];
ICCa[n ]:=Table[0≤δ (u[s+1]-u[s])-(1-δ)(1-(1-x[s])α),{s,1,n-1}];
v0=1/5;v1=4/5;vInc=1/25;
For[α=v0, α≤v1, α+=vInc,
Clear[avU,xSeq];n=1;PrintTemporary[ToString[tr1a]<>”=”<>ToString[N[tr1]]];
While[n<3||avU[n-1]<avU[n],n++;PrintTemporary[”n=”<>ToString[n]];
Clear[x];x[0]=1;x[n+1]=0;x[n]=0;
(* Solve system of payoff equations *)
uSolv=NSolve[equ[n],Table[u[s],{s,1,n}]][[1]];
objective=1/n*Sum[u[t],{t,1,n}]/.uSolv;
constraints=And@@Join[Table[0≤x[k]≤1,{k,1,n-1}],ICCa[n]]/.uSolv;
(* solve for optimal favors *)
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variables=Table[x[t],{t,1,n-1}];
{avU[n],xSeq[n]}=NMaximize[{objective,constraints},variables,
{Method→”DifferentialEvolution”,MaxIterations→500}]
];
nMax=Ordering[Array[avU,n-1,2],-1][[1]]+1;
Col=Max[Col,Count[xSeq[nMax][[All,2]], ]];pay[tr1]=avU[nMax];
optimalX[tr1]=xSeq[nMax][[All,2]];
optimalX0[tr1]=Join[xSeq[nMax][[All,2]],Table[0,{i,30}]]
];
gg={Black,24,”Helvetica”};
data=Flatten[Table[{vv,nn,optimalX0[vv][[nn]]},{vv,v0,v1,vInc},{nn,1,Col}],1];
Labeled[TableForm[Table[Prepend[optimalX[vv],pay[vv]],{vv,v0,v1,vInc}],
TableHeadings→{Table[ToString[tr1a]<>” = ”<>ToString[N[vv]],{vv,v0,v1,vInc}],
Prepend[Table[Subscript[x,t],{t,1,Col}],”u”]}],”n∗-EM equilibria: ”<>ToString[tr2a]
<>”=”<>ToString[N[tr2]]<>”,”<>ToString[tr3a]<>”=”<>ToString[N[tr3]],Top,
Frame→True,LabelStyle→Bold]
ListPlot3D[data,AxesLabel→{Text[Style[ToString[tr1a],gg]],Text[Style[”s”,gg]],
Text[Style[”x”,gg]]},ColorFunction→(ColorData[”LakeColors”][#3*5/3]&)]
Our final Mathematica code example was used to generate figures 24 and 25 depicting
4-state FD equilibria. The included code is longer than previous examples only because it
includes most of the auxiliary subroutines we use while testing the code. These subroutines
provide the user with an option to use either a global or local optimization algorithm, print
out intermediate results so that we can see which part of the code or loop is running and to
gather debugging information if necessary.
(* Clear old variables and set new values *)
Clear[”Global‘*”];start = SessionTime[];global=0;Col=1;
α=.1;δ=.5;sMax=4;tr1:=p;tr1a=”p”;tr2:=α;tr2a=”α”;tr3:=δ;tr3a=”δ”;
(* Define favor functions and ICC *)
equ[n ]:=Join[Table[
u[s]==(p(δ u[s-1]+δ u[s+1]+(1-δ) (x[1+n-s]α+(1-x[s])α)))/(1-(1-2 p) δ),{s,2,n-1}],
{u[1]==(p(δ u[2]+(1-δ)((1-x[1])α+( x[n])α)))/(1-(1-p)δ),
u[n]==(δ(p-(1-2 p) x[0])u[n-1]+p(1-δ)((x[1])α+(1-x[n])α))/(1-δ(1-p)+(1-2 p)δ x[0])}];
ICCa[n ]:=Append[Table[0≤δ (u[s+1]-u[s])-(1-δ)(1-(1-x[s])α),
{s,1,n-1}],0≤(1-δ)((1-x[n])α-1)+δ*x[0](u[n]-u[n-1])];
v0=7/100;v1=47/100;vInc=4/100;
(* sMax optional limit to number of states *)
For[p=v0,p≤v1,p+=vInc,
Clear[avU,xSeq];n=1;u[0]=p;
While[navU[n]),n++;
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Clear[x];x[n+1]=0;uSolv=NSolve[equ[n],Table[u[s],{s,1,n}]][[1]];
(* Define obj, cons and vars - need to choose starting pts carefully *)
objective=1/n*Sum[u[t],{t,1,n}]/.uSolv;
constraints=And@@Join[Table[0≤x[t]≤1,{t,0,n}],ICCa[n]]/.uSolv;
variables=Prepend[Table[{x[t],Min[2*p,.55]*(sMax+1-n)/sMax},
{t,1,n}],{x[0],0.01}];varOnly=Table[x[t],{t,0,n}];
If[global==0,{avU[n],xSeq[n]}=FindMaximum[{objective,constraints},
variables,MaxIterations→20000],
{avU[n],xSeq[n]}=NMaximize[{objective,constraints},varOnly,
{Method→”DifferentialEvolution”,MaxIterations→500}]];
current = SessionTime[]-start;PrintTemporary[”n = ”<>ToString[n]<>” and ”
<>ToString[tr1a]<>” = ”<>ToString[N[tr1]]<>” and time = ”
<>ToString[current]<>” Payoff = ”<>ToString[avU[n]]]
];
nMax=Ordering[Array[avU,n-1,2],-1][[1]]+1;
Col=Max[Col,Count[xSeq[nMax][[All,2]], ]-1];
pay[tr1]=avU[nMax];optimalX[tr1]=xSeq[nMax][[All,2]];
optimalX0[tr1]=Join[xSeq[nMax][[All,2]],Table[0,{i,sMax}]]
];
gg={Black,24,”Helvetica”};
data=Flatten[Table[{vv,nn-1,optimalX0[vv][[nn]]},{vv,v0,v1,vInc},{nn,2,Col+1}],1];
Labeled[TableForm[Table[Prepend[optimalX[vv],pay[vv]],{vv,v0,v1,vInc}],
TableHeadings→{Table[ToString[tr1a]<>” = ”<>ToString[N[vv]],
{vv,v0,v1,vInc}],Prepend[Prepend[Table[Subscript[x,t],
{t,1,Col}],”q”],”u”]}],ToString[sMax]<>”-state FD equilibria: ”
<>ToString[tr2a]<>” = ”<>ToString[tr2]<>”, ”<>ToString[tr3a]<>” = ”
<>ToString[N[tr3]],Top,Frame→True,LabelStyle→Bold]
ListPlot3D[data,AxesLabel→{Text[Style[ToString[tr1a],gg]],Text[Style[”s”,gg]],
Text[Style[”x”,gg]]},ColorFunction→(ColorData[”LakeColors”][#3*5/3]&)]
3.7.3 Numerical algorithms for constrained global optimization
Source: Wolfram Research [21]:
Nelder-Mead
The Nelder-Mead method is a direct search method. For a function of n variables,
the algorithm maintains a set of n+1 points forming the vertices of a polytope in n-
dimensional space. This method is often termed the ”simplex” method, which should
not be confused with the well-known simplex method for linear programming.
At each iteration, n+1 points x1, x2, ..., xn+1 form a polytope. The points are
ordered so that f(x1) ≤ f(x2) ≤ ... ≤ f(xn+1). A new point is then generated to
replace the worst point xn+1.
Let c be the centroid of the polytope consisting of the best n points, c =
∑n
i=1 xi.
A trial point xt is generated by reflecting the worst point through the centroid, xt =
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c + α(c− xn+1), where α > 0 is a parameter.
If the new point xt is neither a new worst point nor a new best point, f(x1) ≤
f(xt) ≤ f(xn), xt replaces xn+1.
If the new point xt is better than the best point, f(xt) < f(x1), the reflection is
very successful and can be carried out further to xe = c + β(xt − r), where β > 1 is
a parameter to expand the polytope. If the expansion is successful, f(xe) < f(xt), xe
replaces xn+1; otherwise the expansion failed, and xt replaces xn+1.
If the new point xt is worse than the second worst point, f(xt) ≥ f(xn), the
polytope is assumed to be too large and needs to be contracted. A new trial point is
defined as
xc =
{
c + γ (xn+1 − c), if f (xt) ≥ f (xt+1),
c + γ (xt − c), if f (xt) < f (xt+1),
where 0 < γ < 1 is a parameter. If f(xc) < min (f(xn+1), f(xt)), the contraction is
successful, and xc replaces xn+1. Otherwise a further contraction is carried out.
The process is assumed to have converged if the difference between the best func-
tion values in the new and old polytope, as well as the distance between the new best
point and the old best point, are less than the tolerances provided by AccuracyGoal
and PrecisionGoal.
Strictly speaking, Nelder-Mead is not a true global optimization algorithm; how-
ever, in practice it tends to work reasonably well for problems that do not have many
local minima.
Differential Evolution
Differential evolution is a simple stochastic function minimizer.
The algorithm maintains a population of m points, {x1, x2, ..., xj , ..., xm}, where
typically m À n, with n being the number of variables.
During each iteration of the algorithm, a new population of m points is generated.
The jth new point is generated by picking three random points, xu, xv and xw, from
the old population, and forming xs = xw +s(xu−xv), where s is a real scaling factor.
Then a new point xnew is constructed from xj and xs by taking the ith coordinate
from xs with probability ρ and otherwise taking the coordinate from xj . If f(xnew) <
f(xj), then xnew replaces xj in the population. The probability ρ is controlled by the
"CrossProbability" option.
The process is assumed to have converged if the difference between the best func-
tion values in the new and old populations, as well as the distance between the new best
point and the old best point, are less than the tolerances provided by AccuracyGoal
and PrecisionGoal.
The differential evolution method is computationally expensive, but is relatively
robust and tends to work well for problems that have more local minima.
Simulated Annealing
Simulated annealing is a simple stochastic function minimizer. It is motivated from
the physical process of annealing, where a metal object is heated to a high temperature
and allowed to cool slowly. The process allows the atomic structure of the metal to
settle to a lower energy state, thus becoming a tougher metal. Using optimization
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terminology, annealing allows the structure to escape from a local minimum, and to
explore and settle on a better, hopefully global, minimum.
At each iteration, a new point, xnew, is generated in the neighborhood of the cur-
rent point, x. The radius of the neighborhood decreases with each iteration. The best
point found so far, xbest, is also tracked.
If f(xnew) ≤ f(xbest), xnew replaces xbest and x. Otherwise, xnew replaces xwith
a probability eb(i,Δf,f0). Here b is the function defined by BoltzmannExponent, i
is the current iteration, Δf is the change in the objective function value, and f0 is the
value of the objective function from the previous iteration. The default function for b
is −Δf log(i+1)10 .
Like the RandomSearchmethod, SimulatedAnnealing uses multiple start-
ing points, and finds an optimum starting from each of them.
The default number of starting points, given by the option SearchPoints, is
min(2d, 50), where d is the number of variables.
For each starting point, this is repeated until the maximum number of iterations
is reached, the method converges to a point, or the method stays at the same point
consecutively for the number of iterations given by LevelIterations.
Random Search
The random search algorithm works by generating a population of random start-
ing points and uses a local optimization method from each of the starting points to
converge to a local minimum. The best local minimum is chosen to be the solution.
The possible local search methods are Automatic and “InteriorPoint”. The
default method is Automatic, which uses FindMinimum with unconstrained methods
applied to a system with penalty terms added for the constraints. When Method is set
to “InteriorPoint”, a nonlinear interior-point method is used.
The default number of starting points, given by the option SearchPoints, is
min (10d, 100), where d is the number of variables.
Convergence for RandomSearch is determined by convergence of the local method
for each starting point.
RandomSearch is fast, but does not scale very well with the dimension of the
search space. It also suffers from many of the same limitations as FindMinimum. It is
not well suited for discrete problems and others where derivatives or secants give little
useful information about the problem.
3.7.4 Figures
Figure 26 refers to the problem analyzed in lemma 3.13. We computed the optimal 3-
state EM strategies for α ∈ { 1
20
, 2
20
, ..., 19
20
}
, p ∈ { 1
20
, 2
20
, ..., 9
20
}
and the corresponding δα
using Mathematica. The corresponding payoff differences, u
(
σ∗em3
) − u (σ∗em2), shown
in table 5 in the appendix. Figure 26 shows u
(
σ∗em3
)
and u
(
σ∗em2
)
, where u
(
σ∗em3
)
was
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interpolated from the set of σ∗em3 payoffs computed with Mathematica. The point to note
is that u
(
σ∗em3
)
> u
(
σ∗em2
)
in numerical testing that spanned the whole feasible region at
5% and 10% increments of α and p, respectively.
Figure 26: u
(
σ∗em3
)
and u
(
σ∗em2
)
with δ = δα
Figure 27 represents solutions to same problem as figure 16 except with the additional
constraint of xs ≤ xs−1, ∀s = 2, 3, ..., n.
Figure 27: Constrained n∗-EM: x∗1 (α) , ..., x∗n∗ (α) when x∗s ≤ x∗s−1
Figures 28 and 29 illustrate n∗-HSSGL equilibrium behavior as δ changes.
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Figure 28: n
∗
-HSSGL favors as δ varies: View 1
Points: α = 0.3, p = 0.3, δ = 0.65, 0.67, ..., 0.95
Figure 29: n
∗
-HSSGL favors as δ varies: View 2
Points: α = 0.3, p = 0.3, δ = 0.65, 0.67, ..., 0.95
Figures 30 and 31 illustrate n∗-HSSGL equilibrium behavior as α changes.
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Figure 30: n
∗
-HSSGL favors as α varies: View 1
Points: δ = 0.9, p = 0.3, α = 0.1, 0.12, ..., 0.74
Figure 31: n
∗
-HSSGL favors as α varies: View 2
Points: δ = 0.9, p = 0.3, α = 0.1, 0.12, ..., 0.74
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3.7.5 Tables
p u x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
.30 .404 .599 .500 .427 .383 .334 .288 .253
.31 .418 .615 .516 .442 .395 .347 .302 .266
.32 .432 .631 .532 .457 .406 .360 .316 .279
.33 .446 .645 .548 .471 .418 .373 .329 .292
.34 .460 .647 .555 .479 .426 .381 .338 .303
.35 .474 .623 .532 .462 .411 .376 .329 .290 .258
.36 .488 .637 .547 .475 .422 .387 .341 .303 .270
.37 .502 .650 .560 .488 .433 .397 .353 .315 .282
.38 .516 .658 .571 .499 .442 .406 .363 .325 .293
.39 .530 .654 .574 .503 .447 .411 .368 .330 .302
.40 .544 .641 .557 .489 .437 .404 .364 .324 .290 .262
.41 .558 .653 .570 .502 .448 .413 .374 .335 .301 .273
.42 .572 .663 .582 .513 .459 .421 .383 .345 .312 .283
.43 .586 .664 .587 .519 .465 .426 .390 .352 .319 .292
.44 .599 .659 .588 .522 .468 .430 .393 .356 .323 .300
.45 .613 .656 .579 .514 .463 .423 .396 .356 .321 .291 .265
.46 .627 .666 .590 .525 .473 .432 .404 .365 .331 .301 .275
.47 .641 .673 .599 .534 .481 .439 .411 .373 .339 .310 .284
.48 .655 .668 .600 .537 .484 .442 .414 .377 .344 .314 .291
.49 .669 .663 .600 .538 .487 .445 .417 .380 .347 .318 .299
Table 3: n∗-EM and favors above socially efficient size: x∗s(p) > 1/2, α = 0.5, δ = 0.9
p u x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
.30 .403 .500 .500 .443 .393 .343 .282 .192
.31 .417 .500 .500 .448 .398 .349 .285 .205
.32 .431 .500 .500 .453 .403 .354 .289 .217
.33 .445 .500 .500 .458 .407 .360 .292 .229
.34 .459 .500 .500 .465 .412 .374 .326 .257 .184
.35 .473 .500 .500 .470 .416 .378 .332 .261 .195
.36 .487 .500 .500 .474 .421 .383 .337 .264 .207
.37 .501 .500 .500 .478 .425 .387 .342 .268 .218
.38 .515 .500 .500 .483 .430 .392 .348 .270 .228
.39 .528 .500 .500 .493 .440 .400 .357 .275 .230
.40 .542 .500 .500 .490 .439 .404 .362 .321 .244 .196
.41 .556 .500 .500 .494 .443 .407 .366 .327 .248 .206
.42 .570 .500 .500 .496 .446 .411 .370 .330 .251 .217
.43 .584 .500 .500 .500 .455 .418 .379 .334 .255 .221
.44 .598 .500 .500 .500 .458 .421 .382 .336 .263 .225
.45 .612 .500 .500 .499 .461 .424 .385 .338 .271 .230
.46 .626 .500 .500 .500 .462 .424 .394 .354 .310 .236 .209
.47 .640 .500 .500 .500 .470 .431 .400 .361 .311 .240 .214
.48 .654 .500 .500 .500 .473 .434 .403 .365 .313 .248 .218
.49 .668 .500 .500 .500 .475 .436 .406 .368 .315 .256 .222
Table 4: n∗-EM with social efficiency constraint on favor size: x∗s(p) ≤ 1/2, α = .5, δ = .9
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α p = .05 p = .1 p = .15 p = .2 p = .25 p = .3 p = .35 p = .4 p = .45
.05 .007 .014 .020 .027 .034 .041 .048 .055 .061
.10 .006 .012 .018 .024 .030 .036 .042 .048 .054
.15 .005 .011 .016 .022 .027 .032 .038 .043 .048
.20 .005 .010 .015 .019 .024 .029 .034 .039 .044
.25 .004 .009 .013 .017 .022 .026 .031 .035 .039
.30 .004 .008 .012 .016 .020 .024 .027 .031 .035
.35 .004 .007 .011 .014 .018 .021 .025 .028 .032
.40 .003 .006 .009 .012 .016 .019 .022 .025 .028
.45 .003 .006 .008 .011 .014 .017 .019 .022 .025
.50 .002 .005 .007 .010 .012 .014 .017 .019 .022
.55 .002 .004 .006 .008 .010 .012 .015 .017 .019
.60 .002 .004 .005 .007 .009 .011 .012 .014 .016
.65 .001 .003 .004 .006 .007 .009 .010 .012 .013
.70 .001 .002 .004 .005 .006 .007 .008 .010 .011
.75 .001 .002 .003 .004 .005 .006 .007 .008 .009
.80 .001 .001 .002 .003 .004 .004 .005 .006 .006
.85 .001 .001 .002 .002 .003 .003 .004 .004 .005
.90 .000 .001 .001 .001 .002 .002 .002 .003 .003
.95 .000 .000 .000 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001
Table 5: 3-EM dominates 2-EM: u(σ∗em3)− u(σ∗em2) when δ = δα
p u x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7
.03 .034 .083
.07 .084 .175 .104
.11 .137 .319 .207
.15 .190 .445 .309
.19 .245 .446 .318 .243
.23 .300 .446 .332 .269 .204
.27 .356 .524 .395 .326 .263
.31 .410 .508 .395 .352 .269 .219
.35 .466 .582 .439 .386 .309 .283
.39 .522 .559 .452 .383 .337 .280 .238
.43 .577 .608 .500 .422 .374 .321 .278
.47 .633 .592 .493 .421 .379 .328 .282 .247
Table 6: n∗-EM data for figure 8: u and x∗1(p), ..., x∗n∗(p), α = 0.5, δ = 0.85
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p ICC1 ICC2 ICC3 ICC4 ICC5 ICC6 ICC7
.03 0
.07 0 0
.11 0 0
.15 0 0
.19 0 0 .001
.23 0 0 0 .003
.27 0 0 0 .002
.31 0 0 0 .001 .003
.35 0 0 0 .001 .003
.39 0 0 0 0 .003 .004
.43 0 0 0 0 .003 .003
.47 0 0 0 0 .001 .004 .004
Table 7: n∗-EM: ICC for figure 8, α = 0.5, δ = 0.85
δ u x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9
.37 .428 .055
.41 .433 .076
.45 .438 .103
.49 .444 .136
.53 .449 .176
.57 .453 .224
.61 .458 .165 .110
.65 .465 .216 .149
.69 .472 .280 .199
.73 .478 .359 .265
.77 .484 .336 .266 .200
.81 .491 .450 .354 .293
.85 .498 .492 .402 .347 .296
.89 .505 .515 .443 .392 .356 .311 .275
.93 .512 .595 .541 .494 .454 .426 .397 .366 .338 .313
Table 8: n∗-EM data for figure 12: u and x∗1(δ), ..., x∗n∗(δ), α = 0.6, p = 0.4
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δ ICC1 ICC2 ICC3 ICC4 ICC5 ICC6 ICC7 ICC8 ICC9
.37 0
.41 0
.45 0
.49 0
.53 0
.57 0
.61 0 0
.65 0 0
.69 0 0
.73 0 0
.77 0 0 .002
.81 0 0 .001
.85 0 0 0 .002
.89 0 0 0 0 .001 .002
.93 0 0 0 0 0 0 .001 .002 .001
Table 9: n∗-EM: ICC for figure 12. α = 0.6, p = 0.4
α u x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9
.20 .658 .689 .555 .512 .406 .343 .290 .238 .204 .231
.24 .639 .686 .590 .461 .390 .356 .275 .213 .180 .225
.28 .620 .648 .573 .415 .365 .315 .234 .217 .218
.32 .602 .653 .535 .419 .346 .291 .238 .229
.36 .584 .649 .513 .407 .343 .277 .255
.40 .568 .639 .481 .384 .328 .261 .219
.44 .551 .604 .458 .371 .305 .251
.48 .535 .509 .391 .332 .261 .208
.52 .520 .501 .384 .318 .257
.56 .504 .506 .388 .323
.60 .490 .420 .327 .267
.64 .474 .331 .271 .210
.68 .462 .364 .290
.72 .448 .275 .219
.76 .434 .341
.80 .424 .237
Table 10: n∗-EM data for figure 14: u and x∗1(α), ..., x∗n∗(α), δ = 0.8, p = 0.4
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α ICC1 ICC2 ICC3 ICC4 ICC5 ICC6 ICC7 ICC8 ICC9
.20 .035 .009 0 0 0 .001 .002 0 0
.24 .024 .001 0 0 0 .001 .003 .003 0
.28 .018 0 0 0 0 .002 .004 .001
.32 .012 0 0 0 .002 .004 .002
.36 .008 0 0 0 .003 .002
.40 0 0 0 0 .004 .005
.44 0 0 0 .002 .004
.48 0 0 0 .002 .005
.52 0 0 0 .003
.56 0 0 0
.60 0 0 0
.64 0 0 0
.68 0 0
.72 0 0
.76 0
.80 0
Table 11: n∗-EM: ICC for figure 14, δ = 0.8, p = 0.4
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α
u
x
1
x
2
x
3
x
4
x
5
x
6
x
7
x
8
x
9
x
1
0
x
1
1
x
1
2
x
1
3
x
1
4
x
1
5
x
1
6
x
1
7
x
1
8
x
1
9
x
2
0
x
2
1
.0
8
.7
32
.7
15
.6
37
.5
23
.4
58
.4
20
.3
92
.3
82
.3
80
.3
63
.3
39
.3
08
.2
71
.2
31
.1
91
.1
51
.1
20
.0
98
.0
80
.1
62
.2
25
.2
26
.0
9
.7
26
.7
16
.6
38
.5
32
.4
57
.4
24
.4
00
.3
92
.3
82
.3
58
.3
26
.2
84
.2
38
.1
91
.1
51
.1
21
.0
97
.1
77
.2
27
.2
26
. 1
0
.7
20
.7
14
.6
35
.5
19
.4
68
.4
26
.4
00
.3
91
.3
79
.3
51
.3
12
.2
65
.2
13
.1
69
.1
36
.1
11
.1
63
.2
27
.2
27
.1
1
.7
14
.7
12
.6
32
.5
14
.4
73
.4
27
.4
01
.3
92
.3
76
.3
42
.2
95
.2
40
.1
89
.1
53
.1
25
.1
60
.2
28
.2
29
.1
2
.7
08
.7
10
.6
30
.5
13
.4
76
.4
29
.4
02
.3
92
.3
71
.3
28
.2
70
.2
14
.1
72
.1
41
.1
66
.2
30
.2
30
. 1
3
.7
02
.7
08
.6
29
.5
17
.4
77
.4
30
.4
04
.3
92
.3
61
.3
05
.2
43
.1
95
.1
60
.1
79
.2
34
.2
32
.1
4
.6
97
.7
10
.6
30
.5
21
.4
74
.4
27
.4
00
.3
89
.3
60
.3
03
.2
40
.1
94
.1
58
.1
59
.2
30
.2
30
.1
5
.6
91
.7
07
.6
27
.5
22
.4
76
.4
29
.4
01
.3
87
.3
42
.2
74
.2
20
.1
80
.1
78
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p u x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14
.01 .014 .135 .043
.02 .029 .225 .095 .028
.03 .044 .299 .136 .078 .023
.04 .060 .403 .177 .107 .042
.05 .076 .498 .218 .137 .068
.06 .093 .580 .258 .166 .099
.07 .109 .602 .255 .213 .101 .078
.08 .125 .612 .289 .233 .119 .102
.09 .142 .615 .321 .251 .138 .129
.10 .158 .630 .336 .265 .195 .102 .101
.11 .175 .631 .363 .282 .210 .117 .125
.12 .191 .631 .390 .298 .224 .132 .149
.13 .208 .629 .415 .314 .238 .147 .174
.14 .225 .625 .439 .329 .252 .162 .199
.15 .241 .634 .433 .320 .293 .185 .124 .173
.16 .258 .631 .456 .337 .303 .197 .136 .195
.17 .275 .648 .490 .361 .316 .213 .152 .210
.18 .292 .643 .479 .358 .321 .258 .168 .120 .186
.19 .309 .645 .502 .375 .331 .269 .180 .132 .205
.20 .326 .680 .548 .407 .348 .285 .197 .149 .208
.21 .342 .683 .556 .420 .357 .294 .208 .166 .212
.22 .359 .680 .555 .412 .351 .329 .233 .167 .132 .208
.23 .376 .686 .567 .428 .362 .336 .243 .177 .147 .211
.24 .393 .686 .568 .438 .370 .342 .251 .186 .161 .215
.25 .410 .685 .568 .448 .378 .347 .259 .194 .176 .220
.26 .427 .683 .567 .458 .386 .353 .266 .202 .191 .225
.27 .444 .691 .583 .461 .391 .360 .306 .226 .172 .158 .215
.28 .461 .690 .582 .470 .398 .365 .312 .233 .179 .172 .220
.29 .478 .689 .581 .479 .406 .370 .318 .240 .187 .186 .224
.30 .495 .687 .580 .487 .413 .375 .323 .247 .194 .200 .228
.31 .512 .686 .577 .495 .420 .380 .328 .254 .202 .214 .233
.32 .529 .687 .582 .503 .428 .386 .334 .261 .209 .231 .236
.33 .546 .690 .588 .501 .423 .383 .363 .284 .223 .181 .197 .229
.34 .563 .689 .586 .508 .430 .388 .367 .290 .229 .188 .210 .233
.35 .580 .689 .588 .516 .438 .394 .371 .296 .236 .194 .225 .236
.36 .597 .700 .615 .526 .453 .406 .378 .306 .246 .201 .244 .236
.37 .614 .694 .596 .524 .446 .402 .379 .334 .265 .212 .177 .206 .231
.38 .631 .693 .596 .531 .453 .407 .383 .339 .270 .219 .183 .219 .235
.39 .648 .704 .623 .539 .466 .420 .391 .347 .280 .227 .188 .239 .235
.40 .665 .703 .624 .540 .471 .424 .395 .350 .285 .232 .198 .243 .238
.41 .682 .701 .624 .540 .476 .428 .398 .354 .289 .238 .209 .247 .241
.42 .699 .707 .630 .549 .475 .427 .398 .380 .312 .255 .210 .178 .237 .234
.43 .716 .705 .630 .550 .480 .432 .401 .383 .316 .260 .215 .187 .240 .237
.44 .733 .704 .630 .550 .485 .436 .405 .385 .320 .264 .220 .197 .244 .240
.45 .750 .703 .630 .550 .489 .440 .408 .388 .324 .269 .225 .207 .247 .242
.46 .767 .701 .630 .549 .494 .444 .411 .390 .327 .273 .230 .216 .251 .245
.47 .785 .699 .630 .549 .498 .448 .414 .393 .331 .278 .235 .226 .254 .248
.48 .802 .706 .637 .561 .500 .450 .418 .398 .359 .299 .250 .212 .197 .243 .240
.49 .819 .705 .637 .560 .504 .454 .421 .400 .362 .303 .255 .217 .206 .246 .243
Table 14: n∗-EM data for figure 17: u and x∗1(p), ..., x∗n∗(p) when α<α. α = 0.2, δ = 0.85
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